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Abstract 
There are narratives based on qualitative and quantitative data that describe the West African Power 
Sector as very inefficient. In the context of electricity distribution, companies are usually tagged inefficient 
with various stakeholders justifying that with various analyses, statistics and narratives. Empirical studies 
establishing such assertions are rather absent or lack a holistic measuring approach. In this work, the 
acknowledgement of the importance of bench-marking in electricity market regulation is made with the 
need to further estimate a baseline cost efficiency of the electricity distribution sector of West Africa 
demonstrated. The aim of this research is to do efficiency studies on the electricity distribution sector of 
West Africa to comprehend the current state of electricity distribution as well as to understand the 
underlying causes of inefficiency.  Three themes are covered in this thesis. The first theme investigates the 
theoretical concepts of measuring efficiency and contributes to a longstanding debate regarding the 
preferred choice of statistical distribution underlying the inefficiency term in the stochastic frontier 
approach. In this regard, the Burr Type X stochastic frontier model is constructed and tested against other 
existing models including Normal-Half Normal, Normal- Exponential and Normal-Rayleigh stochastic 
models. The investigation presents the newly constructed Burr X stochastic frontier model as one that 
competes with the other models when using cross-sectional data.  
In the second theme, cost efficiencies are estimated from an unbalanced panel of 14 electricity distribution 
companies over the period of 2007-2014 using several panel data models including the pooled model, Pitt 
& Lee model, true random effects model and true fixed effects model. The results suggest that the EDCs in 
the West African region operate at an average efficiency level of 52% (pooled normal-Half normal estimate) 
which appears to validate the perception of many stakeholders. The Nigerian EDCs have a mean inefficiency 
level of 51% which is the worst among the sub groups considered. The East African comparator (KPEDC in 
Kenya) recorded an efficiency level of 63% and was outperformed by some West African EDCs. The results 
demanded an investigation into the underlying reasons for such high inefficiencies in the West African sub-
region considering that the sector has experienced significant reform and investment efforts. 
In the third theme, using the Electricity Company of Ghana as a case, a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) 
framework which has the capability of discovering reform opposition and the associated political and 
economic incentives that unearths informal rules in the industry was employed. Our findings suggest a 
plethora of possibilities that are encompassed in political and cultural characteristics of consumers, 
management and political stakeholders who assume overwhelming powers to further influence the 
governance of the power industry. Perceived inefficiency drivers seem to emanate from financial 
mismanagement, cultural and attitudinal forces, unsatisfactory regulation, mismanagement of third party 
contractors, procurements lapses and others. Privatisation seems to be the way forward according to the 
views of many stakeholders but there are issues surrounding the fear of high cost of electricity as well as 
downsizing of the utility that could bring hardship to the staff who will be included in such a programme. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
The main socio-economic goal of all the development frameworks designed for countries has 
been to promote competitive, fast growing, productive economies, which generate sufficient 
employment for their citizens. Fundamental to the fulfilment of this objective is the provision 
of reliable and affordable energy to all productive sectors of these economies to stimulate 
and sustain a long-term steady economic growth as well as clean reliable and affordable 
energy to citizens. The West African region is not an exception to this concept of developing 
and executing a plan of providing adequate, reliable and affordable energy for economic 
development and the general welfare of its citizens. It is therefore not unexpected for the 
region to experience many reforms and modifications of its power sector in the last three 
decades.  
West Africa has abundant and cheaper energy sources including natural gas, hydro, solar, tidal 
wind and biomass that can be converted into electricity but regrettably the statistics of access 
to electricity, per capita electricity consumption and the cost of electricity present a sharp 
contrast on the grounds. With a demand and supply gap of 46% with only a third of its 
consumers connected to the grid amidst relatively high cost of electricity of $0.17 per KWh 
and poor quality of supply, the need for increased efficiency rather becomes a necessity. 
However, the narratives suggest that the power sector and in particular the distribution 
sector has remained very inefficient for many decades and have experienced different 
interventions or reforms that have proven to be unsuccessful. It is therefore important for 
policymakers in the sub-region to re-look at this problem to improve supply quantity and 
reliability for the benefits of the population and industrial sector. 
Power sector reforms began internationally in the 1980s where there was a drive to introduce 
competition and private sector involvement into the traditional sector which was dominated 
by state ownership. Advocates of energy sector reforms believed that once competition was 
introduced, normally through increase in private sector participation, then there was the 
likelihood for increased efficiency and reduced end-user tariffs. According to Williamson 
(1994), this proposition was adopted in the popular Washington Consensus making power 
sector reforms part of a broader set of policy changes recommended and implemented 
around the world.   
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Figure 1.1: Regulatory Operational Model Choices and Structure 
 
Source: Choynowski (2004) 
 
Various models were explored in the phase of reforms as seen in the figure above. Most 
developed countries have traversed the various phases from a Vertically Integrated Monopoly 
to a Full Customer Choice where the retail end of the chain is deregulated. 
In sub-Saharan Africa and many other developing economies, power sector reforms have 
been on-going since the 1990s, although at various levels of implementation across the 
continent. Countries in West Africa have generally explored the transition from state-owned 
utilities to partially privately-owned utilities and are currently at the phase of private 
partnership agreements. There have been regulatory reforms starting with making and 
amending electricity sector laws as well as creating relevant institutions to oversee the 
expected regulatory tasks.  Undeniably, challenges facing the power sector vary across the 
continent with significant differences between the two distinct regions of sub-Saharan Africa 
and North Africa, primarily due to disparities in the levels of power sector development. Even 
within the Sub-Saharan region, energy resource availability and reform outcomes tend to 
cause some significant differences of the power sectors of various countries.  
West Africa continues to have a high electricity supply -demand gap, a situation that has seen 
many years of expensive and unreliable power supply which seriously discourage investments 
in the private and industrial sectors.(Chambers, Foresti and Harris, 2012)   Most authors 
including Gnansounou et al..(2007), Edjekumhene, Amadu and Brew-Hammond (2001) and 
Eberhard et al.(2011) affirm the agenda for power sector reforms as being multidimensional, 
with the main drivers being the need to improve financial and technical performance of 
utilities, increase access to electricity and reduce the cost of power to consumers.  
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A review on electricity sector reforms in West Africa provides key lessons which emanate from 
political and economic perspectives. Widely held view are as follows:  
 Increasing access to electricity has multiple benefits, including health and well-being 
of citizens (especially women) in their domestic lives and productivity and economic 
opportunities for small and large enterprises.  
 An approach to augment access to electricity could be effected through grid extension 
conditioned on socio-economic credit or exploring the great opportunity that exists in 
the use of mini grids with renewable energy options. But any approach to 
electrification of poorer communities (notably in rural areas) is extremely costly and 
thus is difficult to finance without specific public funding. 
 Rural electrification is of immense political interest. This interest could have both 
positive and negative impacts on long term, sustainable and fair investment decisions. 
In one view, political support is essential in order to develop the necessary policy, legal 
and institutional frameworks for electrification. On the other hand, politics can 
interfere and cause a detour to uneconomical and unrealistic electrification projects 
that are not sustainable in the long-term. 
 Despite widespread interest in renewable sources of electricity, and their presence in 
long term plans, they are not typically seen as the main route for expansion of power 
generation. Some countries have been able to produce the renewable energy act in 
which renewable energy producers are fairly compensated through feed in tariffs (FIT) 
but this is at the very infantile stage with renewable energy accounting for less than 1 
percent of the energy mix in the sub-region. Thermal power generation still dominates 
governmental thinking. 
 Whilst there is evidently high latent demand for good quality electricity, lack of access 
and inability to pay high tariffs constrains the investment in infrastructure.  The lack 
of investments in the Electricity Supply Industry has led to high transmission and 
distribution losses, which feeds back into a downwards spiral of lower reliability, 
higher prices and dampening of demand. Issues of non-metering and poor fee 
collection contribute further to high commercial losses. However, the issue of 
efficiency though highlighted in the countries’ reform policies is not supported by 
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relevant plans and programmes. There are opportunities to reduce inefficiencies at 
both the supply and demand levels through programmes to reduce losses and reduce 
the cost of production, which eventually translates into affordable energy. 
Regardless of the level of progress of reforms in the West African Sub-region, it has become 
quite clear as suggested by Edjekumhene, Amadu and Brew-Hammond (2001) and other 
authors that the initial pursuit of reforms was not necessarily voluntary but indirectly 
mandatory. To support the deduction, it is acknowledged that in 1992, developmental and 
financial support to most of the member countries in the ECOWAS region from multilateral 
funding agencies practically paved the way for the latter to impose a post-disbursement 
caveat of mandatory electricity sector reforms. It is quite understandable that the efforts put 
into the reforms in this phase were not concerted, since they was not the original priority of 
the countries that were affected. The other reason for an ineffective reform of the early phase 
was that the intensity of power crisis preceding the early part of reforms was relatively minor 
due to the structure of the economies (less energy intensive) against the available energy 
resources at the time. Primarily, the consumption levels were manageable for a less intensive 
and less populated economy. 
A second phase of reforms, in which most of the West African countries find themselves now, 
has been necessitated by the agitation of stakeholders, particularly civil society, to realise and 
act on their rights to energy access and security.  In certain jurisdictions, some political and 
non-political factions have staged protests to show their displeasure towards the deplorable 
state of the electricity sector. The pursuit of the UN Sustainable Development Goals has also 
added to this activism or impetus and governments are been monitored by interested Civil 
Society Organisations.  
The issues yielding to the perceived unsatisfactory performance of the power sector are seen 
to be interconnected. As such, any professed solutions will suffer the constraint of the 
interplay of multiple factors which do not act in isolation. To support this presupposition, a 
web of causalities could be perceived where underinvestment in the sector contributes to 
inadequate generation, an inefficient transmission and distribution segment of the market 
without excluding the effects huge commercial losses have on the financial strengths of West 
African utilities. For that reason, Antmann (2009) and Eberhard et al. (2011) have highlighted 
that underinvestment in the West African power sector comes from the following: 
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 Smaller markets that are unable to offer economies of scale to investors 
 Absence of cost-reflective prices 
 Failure of counterparties to honour contracts especially governments not paying 
subsidised portions of prices on time. 
 Poor regulation of the electricity market 
In this research, the attention is drawn to the above factors especially issues regarding the 
effective regulation of the electricity supply industry as well as the related inefficiency of the 
of electricity distribution sector. It is believed that in an attempt to promote accessibility and 
affordability of electricity to a wider West African community the above concerns are crucial 
and demand close attention. It is important therefore to understand industry practices and 
the roots of the inefficiency problem, which continue to reduce investment returns or 
benefits in the power sector, and thus hold development back.  In the section following, an 
outline of the aim, questions and objectives that this research seeks to answer are discussed.   
1.1 Research Aim, Questions, Objectives and Themes 
This research is intended to afford an understanding of the efficiency concept, its 
measurement and application in electricity distribution as well as to comprehend the 
underlying causes of inefficiency in the West African context to support decision making for 
regulators, management of EDCs and policy makers.  
The specific research questions drawn from the above aim are listed below as follows: 
 How efficient are the electricity distribution companies of the ECOWAS Block? 
 What are the relative efficiencies of electricity distribution companies in the West 
African Sub-region? 
 What are the driving forces culminating into inefficiencies in the distribution sector? 
 What regulatory and managerial processes and procedures could be recommended to 
improve efficiency of electricity distribution companies in the sub-region? 
In an attempt to answer the above questions, the research seeks to achieve the following 
objectives: 
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 To theoretically and empirically investigate and identify the best approach for 
measuring efficiency. 
 To empirically determine the relative efficiencies of electricity distribution companies 
in the ECOWAS Block 
 To investigate the drivers or causes of inefficiency of distribution companies. 
 To recommend policy actions which are internal and external to the operations of the 
Electricity Distribution Companies of West Africa. 
The research is divided into three themes that are designed to achieve the above objectives. 
The first theme develops a theoretical framework for measuring efficiency while the second 
theme applies this framework to measure the level of efficiency of the electricity distribution 
sector of West Africa. The third theme investigates the possible causes and interventions from 
a political economy perspective. An overview of the different methods applied in the research 
themes are briefly explained in the section below. Further detail of the methods used in each 
part of the research are contained within the subsequent core analytical chapters. 
1.2 Research Methodology  
For theme 1, developing an approach for measuring efficiency that is appropriate for the West 
African context, a review was conducted of stochastic frontier techniques, with critical debate 
about the preferred statistical distribution to be assumed for the inefficiency term, as well as 
whether different distribution types effect changes on the ranking of firms or units analysed. 
In contributing to the above debate, this study incorporates a Burr Type-X distribution (called 
Burr X here after) that could augment the stochastic frontier techniques traditionally used for 
measuring efficiency. Efficiency estimates and parameter estimates from a proposed Normal 
–Burr x stochastic frontier model as well as those from the existing stochastic frontier models 
(Normal-Exponential and Normal-Rayleigh) are tested to investigate whether the choice of 
model affects the efficiency ranking of the firms.  
For the second theme, various stochastic cost frontier models are employed to measure cost 
efficiencies of 14 EDCs in West Africa. Different stochastic frontier panel models run over 
different distributional assumption are applied to an unbalanced panel of 15 EDCs in Ghana, 
Nigeria, Togo and La Cote D’Ivoire and a comparator EDC from East Africa. 
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Finally, for the third theme exploring the causes of the relative inefficiencies identified in the 
second theme, the Political Economy Analyses (PEA) method is chosen and applied. Using this 
approach, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected and analysed in order to 
appreciate the views of consumers, industry and policy experts and other stakeholders 
regarding the inefficiency problem of the electricity distribution sector. In the quantitative 
analyses, a structural equation model is used to verify the questionnaires used as well as the 
perception of consumers and other stakeholders on the inefficiency problem. Using the PEA 
framework, it becomes possible to investigate the potential incentives and interests of 
political and economic actors that interact to sustain the inefficiency problem in the sector. 
1.3 Thesis Contributions  
Contributions to the subject area are twofold. The first is the empirical efficiency studies done 
on EDCs in the ECOWAS region. There are numerous narratives on the inefficiency of the 
electricity distribution companies in the sub-region but no empirical work has been done at 
the block level to support or oppose these assertions. This research provides therefore the 
first comparative study done on the cost efficiency performance of the Electricity Distribution 
Companies in West Africa. Policy makers and regulators in West Africa can use the cost 
efficiency analysis to inform the development of price controls and other regulatory 
measures. Secondly, the construction, modelling and investigations executed with the 
proposed SFA based on Burr X is novel to the productivity and efficiency field.  This implies 
that the study joins the novel works by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) for Normal-Half 
Normal, Greene (1990) for Normal-Gamma and  by Stevenson (1980) for Normal –Truncated 
Normal stochastic frontier models. In this regard, the SFA classical models have been 
augmented by incorporating a competitive stochastic frontier model based on Burr X 
distribution. The major contributions of this research are captured below as: 
Empirical and political economy analyses of the inefficiency problem in the electricity 
distribution sector of West Africa could support decisions of regulators and policy makers. 
Initiation of an important step in measuring the relative cost efficiencies of EDCs which is 
crucial to both regional and national regulators especially in an infantile regional power 
market of the sub-region.  
Improving on the existing techniques of measuring efficiency by investigating the potential of 
Burr type-x distribution the famous Stochastic Frontier Model. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature and stylized facts of the 
electricity industry of West Africa as well as providing a review on efficiency measuring 
approaches. 
Chapter 3 represents the first theme of the research: it discusses further the SFA 
methodologies and constructs an SFA based on Burr type X distribution as well as testing the 
robustness of the latter.  
Chapter 4 represents the second theme: it investigates the relative efficiencies of the EDCs in 
West Africa using the Panel SFA models based on various distributions. 
Chapter 5 represents the third theme: it applies Political Economy Analyses (PEA) to 
appreciate the sources of inefficiency as well as possible solutions. It employs the PEA 
framework and executes both qualitative and quantitative analyses in order to reveal the 
actions of political and economic agents which support or oppose efficiency efforts.  This 
chapter also investigates the reactions of customers to an inefficient electricity distribution 
sector. 
Chapter 6 synthesises all the chapters discussed and captures major findings and their 
implications on policies governing the efficiency of electricity distribution sector.  
Chapter 7 concludes and illustrates contributions made by the study as well as suggestions 
for possible future work. 
The structure of the thesis in figure 1.2 shows the aims, questions, objectives, main research 
themes, methods, data collected, results and analyses as well as the synthesis of the thesis.  
Following this introduction is chapter two which gives an overview of the electricity sector of 
the West African area as well as reviewing the theory and empirical applications of efficiency 
measuring techniques. 
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Figure 1.2: Thesis Structure 
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Chapter 2 
West African Electricity Market and Literature Review 
2. Chapter Overview 
This chapter first presents an exploration of the structure and regulation of the electricity 
markets in West Africa on a country by country basis, through critical review of both academic 
literature and national documents. It looks at available electricity resources, electricity 
generation capacities, regulatory evolution and an ECOWAS regional power pool agenda. The 
first part of the review concentrates on the subject matter of Ghana, Nigeria, La Cote d’Ivoire, 
Togo and Benin as sample countries. These countries are chosen to be adequately 
representative of West Africa entirely.  
The second part of the chapter provides a critical review of the theoretical frameworks for 
efficiency and frontier analyses. It explores the concept of efficiency and its measurement 
techniques, with emphasis on the stochastic frontier approaches. In this second part of the 
chapter, the debate surrounding the preferred statistical distribution assumed for the 
inefficiency term in the stochastic frontier technique is explored. It is then followed by a 
discussion of the features or properties of the Burr distribution, as an approach potentially to 
enhance the robustness of the stochastic frontier model.  
2.1 Background to the West African Electricity Industry 
As already highlighted, Africa is very diverse and so is the West African region. The people 
may have a common ancestral line but are very varied in their culture, tradition and laws. This 
is not different when it comes to the electricity or power industry. There may be 
commonalities in their approaches but roles, institutions, markets and regulatory 
environment may be different in many ways. This exploration of the West African Power 
Sector puts emphasis on the evolution of the power sector, reforms, institutions, 
stakeholders, and electricity statistics as well as the regional approach to making electricity 
affordable and accessible to all. The demand-supply gap is highlighted and it is even made 
more relevant as it is linked to the implications of an inefficient electricity distribution sector. 
This then lays a firm foundation for the aim of the research. The need for an efficient 
electricity system, with a suitable regulatory regime, is prime and one of the initial steps is to 
understand the current sector in detail.  
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The chapter has its primary focus on understanding the West African power sector: the 
following sections explore the electricity industry in a selection of the most significant 
economies, followed by a broader review of the situation in the rest of the region.  
2.1.1 Evolution of the Power Industry of Ghana 
The energy sector of Ghana commenced its institutionalisation with the creation of a Ministry 
of Fuel and Power in 1978 in response to the energy crisis of the late 1970s. After the 
enactment of the National Energy Board (NEB) Law, (PNDC Law 64), the Board was charged 
with the mandate to formulate policies and plan the energy sector. The NEB’s introduction of 
the Energy Fund to provide support for the sector was one of the innovative interventions 
brought on board. This fund was serviced by levies imposed on petroleum products and 
electricity. (Edjekumhene, Amadu and Brew-Hammond, 2001) 
A form of horizontal unbundling emerged when Northern Electricity Department was set up 
in 1987 as a way to deepen service delivery, increase access and enhance asset management 
in the northern part of the country and at this point the Electricity Corporation of Ghana lost 
its distribution charge over the Northern part of Ghana. Upon the introduction of Statutory 
Corporations Act 461, the Electricity Corporation of Ghana was among the 35 state-owned 
companies that were converted to public liability companies. The rationale behind this drastic 
reform was to promote private sector participation and investment, reduce government’s 
influence on the operations of these institutions, improve financial and technical efficiency 
and reduce government expenditures in these companies. The then electricity supply industry 
as seen in figure 2.1 lacked private-sector participation as all the generating and distribution 
companies were publicly owned entities.  In this phase, the electricity tariffs were also set by 
the individual institutions and approved by government. There were no independent 
supervisory or regulatory bodies to advise the industry and inefficiency costs were allowed to 
pass through to consumers. 
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Figure 2.1: Pre-Reform Structure of the Power Sector of Ghana 
 
Source: Developed for the study 
 
The less diversified hydro-based power sector was stressed as a result of low levels of rainfall 
in the late 1980s.  The low water levels of the dams which reduced the available capacities of 
the hydro plants coupled with rising demand was governments motivation to source funding 
to invest in thermal plants. A condition precedent to access credit facilities from the World 
Bank (traditional financier), most developing countries were compelled to initiate regulatory 
reforms to make their electricity markets more attractive to private participation in order to 
inject competition with the hope of improving efficiency like the Latin American experience. 
According to Edjekumhene, Amadu and Brew-Hammond (2001), the government of Ghana 
was not treated differently under the above caveat when they requested for a loan from the 
World Bank. The Government of Ghana therefore proposed a restructuring policy paper in 
1994. 
The objectives of the reform included structural changes within the sector to bring about 
competition in supply, transparency in the regulation of the sector operators, effective 
commercialization of operations of electricity utilities and encouragement of private 
investment in the development of the electricity sector.  Specifically, the reforms targeted 
the following objectives: 
 Ensuring proper policies and incentives to expand electricity access to spur growth, 
improve productivity, service delivery and the quality of life, and institute programmes 
to enhance energy efficiency 
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 Regulating the sector to make each part of the sector operate with economic 
efficiency; 
 Delivering electricity and electricity-related services to customers in an efficient and 
cost effective manner, while ensuring the sector’s financial viability 
 Harnessing Ghana’s as well as the region’s rich energy resources for development and 
making the necessary policy and institutional changes to pass on the economic 
benefits equitably to the people of Ghana 
 Increasing efficiency of asset utilization and thereby determining a realistic level of 
investments needed to meet energy demand created by growth. 
In 1997, in an attempt to achieve transparency in the regulation of the sector, two bodies, the 
Public Utility Regulations Commission (PURC) and Energy Commission (EC) were formed 
under the Act 538 and Act 541 respectively (PURC, 1997). PURC is charged with tariff or rate 
setting and monitoring of quality while the EC is charged with licensing of utilities and 
providing technical standards and indicative planning. 
Mandates of PURC include: 
 To provide guidelines on rates chargeable for electricity services 
 To examine and approve the rates 
 To protect the interests of consumers and providers of utility services 
 To monitor the standard of performance of the utilities 
 To promote fair competition 
The EC’s specific regulatory mandates are under-listed as follows: 
 To receive and assess applications and grant licenses to public utilities for the 
transmission, wholesale supply and distribution of electricity 
 To establish and enforce, in consultation with PURC, standards of performance for the 
relevant public utilities 
 To promote and ensure uniform rules of practice for the transmission, wholesale 
supply and distribution of electricity. 
 
  
14 
 
Reforms is ongoing in the Ghana Electricity Supply Industry. Specific objectives or activities 
were proposed in attempt to achieve the reform objectives. The figure below assesses the 
level of achievements per proposed task.  
Figure 2.2: Power Sector Reform and Achievements 
 
Source: Sarpong (2013) 
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Figure 2.3: Post-Reform Structure of the Electricity Supply Industry of Ghana 
Source: International Financial Corporation (2014) 
 
Reforms have caused major changes in the structure of the Electricity Supply Industry in 
Ghana. There are IPPs operating competitively at the generation level.  The transmission 
company, Gridco, established in 2006, operates Ghana’s National Interconnected 
Transmission Service (NITS). Generation companies can access the transmission system for 
onward delivery to Electricity Distribution Companies. Three distribution companies have 
their operations in three distinct zones which are southern zone, Northern zone and Tema 
free-zone enclave. Apart from Bulk Consumers (Consumers of 3MVA or with annual 
consumption of more than 6GWh), other consumers do not have the choice to negotiate 
pricing or to change suppliers and are charged a universal tariff. The retail end of the chain 
has not been developed. Creating a competitive retail market has the potential to improve on 
service quality and efficiency of delivery of power as observed in many developed countries. 
The current state of affairs of the ESI of Ghana can be deduced in the energy statistics 
discussed further in this section. 
Electricity accounted for 13.7% of aggregate final energy consumed in 2016. This has 
significantly increased given that 2010 recorded 12%. Nonetheless petroleum and biomass 
continue to dominate consumption. In 2016, non-residential and special load tariff (SLT) 
consumers (Bulk consumers of generating companies and SLT consumers of distribution 
companies) accounted for 55.2% while the residential sector used up about 39% of total final 
electricity consumed. 
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Figure 2.4: Final Energy Consumption of Ghana 
 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana (2017) 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Final Energy Consumption by Customer Type 
 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana (2017) 
 
Electricity consumption consistently shows an increasing trend with rising peak demand shown in 
figure 6 below: 
Figure 2.6: Peak Demand Trend of Ghana 
 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana  (2017) 
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Generational investments have been reactionary to power shortages and fixing crisis but not 
according to national plans executed in advance to meet projected demand. The sources are 
dominated by Hydro and thermal with the latter beginning to capture a bigger share of about 
55%. The concentration of Hydro sources pose a high risk to the sustainability of the electricity 
supply system as drought weather causes low water levels which constrains operating plants 
at full capacities. Figure 2.7 shows the decline of capacity as dam water levels reduce in the 
Akosombo dam. 
Figure 2.7: Water Level and Electricity Produced By Akosombo Dam 
 
Source: Energy Commission (2016) 
 
The trend of demand and supply requires an interrogation as to whether the system can or 
cannot sustain the future demand. Referring to table 8, by 2022, there will be a surplus 
generation capacity of 20MW which is inadequate to secure the future from that year 
onwards. There is a possibility to avoid adding more capacity in the near future if losses in 
transmission and distribution are significantly reduced. This will reduce the level investments 
required and finally reduce the cost of power production. 
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Table 2.1: Projected Demand  
 
Source: Electricity Supply Plan for Ghana Power System (2017) 
 
Diversity is an issue as renewables form a negligible part of the generation mix. There is the 
Renewable Energy Act that is yet to be supported by a Renewable Energy Master Plan but 
there are small scale projects already springing up in solar and waste to energy. PURC has 
already designed a Feed-in Tariff arrangement for the different renewable energy types. 
Funding of renewable energy projects encounters challenges that are quite distinct from 
funding for other forms of energy generation.  
Power outages which called for power rationing and unreliable power (locally called 
“Dumsor” which literally means “on and off”) from 2012 to 2016 and an accompanying 
reactionary-investment in new power badges, capacity expansion of existing plants and 
installation of solar plants. This period caused significant economic derailment as an economy 
that was initially growing in the region of 11% was dragged to a growth of 3.6%. 
Owing to the type of PPAs (Power Purchase Agreement), the average electricity tariff 
increased over the last three years (2014-2017) from 13 Cents to about 22 Cents. 
Figure 2.8: Average Electricity Tariff of Ghana 
 
Source: Energy Commission (2016) referenced in Kumi (2017) 
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There has always been an unavoidable debate when it comes to tariffing because of two 
important stakeholders’ predicament. First, customers are not willing to pay more for the 
poor quality of service in order that the utilities can provide the required investment to 
refurbish the supply system. Second, there is a political angle which is a disincentive to 
government’s support for realistic pricing. Any attempt to support price hikes has a potential 
to affect the popularity of the party in power. That apart, to win the political will of a particular 
area, government is pressured and encouraged to coerce the utility companies to take certain 
investment decisions that may not be economically beneficial to the utility companies and 
some consumers. 
Figure 2.9: Electricity Generation Trend of Ghana 
 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana (2017) 
 
According to the Electricity Supply Plan for Ghana Power System, transmitting electricity is 
achieved mainly through a 161 kV network  with a 69 kV network in the Volta region and two 
330 kV circuits. Ghana grid is connected to Cote d’Ivoire by a 225 kV tie-line while Togo and 
Ghana are interconnected by two 161 kV tie-lines. The National Interconnected Transmission 
System (NITS) consists of approximately 5,207.7 circuit kilometres (km) of high voltage 
transmission lines which connect generation plants at Akosombo, Kpong, Tema, Bui and 
Aboadze to sixty four (64) Bulk Supply Points across the nation. The transmission lines involves 
of 364 km of 330 kV line, 4,636.6 km of 161 kV and 132.8 km of 69 kV lines. Also there is a 
single circuit 225 kV tie-line of 74.3 km connecting GRIDCo network with CIE of Cote d’Ivoire. 
(Ministry of Energy, 2017) 
Transmission in terms of area covered has improved significantly through the National 
Electrification Scheme (NES) and the SHEP 4 Programme. As per the Energy Commission 
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Strategic Plan for 2014, about 75 percent of the total number of communities have been 
connected leaving about 80,000 communities with an average population of 100. Even though 
direct access to electricity by individual households in rural communities differ significantly 
from urban settlements, it is still an indication of significant progress with the 30-year 
electrification project. However, in terms of technical efficiency, it is rather unfortunate that 
there is a continuous increase in transmission losses due to the disproportionate replacement 
of dilapidated transmission facilities emanating from unsuccessful recoupment of revenue 
which will incapacitate these utilities to replace obsolete capital with modern and high- 
technological facilities. Below is figure 9 which shows the transmission losses of the grid 
system. 
Figure 2.10: Electricity Transmission Losses of Ghana 
 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana ( 2017)  
 
Financial strength of the transmission utility, GRIDCo, has increased substantially from a loss 
of GHS 685 Million in 2009 to a profit of GHS235.62 Million in 2011. According to GRIDCo’s 
annual report for 2011, revenues due to the increased generation and peak demand as well 
as the increment in tariff by the PURC were the factors that contributed to the enhanced 
financial position of the company. 
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Figure 2.11: Ghana’s Import and Export Quantities of Power 
 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana (2017)  
 
Even though electricity supply hardly meets demand for its consumers, Ghana through 
bilateral and regional agreements, continue to export power to neighbouring countries 
including Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso and La Cote D’Ivoire. Also, Ghana imports power from La 
Cote D’Ivoire when necessary. There is an opportunity with Ghana being a major exporter of 
electricity in West Africa to take advantage of the regional market underway in West African 
Power Pool (WAPP) Project. In the context of inadequate energy resources, the next section 
reviews the operations and regulation of distribution utilities in Ghana.  
2.1.2 Electricity Distribution and Regulation in Ghana 
Distribution of Electricity is faced with challenging issues regarding quality of service and it is 
the sector that is most criticised. However, this manifestation is not unexpected as it is the 
closest of the value chain to the majority of consumers (discounting other wholesale 
purchasers like the mines and VALCO). From Figure 2.12, distribution losses record more than 
20%. The ECG accounts for more losses than NEDco and that is expected because of the bigger 
market share the former has. These losses are substantial and could explain why the industry 
finds it challenging to manage a maximum peak load in the region 2300MW when an installed 
capacity exceeds 3000MW. 
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Figure 2.12: Electricity Consumption and Losses in the Electricity Supply Industry 
 
Source: Energy Commission (2017) 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Transmission and Distribution Losses of Electricity Utilities in Ghana 
 
Source: Energy Commission (2017) 
 
Thus the solution does not lie entirely in increasing generation capacities but also augmenting 
technical and economic efficiencies of distribution and transmission companies could 
increase electricity supply to the end-user at much reduced cost. Limitations of cost recovery 
inherent in electricity pricing methodologies, unmetering of consumers and uncollected bill 
payments have contributed to the low investments in the already deteriorated facilities which 
give rise to huge losses.  There have been many reforms on tariffs to recoup the initial 
investments into thermal generation which required importing fuel at very high cost in the 
face of the depreciation of the local currency. The tariff increases in the late 1990s was 
depleted by a surge in inflation and so a further increment was effected to partially correct 
for high price levels. To help the poor a lifeline rate was set for consumers in the bracket of 
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0KWh-50KWh. Now in operation in theory is the automatic adjustment formula which the 
regulator is not strict on because of interferences from the government among other factors. 
In Ghana, the many reforms have as yet to yield significant impact towards the sustainability 
of the electricity distribution sector. As discussed in the context of many African countries, 
ESMAP (2005) suggests that the issues surrounding pricing below cost recovery levels and 
unpaid subsidies have disadvantaged all the companies in the value chain. With ECG 
(Electricity Company of Ghana) as an example, the efforts made towards improving technical 
and financial efficiencies have not yielded significant results given that losses are still in the 
range of 23%-30% for distributed power and an increasing trend in operating profit margin of 
32.1% in 2009 to loss margin of 94.5% in 2012. These indicators are expected to improve in 
the era of increased turnover (customer size) and revised prices but it is not the case with 
ECG.  Quality of service to final consumer is not satisfactory and the company continues to 
perform poorly against the set targets for reliability and quality of service. Nonetheless the 
blame cannot be entirely apportioned to the distribution companies since inefficiencies at 
other points in the value chain have the potential to increase the cost of distributed power. 
The inefficiencies associated with generation and transmission pass through the chain 
resulting in higher prices that come with its consequences including power theft and non-
payment of bills at the distribution and retail segments.  
Regulation of EDCs in Ghana is in the ambit of PURC and the EC. The latter deals with technical 
regulation while the former deals with the economic regulation. The PURC (set up by Act 538) 
which is in charge of tariff and customer related issues operate a hybrid Rate of Return (RoR) 
regulation. Tariff proposals are submitted by the EDCs and the Commission applies their 
pricing model to ascertain cost recovery with a fair rate of return on their investments. Ideally, 
the process considers and prevents pass-through cost emanating from inefficient operations 
of the companies without disregarding compensation for additional objectives such as 
pursuing targets for national universal access to electricity (PURC, 1999). Tariff is also 
automatically adjusted by trends of inflation, exchange rates and other variables (PURC, 
2011). As expected, in a traditional RoR regulation, there is a function of efficiency where 
tariffs are adjusted based on the level of efficiency target achieved by the EDC. PURC is also 
faced with the common short-comings of RoR which includes possible indiscriminate 
investments and the problem of moral hazard. Hence, PURC’s attempt to cure these 
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shortcomings by computing tariffs less a productivity factor. Aside that, the tariff calculator 
incorporates an index of quality of service performance which includes reliability of the 
supply, customer satisfaction and others though these measurements may not be completely 
unambiguous. 
The efficiency measurements applied to the tariff methodology are unidirectional proxies of 
efficiency represented by simple ratio measures. They include energy sold per employee, 
outage per circuit kilometre, operating cost per employee, losses per customer and many 
more. These proxies are partial measures and not comprehensive enough to represent the 
entire inefficiency of the EDC. These proxy measures introduce a certain level of unfairness 
and introduces tariffing defects. For a regional market with various EDCs, this problem is 
bound to occur and a better efficiency measurement needs to be utilised instead of simple 
ratios.  
Ghana’s future electricity supply requires more investment and the minimum both EDCs and 
consumers can do is to be more efficient in the distribution and usage of electric power. 
Tariffing methodologies which employ a comprehensive efficiency estimate cannot be 
underestimated in the RPI-X function in order to pursue an effective incentive regulation 
regime. By this, the regulated segment could be incentivised to be more efficient to reduce 
total waste of electricity.  
In the section following the research explores the Electricity Supply Industry of Nigeria. 
Contextualising efficiency issues in Nigeria is such an important element of our review as it 
consumes more than half of the total power used in West Africa even with a lower 
electrification rate. That apart, the review explores the power market development process 
in order that differences and similarities to the Ghanaian case can be more comprehensible.  
2.1.3 Background to Nigeria Electricity Sector 
This section commences by giving a brief history of the Nigerian Power Sector Reform. It was 
1886 when a Diesel power plant with a capacity of 20MW was installed in Lagos. Other plants 
of lower capacities began to proliferate in other parts of the country.  Then followed the 
formation of Electricity Corporation of Nigeria in 1951, the establishment of Niger Dams 
Authority in 1961 and the bundling of these two in 1972 to form the vertically integrated 
NEPA. In this new agency where power sector monopoly was typified, generation, 
transmission and distribution were thus under the supervision of a single establishment.  
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Power challenges exacerbated in the 1990s and as a matter of reforms NEPA was partly 
commercialised by the appointment of a managing director and subsequent separation of the 
agency into four autonomous divisions, each headed by an executive director. The 2001 
National Electric Power Policy actually set the pace for the reform agenda as it aimed at 
attracting private sector investment, establishing a transparent regulatory framework, 
promoting divestment of government investment and enhancing competition and a 
liberalised electricity market.  
In 2005, the Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) was enacted which then provided the 
legal backing for the reform and its related objectives: 
 “To provide for the formation of holding company and successive privately owned 
companies to take over the functions, assets, liabilities, and staff of Nigeria Electric 
Power Authority (NEPA) 
 To develop competitive electricity markets 
 To establish the power sector regulatory agency to be known as the Nigerian 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) 
 To prescribe the procedure for licences and tariffs for power generation 
transmission, distribution, system operation, and electricity trading 
 To prescribe the procedure for consumer protection and licensee performance and 
enforcement of these obligations 
 To stipulate the process for competition and market power 
 To provide for the Power Consumer Assistance Fund and Rural Electrification Fund. “ 
(NERC, 2015) 
In order to enhance economic growth, development, and transformation in Nigeria, the main 
goal of the reform is to increase efficiency, accessibility, reliability, and affordability of quality 
electricity supply. 
Roadmap for Power Sector Reform developed in 2010 and revised in 2013 outlines Nigeria’s 
plans to accelerate the reforms according to the dictates of EPSRA. The Presidential Action 
Committee on Power (PCAP) inaugurated in the same year and with the Presidential Task 
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Force on Power as the executive, was tasked to drive implementation of the reform process 
with speed. 
Again by the dictates of EPSRA, first, an initial holding company (PHCN) was established for 
the state-owned NEPA which was subsequently unbundled. 18 successor companies emerged 
from which 11 are distribution companies, 1 being a transmission company (TCN) and 6 
generating companies. While the generation and distribution segment of the power sector 
are completely privatized, the ownership of the transmission process is retained by the 
federal government but contracted to be managed on behalf of the government by Manitoba 
Hydro International (MHI). The management contract at the transmission segment was 
expected to attain improvements in technical and financial efficiency without sacrificing the 
transfer of skills/ knowledge from the contractors to the local employees. By 2013 all the 
privatised successor companies were handed over. The above constituted the first set of 
actions for the first phase of the reforms while the establishment of a regulatory body (NERC) 
for sanity in the market represents the second action.  This was followed by the incorporation 
of successor distribution and generation companies to take over the assets of PHCN. The 
creation of NBET was the forth and it was established to undertake electricity power trading 
and management of existing liabilities among the power market players. The creation of a 
training institute for the purpose of bridging the human capital gap birth NAPTIN which 
crowns the first phase of reforms. 
The second phase is a medium-term horizon with the objective of attracting private sector 
participation by developing and using a cost-reflective electricity tariff to ensure competitive 
pricing. It is expected that in this phase, successor power companies would have been up and 
running (at least with bilateral trade transaction to be commenced).  In the third phase, 
competition is expected to be deepened with a cost-reflective pricing structure and 80% 
dilution of government ownership of gas fired power plants. Table 2.2 assesses the 
achievements of reforms in the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry. 
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Table 2.2: Power Reforms and Achievements in Nigeria 
Reform Targets Achievements 
Development of a national 
policy 
A structured and sufficiently robust policy has been successfully 
developed. The policy is continuously being reviewed and improved 
on. The most recent is the NREEEP on renewable energy. 
Privatisation of the power 
industry 
PHCN was has been unbundled and 17 private companies emerged 
for generation and distribution while TCN which not privatised, is 
under a management contract. 
Progress of privatisation is high with over 70 licenses issued to 
independent power producers. However, the expectation of a 
privatised industry is yet to be realised as the private sector is faced 
with problems of lack of funding, innovation and leadership in a 
market where the independent regulator is really not autonomous 
Establishment of legal and 
institutional framework for 
effective delivery of 
reform. 
Most of these targets have been met. NERC has been created as an 
industry regulator responsible for playing the role of a facilitator and 
enabler of activities in the sector through effective regulation and 
oversight of all stakeholders in the sector. Other institutions include 
TCN, NBET, NELMCO, Rural Electrification Agency, Gas Aggregation 
Company Nigeria Ltd (for growth of natural gas in the power sector) 
and NAPTIN 
Establishment of a 
temporary Bulk Trader 
engaged in the purchase 
and resale of power and 
ancillary services from 
produces until a complete 
market is established 
NELMCO initially was created for the task with NBET taking over 
subsequently. The Operator of the Nigerian Electricity Market was 
created for wholesale market settlement and responsible for 
metering system among generation, transmission and distribution 
firms. Duplication of roles may be a matter of concern and there may 
not be better reasons to justify the separation of roles for these two 
establishments. 
Commercialisation of 
electricity market 
In 2012, the tariffing system (MYTO) was designed and partially 
implemented in the Transition Electric Market (TEM) by NERC. 
However, at this stage it is not cost reflective and there are still 
liquidity challenges in the industry even though there is an agreed 
limited revenue allocation to the players. Ironically, government is 
still injecting funds in a rather privatised industry. 
Increasing power 
generating capacity to a 
target of 40,000MW by 
2020. 
Increasing rural 
electrification to 75% 
From the trends in growth of generation capacity, this target seems 
to be over ambitious and may be unrealistic to be achieved even in 
the medium term. 
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Figure 2.14 below also shows the structure of the Nigerian Power market which is the product 
of the reforms. Eleven distribution companies, 6 generation companies (privatised) and one 
transmission company owned fully by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Figure 2.14: Post-Reform Trading Arrangement for Nigeria's Electricity Supply Industry 
Source: NERC (2015) 
 
With 11 electricity distribution companies with limited control over which franchise to 
operate and bearing in mind the inherent impediments or limitations of the allocated 
jurisdictions, it is proper to have a very formidable regulatory and pricing regime. The section 
below provides an understanding of the pricing methodology which is of immense importance 
to the objectives of this research. 
2.1.4 Regulation and Efficiency of EDCs in Nigeria 
The absence of a cost-reflective electricity tariff has been one of the main deterrents to local 
and foreign investor participation MYTO was therefore introduced to correct this irregularity. 
By the methodology, it allows a minor review every six months and a major review annually. 
Also consumers are classified into residential, commercial, industrial, special, and street 
lighting. MYTO 1 and MYTO 2 produced when the regulator works with basic process found 
in figure 2.15. 
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Figure 2.15: Multi-Year Tariff Order (MYTO) for Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry 
 
Source: NERC (2008) 
 
Distribution and commercial losses represent the level of inefficiency in this model and 
therefore the model gives an incentive for reducing the level of inefficiency of the distributor. 
Given the inconclusiveness of using unidirectional estimates of efficiency, the regulator may 
be unfair. MYTO 2 was developed after stakeholders raised concerns and consequently it 
made provisions for inflation rates, exchange rates, gas supply price, generation capacity, 
capital expenditure, operations expenditure, and cost recovery and reasonable return. 
Instead of an annual review in MYTO 1, there is a period of 15 years with a major review every 
5 years until the market becomes fully competitive. A feature in the MYTO 2 is the inclusion 
of fairness and public interest as key factors. The fixed charge that was inherent in the current 
tariff system has now been excluded in prices of vulnerable customers and those operating in 
the informal sector. The MYTO methodology utilises a building block approach which is a 
combination of Price cap and RoR or cost of service regulation. It can be classified as a form 
of incentive regulation. The building block approach determines cost of providing electricity 
services and equate price to reasonable return to capital invested. Since the regulator expects 
an improvement in performance in terms of efficiency, financial viability and quality of 
service, the MYTO incentivises distribution companies to over perform the projected targets 
built in the tariff path. Three building block elements are considered in the methodology and 
they are Return on capital, Return of Capital and Operating Costs. The firm is thus 
compensated for its obligations to debt or equity providers, depreciation due to run down of 
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capital, fuel, and variable and fixed operating &maintenance, overheads and administration 
costs. 
There are some challenges with regulation and the implementation of the MYTO 
methodology in the transition electricity market. Some of the issues are typical to many 
markets. For example even in the matured electricity markets, lack of a uniform reporting 
framework (including accounting standards) and monitoring performance of industry players 
still exist as challenges to the regulator. Specifically to the Nigerian Electricity Market, the 
difficulty of incentivising investments in generation is a major problem to the distribution 
companies that always draw in government to redeem the situation making it less ambitious 
as a privatised market.  
In the next section, the discussion is centred on how reforms and policy changes including the 
MYTO regime have changed or influenced the statistics of the electricity supply industry. 
2.1.5 Current State of Nigeria’s Electricity Supply Industry after Reforms 
Figure 15 provides a summary of the losses across Nigeria’s power sector. It is evident in the 
figure that the Nigerian Electricity Supply Industry has had significant investment, but is 
unable to effectively utilise capacity to the full. About 69% of the installed capacity of 
generating plants are unavailable. Huge losses are incurred during transmission and 
distribution. As high as 46% accounts for the distributional technical, commercial and 
collection losses can be appreciated in figure 2.16.  
Figure 2.16: 2014 Technical and Commercial Losses in the Distribution Sector of Nigeria 
 
Source: NERC, Advisory Power Team  
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Figure 2.17:  Installed and Available Capacities, Losses in the Electricity Supply Industry of Nigeria 
(GW) in 2015 
 
Source: Nigeria Power Baseline Report (2015) 
 
Power supply at the required quality remains a serious challenge for Nigeria despite her 
abundant energy resources. According to the 2013 GDP, Nigeria had the largest GDP close to 
US$510 billion and overtaking South Africa. Many firms experience on average 196 hours of 
outages per month which amounts to 8 days of unreliable power (figure 2.18). These firms 
and upper income consumers generate their own energy for their commercial and domestic 
operations (IEA, 2014). Even with the expedience of prosumers, about 8% of sales is lost 
annually by businesses in Nigeria.  
Figure 2.18: Electrical Outages Duration and the Impact on Business Sales in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries  
 
Source: IEA (2014)  
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According to Power Africa, out of the 6800 MW generating capacities, only 3600 MW is 
available due to gas supply constraints and seasonal hydro crisis. Putting it in context, 
Nigeria’s generating capacity compared with South Africa’s installed capacity of 40000 MW 
(0.78KW per capita) reveals gross underinvestment given that the latter has only a third of 
the population of the former. 
At 125 kWh per capita, electricity consumption is one of the lowest in the world. The 
presupposition demonstrates the magnitude of demand and supply gap that exists in the 
electricity market. This gap seriously impedes the growth of the non-oil sector and, as a result, 
job creation and poverty reduction.  
According to the African Development Bank (2010), out of the 45% of the population that 
have access to electricity, only about 30% of their demand for power is being met. The power 
sector is plagued by recurrent outages to the extent that some 90% of industrial consumers 
and a significant number of residential and other non-residential customers provide their own 
power at a huge cost to themselves and to the Nigerian economy.  
ECREE (2014) shows Nigeria’s national electrification rate to be 48% which is less than that of 
Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Cape Verde and Senegal (figure 2.19). Given that Nigeria is the biggest 
consumer in West Africa, this statistics show the extent of the problem at the sub-regional 
level. The landscape of electricity generation, transmission and distribution has serious 
challenges but there are also huge investment opportunities to be realised should the 
stakeholders take a collective action to make the current reforms work.  
In addition, while privatisation of the generation and distribution sectors is expected to 
increase supply and reduce inefficiency, the future of the Transmission Company of Nigeria is 
disturbing as investments in the system is not keeping pace with current and future installed 
generation capacity in the time of increasing demand. That apart, according to the  Advisory 
Power Team (2018), distribution companies have not shown a clear improvement in 
operations and sustaining the sector liquidity maybe impossible without government’s urgent 
intervention.  In summary, the reforms should be monitored closely to ensure that no part in 
the value chain is ignored to avoid a pass-through effect in the system that eventually impairs 
any progress made.  
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Figure 2.19: Electrification Rate of West Africa 
 
Source: ECREE (2014) 
 
After detailed reviews of Ghana and Nigeria, the next section looks at a selection of other 
countries in the sub-region.  
2.1.6 Electricity Situation in other West African Countries 
Generally, West Africa is endowed with natural resources and has a high energy potential, 
however, installed capacity is around 10,640 MW of which only around 60% (6,500 MW) is 
fully functional to meet demand.  It is therefore not surprising to a high section of the 
economy that is unserved with electricity and continue to use biomass or thermal generators. 
According to the AfDB (2011), total demand is growing, reinforced by an increasing rate of 
population and urbanisation, assessed to be about 22,000MW, far more than the actual 
generating capacity. This supply and demand gap is exacerbated by high commercial and 
technical losses estimated at 21.5% in West Africa in 2010 (ECREEE, 2014). 
Figure 2.20: Transmission and Distribution Losses and Loss Rates of Sub-Saharan Countries in 2012 
 
Source: OECD/IEA, (2014) 
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Figure 2.21: Electricity Access Rates of West African Countries in 2011 
 
Source: ECREEE (2014)  
 
Figure 2.22: Electricity Prices for Medium Voltage Users of West Africa 
 
Source: Understanding ECOWAS Energy Policy ((Karaki, 2017)) 
 
Most West African countries rely heavily on thermal power and obsolete power plants, which 
means that electricity costs in West Africa are among the highest in the world. An average of 
17.9 Cents per KWh is higher than that of South East Asia and other parts of the world 
dominated by developing countries. High prices, low electricity access rates, unreliable supply 
of cheaper energy sources (natural gas), and climate change effect on relatively cheaper 
hydro power plants and high technical and commercial inefficiency have led to nearly 173 
million of the West African population without access to electricity. (Refer to figure 2.23 
below) 
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Figure 2.23: Share of ECOWAS Population without Access to Electricity 
 
Source: ECREE (2014) 
 
The electricity generation and distribution facilities in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone 
were seriously damaged during recent military conflicts and construction has been disrupted. 
They are still seeking opportunities to rebuild their infrastructures with the help of the 
international community. Other countries in the ECOWAS region are without coastal access, 
such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which do not possess important energy resources and 
are likely to be dependent on electricity imports; and small countries of the coastal region 
(Benin and Togo) which already have established an integration of their bulk electricity supply 
that can serve as an antecedent to an integrated regional approach. Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal 
and Guinea have significant electricity resources and are contributing to the WAPP or have 
the potential to do so. 
La Cote D’Ivoire has high prospects of natural gas and so about 75% of the country’s electricity 
plants are fuelled with natural gas. Senegal, unfortunately relies on crude oil while Guinea has 
hydro power that is extremely underutilised or underexploited. There is significant progress 
in La Cote D’Ivoire’s electricity market with increasing generating capacity and improved 
regulation. The country was the first in sub-Saharan Africa to turn to the private sector to 
expand its electricity generation capacity when the government, after opening up electricity 
production to competition, established Compagnie Ivoirienne de l’Électricité (CIE) in 1990 and 
granting it a concession covering the purchase, transmission and distribution of electricity. A 
second restructuring phase launched in 1998 was mainly geared towards the financial stability 
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or enhancement of profitability in the ESI of Cote d’Ivoire– this time primarily focused on 
making the sector more profitable. A last reform was launched in 2011, when the state-owned 
company Société des Énergies de Côte d’Ivoire (CI-ENERGIES) was created to plan and manage 
investments in the power sector. Hitherto, the production of power was open to the private 
sector, but the transmission, distribution, import and export activities of electricity remained 
a State monopoly as per the Electricity Law of 1985.  
The current authority in charge of regulating the electricity sector is the Autorité Nationale 
de Régulation du Secteur de l’Electricité (“ANARE”). The Electricity Code gives greater 
independence and authority to the ANARE by specifically providing that the regulatory 
authority is an independent legal entity with financial autonomy. The authority is in charge of 
overseeing the compliance with the laws, regulations and obligations under authorizations 
and conventions in force in the electricity sector; proposing electricity tariffs to the State as 
well as the tariffs to access the national grid; protecting users and consumers of the public 
services and as well as their rights; arbitrating disputes between operators or between 
operators and the State; and advising and assisting State in regulating the electricity sector. 
The Code addresses matters relating to contract terms and tariffing both in their quest to 
creating an industry that has reasonable technical and commercial losses and affordable 
prices.   
Togo and Benin have a slightly complex electricity market built out of collaborations and 
partnerships with agents within and out of each of the countries. The VRA of Ghana, CIE of La 
Cote d’Ivoire and TCN of Nigeria are the major suppliers of electricity to Togo and Benin. In 
Togo, however with the funding aid from the IFC there has been an established IPP.  Contour 
Global is an independent power producer which was established in 2010 with a 25 year 
concession arrangement.  CEB (Communauté Electrique du Benin) is responsible for 
purchasing and selling power to the distribution companies of these two countries. The CEB 
delivers power to Benin’s distribution company, the Société Béninoise d'Energie Electrique 
(SBEE), Togo’s distribution company, the Compagnie d’Energie Electrique du Togo (CEET), and 
to large industrial customers. In Togo, the CEET (Compagnie d’Energie Electrique du Togo) 
which is the distribution company with some in-house generators distribute electricity to the 
lowly grid-connected urban and peri-urban areas (about 30% electrification rate on the 
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average). Rural electrification is extremely low at 5%.  The Electricity supply industry is seen 
in the figure below. 
Figure 2.24:  How the Electricity Supply Industry in Togo and Benin is Organised 
 
Source:  SOFRECO ( 2010) 
 
Regulation of the market is overseen by Ministry of Energy and a special set up called ARSE 
(Autorité de Réglementation du Secteur Electricité) set up in 2000 to advise the energy 
ministry on definition and implementation of subsector regulations and tariff proposals and 
decisions. Aside, advising on procurement activities it manages potential conflicts with 
concessionaire and consumers. However, given that CEB operates under a special code (Code 
Benino-Togolais of Electricity), ARSE’s supervision does not extend to it.  The existing national 
regulations are not explicit with tariff setting and there is no well-defined methodology. Low 
access to electricity in rural areas and the lack of promotion of renewable energies in order 
to bridge the demand and supply gap requires specific policy and requisite plans. End use 
prices are still very high in the range of 19- 21 US cents while  technical and commercial losses 
are reported in excess of 24%. 
The deliberation and the facts presented in the sections above suggest that the West African 
region has as yet to have an efficient electricity industry.  Also, owing to the different 
strengths of the various member countries regarding energy resources, the ECOWAS 
commission is pursuing a regional energy integration agenda endorsed by an energy protocol 
in 2003. In the next section, the objectives, plans, regulation and possible limitations of the 
agenda are discussed. 
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2.1.7 ECOWAS and Power Sector Regionalisation 
In 2003 and according to the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) protocol 
on energy, all member states shall co-ordinate and harmonise their policies and programmes 
in the field of energy. Member countries are to ensure effective development of energy 
resources as well as establish adequate co-operation mechanisms with the view of ensuring 
a security supply of energy in the sub-region. It is explicit this Energy Protocol that the alliance 
is dedicated to promoting the development of new and renewable energy in the frame work 
of policies regarding diversification of energy sources. However, paramount of all is to join 
forces to ensure that countries that have adequate supply of energy are able to support other 
countries that lack capacity to even generate and supply energy sufficient enough to run their 
economies. The need for regionalisation has been based on the variation that exists in the 
different countries in terms of availability of energy resources as well as the recognition that 
through regionalisation, trade in energy and other commodities could deepen among 
member countries. The ECOWAS block intends to reduce the electricity supply deficit through 
the power pool concept by correcting issues of mismatch in the demand and supply of 
electricity, inadequate installed and available capacities of member states and the highly 
unsteady price of fuel and the inadequacy of tariff that compensate players fairly. Solutions 
to complement these problems aforementioned are viewed by the ECOWAS block as seen 
below:  
 Development of generation and transmission infrastructure by encouraging private 
public partnerships  
 Establishment of a regional market 
 Establishment of regional regulator or regulatory framework. 
Studies conducted by Gnansounou, Bayem and Bednyagin (2007) and others have justified 
the benefit of regionalisation by comparing the level of investments needed in two different 
strategies namely the integrated approach and the ‘autarkical’’ strategy which consists of 
inadequate expansion of national power generation systems and the exchanges of electricity 
between the countries in sub-zones.  They conclude that “integrated strategy which involves 
a total regional integration with the whole West African zone as one region is recommended 
in this article as it enhances fast retirement of the obsolete power plants and the integration 
of new investment projects.  
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On the other hand, the potential of regional power sector integration has been investigated 
by ESMAP (2010), which considers the lack of political will to be a key obstacle and it is 
envisaged that member states may ignore the wider regionalisation plans and concentrate on 
national plans as a result of challenging economic conditions of these less endowed countries. 
Barnett (2014) appreciates the aforementioned in his section of political economy of power 
pools by highlighting the intensive capital requirements as a deterrent to survival of the pools.  
The establishment of the West African Gas Pipeline and the West African Power Pool projects 
by ECOWAS initiated the agenda for regional integration of the entire energy sector of the 
region even though prior to their set-up, there were bilateral/tripartite agreements and 
projects that linked and caused trade between countries.  
Figure2.25: Import and Export of Electricity in the West African Power Sector 
 
Source: ECREEE (2015)  
 
The regionalisation concept has been developed with a master plan and a regulatory body to 
ensure sanity and fairness among the market players. The master plan for 2012 to 2015 was 
explicit on their achievements and awaiting or pending priority projects. There are on-going 
projects in generation and transmission initiated by WAPP. There are various funding 
strategies and partners for each or a set of projects. They rely on external donors and private 
partnership for the execution of these projects. For the distinguished WAPP zone A (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger) and WAPP zone B (Mali, 
Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone), there is a significant level 
of interconnection among countries especially in the former. For the Zone B, the only 
connection that exists is that between Mali and Senegal which enables power transmission 
 
  
40 
 
from the Manantali hydropower plant and SOGEM generation plant. For Zone A, all the 
countries are interconnected except for Niger which is only connected to Nigeria. However, 
among the priority projects for the near future includes the complete connection of Zone A 
and Zone B to allow for a complete regional trade. As per the plan, 5 exchange points are to 
be established to permit adequate control and scheduling of generation and transmission in 
the region. These exchange points are to be regulated by the ECOWAS Regional Electricity 
Regulatory Authority (ERERA) which was established in 2008 by a supplementary Act 
A/SA.2/1/08. This is charged with regulation of electricity exchange points and to assist 
regulatory institutions in member countries.  
Aside investments being made by individual countries, WAPP intends to invest into 
maintaining an emergency supply by investing into a number of generation facilities. It is 
estimated in the update of WAPP’s master plan authored by TRACTBEL in collaboration with 
the Sector Ministries of member states that a global investment outlay of US$26.5 Billion is 
required to finance these regional priority projects for the period 2012-2025. These projects 
include 33 generation projects amounting to a sum of US$20 billion and 26 transmission 
projects showed with an estimated cost of US$6.5 billion. These typical project finance 
facilities proved viable with a positive NPV of US$12.1 billion for the entire region over the 
period 2012-2025.   
2.1.8 Summary on West African Electricity Systems 
The preceding sections presented an array of factors leading to the poor electricity supply in 
the various countries. In spite of the disparities between the countries, the West African 
Power Pool intends to create a regional market and envisage an improvement in the quality 
of service as well as regulate energy trade across this region. The issue of underinvestment, 
high technical and commercial losses are very important as far as these reforms are 
concerned and would be of prime interest to avert these challenges. Regulation of utilities in 
the ECOWAS sub-region could utilise incentive or benchmarking regulation which requires 
benchmark measurements including efficiency estimates and other parameters for price 
controls. Adopting a uniform way of measuring and comparing efficiency of utilities in the 
West African Power Pool could be a step in the right direction.  Economic efficiency, technical 
efficiency and financial efficiency are some of the indicators to start tracking for peer 
reviewed pricing or tariffing regimes of the electricity sector. It is expected thus to answer the 
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question: what drives energy efficiency in distribution companies of West Africa (since most 
losses are made at the distribution sector). Another question regarding how economic energy 
efficiency or technical efficiency relates to financial efficiency of utilities in the WAPP could 
be probed into much further. Of great relevance to the above critical investigations is to 
provide confidence to investors and member states with the sole motive to revealing the 
benefits of regional integration reforms and regulation in order to make them more 
committed to the electricity industry integration agenda of ECOWAS. 
Another important common issue, but varying in terms of application, is the subsidisation of 
electricity in the entire region which has been a set-back to potential investors and leads to 
the inefficient use of energy by the segment of the economy who are in the high income 
bracket. It is true that Governments make up the difference in tariffs but may take longer time 
as these member states struggle to meet their normal budgetary expenses.  Such prolonged 
repayment of subsidies manifests itself in the continuous financial weakness of national utility 
companies and IPPs with the former expected to even be worse of as governments are mostly 
the sole or majority shareholder.  
Even though experiences of many developed competitive markets have given rise to lower 
prices of electricity, it is still important given the longstanding ‘investor and member country 
fears’, to be able to model the possible competitive pricing outcomes of WAPP so as to 
minimise the uncertainties regarding total commitment of investors and member states.  
While agreeing to the grave importance of the potential investigations discussed above, the 
significance of a robust efficiency measuring technique in regulation at both the national and 
regional levels cannot be stressed enough. Even more important, is the application of 
benchmarking regulation in the electricity market which calls for a fair, robust and uniform or 
standard methodology to measure relative efficiencies which allows for both discretionary 
and non-discretionary parameters. Non-discretionary factors may include those beyond the 
control of management. Such factors include economic, regulatory, geographical, climatic and 
other conditions that can affect the cost and quality of service performance of utilities as 
discussed in Growitsch, Jamasb and Wetzel (2010). Thus the use of simple ratios such as 
customer to sales ratio, energy sold by employee, output per circuit kilometre and operating 
cost per employee may be disadvantageous to some firms due to their inability to control 
certain factors outside their realm. An example with regards to non-discretionary factors such 
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as markets with naturally low customer densities is normally beyond the control of the utility 
company. An all-encompassing and robust relative efficiency measuring technique is thus 
required in the commonly used benchmarking regulation.  
The next section explores the concept of efficiency after which a survey of the different 
techniques used in measuring efficiency is executed. This is done with the focus of presenting 
an adequate background to enhance the understanding of extensions and applications of 
existing models in chapters three and four respectively. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review on Efficiency and Frontier Analysis 
The objective of this part of the review is to uncover the foundations of the efficiency concept, 
the essence of measuring it and the techniques used in measuring it.  The review also 
highlights the various extensions built on the core and primary techniques with the focus of 
finding aspects of further investigation to enhancing their robustness. In this regard therefore, 
the literature reviewed transcends generic productivity measuring models to extended 
stochastic frontier models and to latent models. The section considers reviews on both 
parametric and non-parametric techniques with this section treating in detail the stochastic 
frontier technique. The Stochastic frontier is shown to be well suited to the focus of this 
research. The specifications of functional forms and the distribution of the inefficiency term 
in the SFA model are discussed in the end. The Burr distribution is introduced and its potential 
performance reviewed against the prominent distribution types into the classical or existing 
methodologies. This becomes relevant as the review proceeds to explore the application of 
Burr distribution on the stochastic frontier models in chapter 3.  
2.2.1 Background to Efficiency Concept and its Measuring Techniques 
Surveys done by Greene (2007) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) suggest that literature on 
efficiency measurement is voluminous with many more researchers still investigating and 
extending existing models for improvement. This level of interest is due to the subject 
matter’s importance but also to its widespread application across all productive sectors. The 
efficiency concept has been looked at in many respects and Patterson (1996) executes the 
concept as well as its measurement in terms of energy efficiency from the engineering 
perspective to the production perspective. Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008) distinguishes 
between efficiency and productivity by giving an exposition on the way the concept has 
evolved from one to the other. They used the variations in the domestic performance of US 
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airlines to highlight the possible sources of these variations and settle on the variation of 
productive efficiency as the underlying reason. By examining or analysing the differences in 
productive efficiency in managing resources and services of these airlines and their impact on 
their financial performance, they brought meaning to productivity and defined it as the ratio 
of output and input (output/input). Productivity change can be easily calculated as the ratio 
of the change in output and change in input. These two measurements are simple but could 
get quite complicated when there are multiple inputs and multiple outputs which is usually 
the case. While studying the resource and output trends in the United States post 1870, 
Abramovitz, (1956) concludes that variations in productivity is a residual famously referred to 
as “measure of our ignorance”. Minimising measurement error in the design of output and 
input indices has been the main effort in ousting this residual and Solow (1957) among others 
as reported in Stone (1980) were the early proponents of this remedy. The variation in this 
residual is attributed to differences in production technology, scale of operation and 
operating efficiency and this assertion is supported by the US Department of Labour’s 
Statistics (2005) and the OECD (2001). Operating efficiency is paramount in our discussion 
among the three sources of productivity variation and it is in the interest of any analyst to 
understand its contribution to productivity from a cross-sectional interaction (production 
point) as well as its inter-temporal contribution to changes in productivity. At this point the 
discussion begins to settle on the efficiency of a producer to be a comparison between 
observed values and optimal values of its inputs and outputs. Yet, three problems are 
fundamental to this measurement which includes: first, which outputs and inputs are relevant 
and need to be included; the next concerns how multiple outputs and inputs can be weighed 
and compared; and the last relates to how the technical or economic capability of a producer 
is ideal? 
The works of Knight (1933), upon facing the first problem, settled and proposed the definition 
of productivity to be a ratio of useful outputs and useful inputs. Discussions on what variable 
to include as useful ensued between Leibenstein (1966) and Stigler (1976) in the argument 
regarding X-efficiency. An extension of the argument was the link between omitted variables 
and productivity differences and also the connection between a complicated model and its 
practicability. These linked issues still had to account for weighing these variables to allow for 
comparability which then introduced market prices and the other issues of how to treat price 
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levels of years and in different jurisdictions and the more complicated case of no price 
information. A case of no competitive market prices and the existence of controlled prices or 
monopolistic prices in the markets in some of the analysed units can only add to the 
difficulties of weighing variables.   The question relating to “at what level of potential of a 
producer is an optimal producer was even a much more difficult issue to address. As 
suggested by Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008), the lack of a solution to this very challenge, a 
very important part that really is driven by efficiency seem to have been unattended to for a 
relatively long period of time.  
The relationship between productivity and efficiency has been exposed adequately and thus 
the next section will continue the discussion on the approaches used to measure efficiency. 
2.2.2 Understanding Frontier Techniques in Measuring Efficiency 
From a general production philosophy, producers are considered efficient if they produce the 
highest possible output given the inputs they actually employ or whether they produced that 
output at the lowest cost. Optimality as found in many economic concepts is the back-bone 
of defining efficiency. Studying efficiency and productivity measurement is grounded in the 
understanding of production, production functions and productivity. As suggested by Sena 
(2003) and others, since the high levels of efficiency and productivity are desirable goals for 
any economy, defining and measuring them in approaches that follow economic theory and 
provide valuable information for management and policy makers are very important.  Out of 
the different methods it appears that those based on the notion of best practice frontier have 
dominated literature and practice. Literature often than not ascribes the success of these 
frontier methods to their ability to incorporate economic theory and the ease of rationalising 
and operationalising the concept of efficiency from these frontier methods in providing handy 
information for decision. Thus the measurement of economic efficiency has been strongly 
hinged on the use of frontier functions and it is therefore not surprising to encounter most 
efficiency literature acknowledging the works of Farrell (1957). Michael J Farrell with a primal 
idea from Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951) adopted a frontier approach to measure 
technical efficiency and price efficiency of agricultural units in the United States of America. 
It was asserted that technical efficiency reflects a firm’s ability to maximize its output from a 
given combination of inputs. It was argued on the other hand that price efficiency is indicative 
of the usage of optimal quantities of inputs with their respective prices. Evolution of the 
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nomenclature along the path of furthering the discussion, one of which is that of Kopp( 1981) 
termed Farrell’s price efficiency as allocative efficiency which, combined with technical 
efficiency yields economic efficiency.  
At this point and for the purpose of modelling, it is compelling to discuss the different 
efficiency types as in technical, allocative and economic efficiency using a functional form,  
the usual Cobb Douglas function of production. 
Technical Efficiency (TE) according to Coelli and Perelman (1996) could be input or output 
oriented in that the key indicator is how much we need to proportionally reduce input to 
produce a fixed quantity of output. Different approaches have been used to illustrate how 
the different efficiency types could be identified on a production frontier, however, the one 
by Coelli (1996) is appreciated for its clarity. He considers two firms P and Q using inputs, X1 
and X2, to produce one output, Y with a constant return-to-scale production function. 
Figure 2.26:  Concept of Technical and Allocative Efficiency Measurement 
 
Source: Murillo-Zamorano (2004) 
 
On the premise of constant returns to scale (CRS), as Farrell (1957) defines the technological 
possibility sets using the unit isoquant YY’ representing the minimum combination of inputs 
needed to produce a unit of output. Thus, under this framework, every firm with a package 
of inputs along the unit isoquant is considered as technically efficient while those above and 
to the right of it, such as firm P suggests a firm that is technically inefficient since the input 
package that is being used is in excess of the minimum that is required technically to produce 
a unit of output. The technical inefficiency of producer or firm P is measured by the distance 
RP on the ray OP and the distance denotes the amount by which all inputs can be rearranged 
without reducing the amount of output produced in its technically inefficient state. Thus the 
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technical inefficiency level associated to firm P can be expressed by the ratio RP/OP and thus 
arriving at a technically efficiency of 1-RP/OP which is the same as the ratio OR/OP.  
A cost minimisation behavioural objective can be assumed if information on market prices is 
known. According to Murillo-Zamorano (2004), by letting input price ratio  reflect the slope 
of the isocost-line CC’ and employing the unit-isoquant in figure 2.26, allocative inefficiency 
can also be derived. In this case, the suitable distance is given by the line segment SR, which 
is measured as a ratio SR/OR. Considering the least cost combination of inputs given by firm  
R’, the above ratio indicates the cost minimisation that a producer would be able to reach if 
it moved from a technically but allocatively inefficient input package of firm R to a both 
technically and allocatively efficient one of firm R’. Therefore, the allocative efficiency (AE) 
that illustrates the producer at package P of firm P is measured by the ratio OS/OR.  
Together with the concepts of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, overall efficiency 
which is later conceived as Economic Efficiency subsequent to Farrell (1957) can be measured 
in equation (2.1) .  OS/OP therefore defines Economic Efficiency (EE) as below: 
𝐸𝐸 = 𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐴𝐸 =
𝑂𝑅
𝑂𝑃
∗
𝑂𝑆
𝑂𝑅
=
𝑂𝑆
𝑂𝑃
  (2.1) 
The geometric distance as far as EE is concerned is defined by SP and could be subjected to 
analyses of cost reduction. The applied concept of frontier economics as described above is 
viewed in the context of an input-oriented scheme. Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985 and 
1994) provide an explanation of the same frontier concept for an output-orientated approach 
to analysing efficiency. In order to verify the coherence in both approaches, Fare and Lovell 
(1978) show that under CRS, there is no dissimilarities in the technical efficiency 
measurements from either an input-oriented or an output-oriented approach.  However, 
such equivalence has been rejected in the case of variable return to scale (VRS) in the works 
of Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1979) as well as Kopp (1981) in the case non-constant returns 
to scale. Where the behavioural objective has differed from cost minimisation, allocative 
efficiency in an output oriented problem has been measured from a revenue maximisation 
perspective in Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985 and 1994) and Lovell (1993). An analysis of 
allocative efficiency on the basis of profit maximisation was executed by Kumbhakar (1987), 
Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) and Grosskopf and Weber (1997) on the assumption of both 
cost minimisation (input oriented model) and revenue maximisation (output oriented model). 
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Greene  (2007) argues that efficiency techniques based on revenue and profit functions have 
received less utilisation in literature unlike production, cost and distant functions. He 
attributes that to the need for many assumptions about producer and market behaviour 
when using either revenue or profit functions frontiers. Also, he suggests that while cost and 
production functions are reflective of the optimisation behaviour of individual firms, in the 
case of a profit function it requires additional assumptions of market structure and price 
setting. Greene (2007) also attributes the less utilisation of profit and revenue functions to 
the high data demands of these techniques as compared to cost and production techniques.  
From the above works, it can be perceived how the simple frontier approach of (Farrell (1957) 
has evolved into other alternative ways specifying production possibility sets from the various 
perspectives discussed. It is also admissible that distant function approach has also emerged 
and spread widely after the primal frontier work of Farrell.  Since the main aim is to develop 
a framework where a frontier can serve as a point of reference or benchmark with which 
producing units or firms can be compared with, it is not surprising that over the last fifty years 
there has been varied tried and tested approaches at constructing, calculating and even 
estimating these frontiers. Nonetheless, these approaches can be classified and distinguished 
by a parametric or non-parametric criterion. 
In the parametric approach, functional forms of the frontier are predefined or pre-established 
apriori while in the non-parametric approach, the functional form is deduced or calculated 
from the sample observations in an empirical way. Most of the literature used in the 
estimation of economic efficiency have utilised either parametric or non-parametric 
approaches. There are different opinions as to which is a better approach and till date the 
method of choice remains a debate with an unyielding result. The proponents argue for and 
against the two approaches based on their disadvantages and advantages. For example 
Berger (1993) and others prefer the parametric approach whereas Seiford and Thrall (1990) 
are advocates of the non-parametric approach. Further advances that try to combine both 
methods utilises Bayesian analyses and Bootstrapping theory which treats stochastic noise in 
the non-parametric approach as well as providing flexible functional forms in parametric 
methods. Sticking to the objectives of this chapter (literature review), emphasis will be placed 
on the basic models of non-parametric approach and further review the basic and more 
complex models of the parametric approach in the next section.  
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2.2.3. Non-Parametric Frontier Techniques (DEA) 
Building on the Farrell (1957) basic model of single-input/output efficiency measure, Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) generalised it into the multiple-input/output case and remodelled 
it as a mathematical programming problem. Later in 1981, this was then termed Data 
Envelopment Analysis. From that time onwards there have been various improvements and 
empirical applications of this technique in productive efficiency literature even though they 
were originally born in the operations research arena for measuring and comparing relative 
efficiencies of a group of decision making units (DMUs). In the non-parametric approach, the 
objective is to define a frontier envelopment surface for all sample observations. The most 
efficient DMUs determine the surface and therefore any DMU that do not lie on it are 
considered the inefficient ones. A striking difference between the non-parametric and the 
parametric approaches is the lack of consideration for statistical noise in the former. 
The CCR model of basic DEA is presented in the figure below: 
Figure 2.27: The Basic Model of DEA 
 
Source: Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) Model in Murillo-Zamorano (2004) 
 
In this model, three assumptions are made: a constant return to scale (CRS), convexity of the 
set of feasible input-output combinations and finally, strong disposability of inputs and 
outputs. Murillo-Zamorano (2004) explains the estimation of efficiency in figure 2.27 by 
viewing the convex hull as an isoquant line where DMUs lying on it are assumed to be using 
the same proportions of inputs to produce various amounts of a single output. This isoquant 
(DG) is estimated by DEA techniques from data on the population of five DMUs producing 
various amounts of a single output by utilising different amounts of inputs. Thus the DMUs 
which are A, B, C, D, E and G produce Y from a combination of X1 and X2. Going by a much 
simpler analysis of measuring the level of inefficiency is by comparison of a DMU to a single 
referent DMU on the isoquant line. For example, technical efficiency of DMU A, would be 
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determined by the ratio OA*/OA where A* is a linear combination of referents B and C (known 
as ‘peer group’). A* and A are considered to use equal proportions of inputs since they lie on 
the same ray. Similarly, the efficiency of DMU E is estimated by the ratio OC/OE. The segments 
DC, CB and BG which form the frontier envelope all the performances of other DMUs not on 
the isoquant which is indeed not 1 since it is rather a linear approximation. Also, the points F 
and A* are not real DMUs but hypothetical units estimated as weighted averages of inputs.  
In essence, the individual efficiency scores are calculated by using mathematical 
programming techniques. Here, the solutions to the problem must satisfy an inequality 
constraints for the purposes of increasing or decreasing certain outputs or inputs without 
changing the expected amounts of inputs or output. Through mathematical programming 
formulation, the DEA calculation are designed to maximise the relative efficiency scores of 
each DMU subject to the constraint that the set of weights obtained by the programme for 
each unit must also be feasible for all the other units in the sample.  For example, with N 
homogenous units with an input –output vector of m inputs and s outputs, for each unit off 
the efficient frontier and with j representing the weight of each unit within the peer group, 
then a vector ̅ = (
1
, … ,
𝑁
)  can be defined. The efficiency scores can be calculated by the 
following mathematical programming formulation. 
TECRS=min0  (2.2) 
Subject to 
∑ 
𝑗
𝑋𝑖𝑗 ≤ X𝑖
0𝑛
𝑗=1   i= 1… m 
∑ 
𝑗
𝑌𝑟𝑗 ≥ Y𝑟
0𝑛
𝑗=1   r= 1… s 
The solution to the above mathematical programme is that for each DMU analysed, the yield 
is at least the same level of output (refer to second constraint) but consumes just a proportion 
() of each of the inputs utilised by the DMU (refer to first constraint). The technical efficiency 
scores are determined by the optimal * which is arrived by the linear combinations of 
referents that for each DMU minimises the value of  
A dual version formulation can be obtained as a maximum rate of weighted outputs to 
weighted inputs subject to the constraint that the similar ratios for each unit be less than or 
equal to one or unity. An emerging problem for the initial dual formulation solution was the 
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population of infinite number of solutions to the maximisation problem as discussed and 
corrected by Coeli, Rao and Battese (1998) 
DEA with much flexibility has been extended from its basic model to much complex models 
from models that treat non-discretionary variables to models that deal with multiplier sets, 
to models that introduce multiplicative measures of relative efficiency by using multiplicative 
envelopment surfaces. There are also extensions in relation to measuring allocative efficiency 
from price information with a choice of a behavioural objective such as cost minimisation, 
revenue maximisation or profit maximisation. For panel data analyses, an example is the 
window analysis founded by Charnes, Clark, Cooper and Golany (1994).  
With the deterministic property of DEA being its main weakness, recent literature has shown 
it is possible to define a model that allows for the determination of statistical properties of 
the non-parametric frontier estimators.  Grosskopf (1996) seem to be the most revered in this 
area where he provides a survey of statistical inference in non-parametric, deterministic 
frontier models. Bootstrapping techniques are also efficient in dealing with the statistical 
inference problem of non-parametric models and this arose subsequent to the application of 
asymptotic results. In the recent developments, Sengupta (2000) and Huang and Li (2001) 
have constructed more refined stochastic DEA models with the latter discussing the 
relationships of their constructed stochastic DEA models by applying the theory of chance 
constrained programming and subsequently testing the model on some classical DEA models. 
2.2.4 Parametric Approaches 
In this section, the review begins by understanding with least squares regression based 
estimation of frontier functions in order that the journey in the parametric efficiency 
approaches could be well explored.  Considering the production model, f (xi,), being linear 
in the logs of the inputs and the left hand side of the estimating equation representing the 
output variable, then,  
                                    𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 =  +  
𝑇𝑥𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖  (2.3) 
In this model, the following is assumed: 
𝜀𝑖 = −𝑈𝑖; 
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𝜀𝑖 is assumed to be independent of all model variables and in addition , it is non-zero 
(negative) mean and has a constant variance as well as an ordinary regression noise 
(disturbance) 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑋𝑖] ≤ 0 
𝒙𝒊  is the set of functions of inputs embedded in the empirical model. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 = ( + 𝐸[𝜀𝑖]) +  
𝑇𝑥𝑖 + (𝜀𝑖 − 𝐸[𝜀𝑖]) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 = 
∗ +  𝑇𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
∗ 
 
The model is reduced therefore into a classical linear regression one. Since 𝜀∗ is the difference 
between a random variable (constrained to be always negative) and it’s mean, normality is 
therefore disallowed. Regardless, the OLS is a robust estimator of non-normality and thus the 
model’s parameters can be estimated consistently except for the constant term. 
Unfortunately, in this model, the constant term is rather the most important parameter in 
estimating the residuals or by extension  𝑬[𝑢𝑖|𝑿𝒊] . 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖 −  𝑎
∗ − 𝑏𝑇𝑥𝑖 = −𝑢𝑖 + 𝐸̂ [𝑢𝑖] 
b is the vector of the least square coefficients by regressing y on x and on a constant, 𝑎∗ 
At this stage it is possible to estimate consistently with 𝒆𝒊 − 𝒆𝒎 for  𝒖𝒋 − 𝒖𝒎 as the former is 
an unbiased, pointwise estimator of the latter. 
A ratio estimator exp(𝑒𝑖) exp(𝑒𝑚⁄ ) similarly can estimate consistently  
             
𝑇𝐸𝑖 exp (𝐸[𝑢𝑖])
𝑇𝐸𝑚 exp(𝐸[𝑢𝑚])
=  
𝑇𝐸𝑖
𝑇𝐸𝑚
                   (2.4) 
Had the task been comparison of firms, the frontier aspect of this technique will be 
inconsequential and one could rely on the OLS estimates. To further advance the model for 
inclusion of a frontier and having in mind that the deficiency of the OLS model is the 
displacement of the constant term, the two methods proposed are the Corrected Ordinary 
Least Squares (COLS) and Modified Ordinary Least Squares (MOLS). 
 
  
52 
 
COLS solves the constant displacement problem  by shifting the estimated production 
function upward until all other residual points are below one referral point or residual. A 
corrected OLS constant is achieved eventually as seen in the model below: 
𝑎𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝑎
∗ + 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑖 
                             𝑒𝑖𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑆 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑖            (2.5) 
It is expected that all the COLS residuals will agree with the theoretical restriction. COLS 
technique is therefore a parametric approach that applies ordinary least squares in the 
estimation of a production function or cost function where the error term is adjusted to be 
either negative or positive. The adjusted line or constant then becomes the efficient frontier. 
The limitation of this method even though it is used in some regulatory regimes for price 
reviews as in the UK (OFGEM) include the specification of the functional form of a production 
function, the lack of  distinction between noise and efficiency. In addition, Coelli and Walding 
(2006) perceive COLS as providing an average efficiency measure rather than a frontier 
efficiency.  
With Modified OLS, the approach requires a parametric model of the distribution of the 
efficiency term. Greene (2007) suggests that using the mean for the estimation of 𝑢𝑖  is rather 
useless (it is zero by design) even though the OLS residual are pointwise consistent estimates 
of their population counterparts, −𝑢𝑖. With a constant displacement of the OLS intercept, the 
variance and any higher order central moment of the OLS residuals is capable of producing a 
consistent estimation of even deeper model parameters by employing method of moments. 
Thus the E (𝑢𝑖) is thus estimated by the variance of a certain distribution. The efficient frontier 
is thus formed by displacing the OLS constant by an estimation of 𝑢𝑖  which is also linked to 
estimates of variances or higher moments. It is noteworthy that in the case of a cost function 
and unlike the production function that has been looked at so far, the estimated cost frontier 
will lie under the data points and not above. 
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Figure 2.28: Corrected OLS and Modified OLS Frontier Techniques. 
 
Source: Greene (2007) 
 
COLS and MOLS are frontier functions in which deviation of an observation from the 
theoretical maximum is attributed solely to the inefficiency of the firm under review. They 
are generally termed deterministic frontier functions whose slope parameters are estimated 
and are consistent with OLS. They are termed deterministic because the inefficiency term (u) 
contains the entire stochastic component of the model. Aigner and Chu (1968) advanced this 
aspect of the efficiency literature by suggesting a log-linear production function in which the 
Technical efficiency (TE) component is a random disturbance U which is in the 0-1 range.  They 
arrived at a basic Cobb-Douglass production function model:  
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑖
1
𝑋2𝑖
2
𝑈𝑖  (2.6) 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑌 =  + ∑ 
𝑘
𝑋𝑘𝑖 +
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝜀𝑖 (2.7) 
 
=  + ∑ 
𝑘
𝑋𝑘𝑖 −
𝑘
𝑘−1
𝑢𝑖  
Given that  = 𝑙𝑛𝐴, 𝑋𝑘𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛 𝑋𝑘𝑖, 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑖. 
Aigner and Chu (1968) recommended and applied two methods of computing the parameters 
that would restrict 𝑢𝑖  to be non-negative: linear programming and quadratic programming 
methods. 
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The third (SFA) which is extensively explained subsequently is dissimilar due to the way the 
frontier is constructed. In SFA specification, maximum output that the producer can achieve 
is assumed to be determined both by the production function as well as random external 
elements such as luck or unexpected disturbances in the associated market. The estimates of 
-𝑢𝑖  is produced by slack variables associated in the constraint. An average technical 
inefficiency can be arrived at by the following statics. 
                        Average Technical Inefficiency =
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?𝑖  
𝑁
𝑖−1           (2.8) 
Or 
              Average Technical Inefficiency =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑒−𝑢𝑖  𝑁𝑖−1 = 𝐸 ̂[𝑇𝐸𝑖] (2.9) 
Applications of these models can be seen in studies done by Forsund and Hjalmarsson (1979) 
and Forsund (1992) where the authors adopted a generalised production function and 
minimised the sum of the residuals with additional constraints. In these studies, economies 
of scale and technical efficiency were the main foci and were determined as such. Greene 
(2007) brings to attention that in the programming procedures, deterministic models are 
assumed a statistical model and this makes the properties of the “estimators” ambiguous 
since it relies on the process that actually generates the data. Matters concerning the lack of 
naturally produced standard errors of coefficients required for making inference is also 
discussed as a disadvantage of these models. Schmidt (1976) describes Aigner-Chu’s 
optimisation approach to have the propensity to be construed as a log likelihood estimation 
and thus appear as having a statistical pedigree but insist since the model does not satisfy all 
the log likelihood conditions, statistical inference assumed on standard maximum likelihood 
estimator results may be distorted.  
Stochastic Frontier Model (SFM) as a parametric technique is widely used in many forms.  It 
uses econometric approaches where the error term is decomposed into an inefficiency term 
and a random noise term. The literature on SFA has moved from the cross-sectional models 
to various panel-data models with different assumptions on the probability densities of the 
composite error term. The classical SFA worked on by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) 
requires specification of the functional form as well as the distribution of  the inefficiency and 
noise terms. Battese and Coelli (1992) and Battese and Coelli (1995) suggest that SFA is more 
robust with large number of observations. The pros and cons of each SFA method are explicit 
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in this section making the choice one makes to be linked with one’s chosen objective. For the 
purposes of the modification of the SFA model as well as it being the main technique being 
employed in chapter 4, more probing is done on it in the next chapter. 
As suggested earlier in this section, the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) has 
metamorphosed from cross-sectional estimation to panel estimation with various 
methodologies of estimations. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) show this evolution in their book 
titled “Stochastic Frontier Analysis” where they show the various techniques used in 
stochastic frontier techniques. From time-invariant panel models to time-variant panel 
models, there have been considerations of fixed and random effects each giving unique 
results in practice. Important and common to these different approaches has been the 
assumption of the underlying distribution of the decomposed error term into the noise error 
term (v) and the inefficiency error term (u). This has attracted different assumptions as much 
as the modification of the SFA model and yet the debate is ongoing as to whether it matters 
or not. The next section discusses the above and introduces burr distribution as a potential 
modifier of the SFA model. 
2.2.5 Stochastic Frontier Model 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977) and Battese and 
Corra (1977) concurrently developed a Stochastic Frontier Model that, besides incorporating 
the efficiency term into the analysis also captures the effects of exogenous shocks beyond the 
control of the units under review. This type of model also accounts for the presence of 
stochastic elements in the production and modelling processes as well as in the measurement 
of the engaged variables.  
Utilising the Cobb-Douglas case and in logarithmic forms, the single-output stochastic frontier 
can be represented as 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑛𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖 − 𝑈𝑖  (2.10) 
Where 𝑉𝑖 represents the random noise and one-sided inefficiency term is represented by 𝑈𝑖. 
The error term representing statistical noise is assumed to be identical independent and 
identically distributed. With respect to the one-sided (inefficiency) term, various statistical 
distributions have been assumed in the literature, the most frequently used being the half-
normal, exponential, and truncated from below at zero. In so far as the two error terms are 
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assumed independent of each other and of the predictor variables with an assumed 
distribution, a likelihood function can be defined. Executing a maximum likelihood estimation 
then becomes the next logical step to determine the parameters of the joint distributions of 
V and U.  
Regardless of the distribution chosen, for efficiency measurement analysis, the composed 
error term needs to be decomposed.  Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) showed 
that for the normal-half normal case, the expected value of  𝑢𝑖  conditional on the composed 
error term, 𝑒𝑖 is 
 
                               𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑒𝑖] =
σλ
1+𝜆2
[
𝜙(𝑒𝑖𝜆 σ)⁄
𝛷−𝑒𝑖𝜆 σ⁄
−
𝑒𝑖𝜆
σ
]  (2.11) 
 
With 𝜙(. ) being the density of the standard normal distribution, 𝛷(. ) the cumulative density 
function,𝜆 = σ𝑢 σ𝑣 ⁄ , 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖  and σ = (σ𝑢
2 + σ𝑣
2)1 2⁄   
The technical efficiency of each unit was computable once Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and 
Schmidt (1982) obtained the conditional estimates of 𝑢𝑖  found below as: 
 
                                  𝑇𝐸 = 1 − 𝐸[𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖]           (2.12) 
 
A substantial level of debate regarding the right point estimator given the pioneer work done 
by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) has developed. First, many others proposed 
and preferred the 𝐸𝑥𝑝{−(𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖)} as opposed to 1 − 𝐸[𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖] since the latter is just a first-
order approximation whiles the former is a more general infinite series.   
i.e. 𝐸𝑥𝑝{−(𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖)} = 1 − 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖
2/2 −  𝑢𝑖
3/3! ⋯ 
An additional alternative point estimator of technical efficiency was developed by Battese 
and Coelli (1988) which is supposed to be a preferred estimator for values of  𝑢𝑖  not close to 
zero. 
It is expressed as: 
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    𝐸[𝐸𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖] =
1−𝛷(γ+(γ𝑒𝑖 𝛿))⁄
1−𝛷(γ𝑒𝑖 𝛿)⁄
. exp (γ𝑒𝑖 + (𝛿
2 2)⁄ ) (2.13) 
Where 𝛿 =
σ𝑢.σ𝑣
σ
 and γ =
σ𝑢
2
σ2
 
Notwithstanding the type of point estimator used, there exist a shared essential defect.  
Although they are all unbiased, they are not consistent estimators of technical efficiency given 
that  𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖 ≠ 0 a situation Greene (1993) found very unfortunate. 
However, as the recent literature has shown, it is possible to get confidence intervals for any 
of the three alternative technical efficiency point estimates commented on above. Murillo-
Zamorano (2004) highlights that Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1996) suggest 
technical efficiency estimator for the JMLS while Bera and Sharma (1996) proposed that for 
Battesse and Coelli (1988).Subsequently, Horrace and Schmidt (1995,1996) derive upper and 
lower bounds on exp {−(𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖)} based on lower and upper bounds of −(𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖) respectively. 
Horrace and Schmidt (1996) describes a method for calculating confidence intervals for 
efficiency levels. In 1995, the same authors further advanced by conducting multiple 
comparisons with the best methodology.  
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) also computed the expected value of 𝑢𝑖  
conditional on the composed error term in a model based on exponential distribution. Their 
exposition is seen below: 
              𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑒𝑖] = (𝑒𝑖 − 𝜃σ𝑣
2) +
σ𝑣𝜙[(𝑒𝑖−𝜃σ𝑣
2)/σ𝑣]
𝛷[(𝑒𝑖−𝜃σ𝑣
2)/σ𝑣]
  (2.14) 
Where  𝜃 = 1 σ𝑢⁄  
There are two main shortfalls of the proposed half-normal and exponential distribution used 
for the inefficiency term. First, Stevenson (1980) suggests that there was no need to restrict 
the mean to zero since artificially high technical efficiency levels since the conditional 
technical inefficiency scores will concentrate in the neighbourhood of zero. Stevenson (1980) 
therefore argues that there could be over estimation in the efficiency levels when using the 
model of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and thus the zero mean condition in the half 
normal and the exponential models were unnecessary. The other drawback which is quite a 
generic problem with most SFA models is the pre-determined shape of the distribution of 
disturbances.  In an attempt to address these limitations, Stevenson (1980), proposed and 
produced efficiency analyses using a model based on a truncated distribution.  
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Green (1980a) and Green (1990) demonstrate attempt at solving the deficiencies of the half-
normal and exponential models. In the former, a frontier deterministic model was rather 
constructed based on gamma distribution as seen below: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑋, ) −   Where ~𝐺(, 𝑃) 
Meaning 𝑓() =
𝑃
(𝑃)
𝑃−1𝑒−  and  ≥ 0,, 𝑃 > 0 (2.15) 
In Greene (1990), gamma distribution was applied to the stochastic frontier model: 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑋, ) + 𝑣 − ; Where ~𝐺(, 𝑃) and 𝑣~𝑁(0, σ2) 
He executed a maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the composed error. A 
consistent method-of-moment estimator as well as the decomposition of the error term into 
the efficiency term and the random noise term were described in that piece of work.  
Sharing the perspectives of other authors, Murrillo –Zamorano (2004), amplifies the nature 
of the complexity relating to the various estimation procedures and suggest that it might 
outweigh the benefits. This might be one of the reasons that makes fixed shape models the 
most prevalent and might not be reasons of being the most predictive and robust model. 
Users of such models may have prioritised simplicity over robustness. On the other hand, 
researchers who have preference for quality or robustness may find it appealing to investigate 
which SFA distributional model gives the best results. In connection with that dilemma, our 
motivation to investigate further this subject matter rather puts us in the latter category of 
researchers as this study experiments the use of Burr type-x distribution on the stochastic 
frontier model. Section 2.2.9 elaborates the issue of whether the type of distribution really 
matters.  
The next section explains the concept and types of heterogeneity that may arise in an attempt 
to model and benchmark production units that usually possess unique attributes since most 
of the firms operate in different terrains with different characteristics. This task is imperative 
because heterogeneity is a natural and survival condition just like the concept of productivity. 
Also with regards to the industry in which our empirical studies is conducted, heterogeneity 
is naturally inherent in these monopolies as they promoters of the distribution sector do not 
choose their area of operation which are by default different in many regards. The last reason 
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is that in the literature of frontier economics, there has been many advancement in modelling 
heterogeneity such that this review cannot afford to ignore. 
2.2.6 Heterogeneity and Efficiency Modelling 
Heterogeneity can be classified into observable and unobservable heterogeneity. The former 
refers to heterogeneity that is contained in the measured variables. This would include 
specific shift factors that operate on the production or cost function with the potential of also 
entering the inefficiency distribution. It is also possible as explained by Alvarez, et al. (2005) 
that observable heterogeneity may also influence through the scaling property in the form 
of heteroscedasticity. It is also likely to have heterogeneity located in the different parts of 
the model as discussed above.  
Unobserved heterogeneity, on the other hand, get involved in the model as ‘effects.’ Greene 
(2004) argues that behaviour of unobserved heterogeneity is normally seen as fundamental 
issue of panel. Unobserved heterogeneity could in principle and mostly reflect variables that 
are omitted in the model. However, aside omitted variables that are production factors 
(measured in either quantity or prices), any other variables ought to be grouped and 
identified differently. Unobserved heterogeneity are typically features that do not change 
over time that enter the model and may or may not be related to the variables in the model.  
On this subject matter, Greene (2004) performs a satisfactory analyses while attempting to 
distinguish between the two and constructs models of Stochastic frontier embedded with the 
possible heterogeneous conditions discussed above. 
Based on the above appreciation of heterogeneity, understanding true technology is crucial 
in the accurate measurement of performance. The proposition that a range of production 
technologies exist in an industry is generally accepted, in principle, but rarely in the execution 
of empirical analyses. Estimation of the technology rests on the assumption that all producers 
in the sample use the same technology. 
With this view, where there is a multiplicity of technologies, a fairer representation of 
productivity potential involves identification of these technological variations across the 
candidates being analysed. For example, electricity distribution companies in the energy 
industry may use different technologies. It is thus possible that the production or distribution 
technology assumed may not be representative for all the firms under review. The estimated 
technology can fail to represent a “true" technology of a particular firm which has the 
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potential to introduce some bias or unfair measurement. Economies of Scale, elasticities of 
substitutions and other measures of production structure could be misleading when a single 
or aggregate technology is imposed on all the firms being surveyed. 
The significance for firm specific characterisation in the construction of production frontier is 
that if the unobserved technological differences are unaccounted for during estimation, they 
may be captured inappropriately as inefficiency. According to Parameter and Kumbhakar 
(2004) the incorporation of a priori information to fragment the sample so that homogeneity 
of technology and efficiency is maintained could be one simple way of incorporating 
heterogeneity. The importance of heterogeneity in production technology has since been 
recognised in the applied field of efficiency. Mester (1996) in the analysis of US savings and 
loans banks based on ownership type (public or private) and Altumbas, Evans and Molyneux 
(2001) whose analysis on banks considered differences in organisational structure were 
among the early writers in the subject matter. Other authors including Mester (1996) and Bos 
and Schmiedel (2007) engaged in splitting and accounting for heterogeneity based on 
geography.  After an extensive review on the type, sources and classification of heterogeneity 
in panel data models, the next section explores in detail the model specifications and other 
extensions applied to the Stochastic frontier Approach.  The section examines the evolution 
of the stochastic panel models which systematically infuse heterogeneity and construct 
significant extensions of the basic panel models discussed earlier. 
2.2.7 Panel Stochastic Frontier Modelling and its Extensions  
The cross sectional models discussed above have shown some inconsistencies although 
unbiased. The Stochastic frontier continued to evolve with the introduction of the panel 
models to correct some of the deficiencies of cross sectional models. The advantages of panel 
data in stochastic frontier analyses come in three ways as supported by Pitt and Lee (1981) 
and Schmidt and Sickles (1984).  
The strong assumptions of distributions and independence of error terms are not necessary 
in the case of panel unlike in cross sectional frontier analyses. For example, when employing 
maximum likelihood estimation for a cross section data, apart from the specification of the 
distributional type, there is a strong requirement for the technical efficiency term to be 
independent of the regressors. This lacks practicality as there could be a policy incentive that 
affects the utilisation of a certain variable of production whiles it also impacts on the 
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inefficiency of the producer. A compelling policy to increase labour intensity may also affect 
the efficiency of a firm. 
The second advantage of panel frontier is that when evaluating the performance of a 
producer, it can be estimated consistently. Due to the structure of cross sectional data, the 
producer’s behaviour over time cannot be investigated. Panel stochastic frontier provides this 
avenue where the analyst can observe changes over time and even assess the performance 
of a producer or a unit before and after a particular intervention is introduced into the 
production process.  
At this point of the evolution of the stochastic frontier panel models, three shortcomings are 
faced by the analyst when observing producers at several points in time. The practicality of 
an unavoidable case of correlation of the inefficiency term with input levels which is 
substantiated above may be unwarranted in certain cases. For example in the case of Huang 
and Liu (1994) who constructed the inefficiency term to include functions of the inputs (x). 
The issue of assumption of normality for the noise term and other forms of distributions for 
the inefficiency term is yet another assumption that may or may not be relevant. 
Finally, the fundamental question of whether inefficiency varies with time or not presents 
another area of investigation. On this matter, Greene (2007) indicates that in the case of a 
cross section, it is really a moot point but to say that inefficiency is fixed over time is rather 
very important in the analysis of panel data. The consensus seems to be that by intuition, the 
longer the panel, the better is the estimator of time invariant inefficiency regardless of how 
it is computed in the model. However, he suggests that it is also true that the longer is the 
observation time period, the less tenable the assumption of a” fixed inefficiency over time” 
is. 
Evidenced earlier, the shortcoming of panel data, the succeeding section exposes the various 
solutions or techniques (not simple though) used to address the issues. It begins with time-
invariant panel models to time-variant models which addresses specifics of the panel constant 
term leading to sub-models of random effects and fixed effects.  
2.2.7.1 Time Invariant Models 
These are models which may assume technical inefficiency as specific to an individual 
assessed unit and time invariant.  This implies that inefficiency may be different for different 
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firms but also supports the notion of no learning over time as these inefficiency levels do not 
change with time. This review commences with the basic linear fixed effect model where 
there is no distribution assumption on 𝑢𝑖  and the inefficiency term is allowed to be correlated 
with the regressors and with the normal noise term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
                           𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  +  
  ′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖 (2.16) 
If  𝑖 =  − 𝑢𝑖  
                                      𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑖 +  
  ′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡  (2.17) 
̂ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {̂𝒊} 
?̂?𝒊 =   ̂ − ̂𝒊 
With either N or T    can be consistently estimated. However, consistency of the 
estimates of 𝑢𝑖  will require both conditions- N and T. (Greene, 2004) 
Where  𝑖 represent producer-specific intercepts. As in the case of COLS, OLS estimation is 
used to estimate the parameters.  
The cost function model equivalent of measuring relative productive efficiency is defined as: 
̂ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {̂𝒊} 
?̂?𝒊 =   ̂ − ̂𝒊 
Examples of studies that have utilised fixed effects models in literature include Tandon, 
Murray and Lauer (2000) and Hollingsworth and Wildman (2002). 
In the linear random-effect model, the 𝑢𝑖  are randomly distributed with a constant mean and 
variance and are assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors and with 𝑣𝑖𝑡. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  +  
  ′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖 
Considering  ∗ =  −  𝐸(𝑢𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑖
∗ = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖) 
                                         𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 
∗ +    ′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖
∗  (2.18) 
Estimation of the model is done using a two-step generalised least squares (GLS) method 
where ∗ and  are estimated by Feasible GLS. 𝑢𝑖
∗ is estimated in the second stage from either 
the residuals or the best linear unbiased predictor (BLUP) 
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The panel data models and techniques discussed so far do not have to assume a distribution 
in the specification as well as the estimation of their frontier functions.  Nevertheless, for 
efficient estimation of the parameters and the technical efficiency scores of the units under 
analysis, maximum likelihood techniques could be applied as discussed in the cross-sectional 
models.  The normal-half-normal panel model equivalent of that  Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) was derived by Pitt and Lee (1981). In this model, they interpreted the random effects 
as inefficiency instead of heterogeneity with the difference between their model and classical 
panel random effect being the incorporated half-normal assumptions for the individual 
specific effects. The short coming of the model was mainly the capturing of any unobserved 
time invariant firm specific heterogeneity as inefficiency. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) added to 
the extension of the model by using the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimator for fixed 
effects while Battese and Coelli (1988) further extended Pitt and Lee’s analysis to derive the 
normal-truncated stochastic frontier panel data model after which, Battese, Coelli and Colby 
(1989) applied maximum likelihood techniques to analyse an unbalanced panel data.  
Murillo-Zamorano (2004) explains the difficult task of choosing one of the three time invariant 
models as a preferred one since each one has dissimilar properties and impose different 
necessities on the data being analysed. In terms of the efficiency scores and the ranking of 
the units been assessed literature reveals no significant differences in the outputs of these 
three time invariant panel models. Rather, Kumbhakar and  Lovell (2000) suggest that these 
approaches are likely to produce similar efficiency rankings at the top and bottom of the 
distribution. 
By intuition and from the notion of more innovation over time, it is anticipated that technical 
efficiency could be time variant as the time dimension becomes larger or the period becomes 
longer. The next section discusses time –varying technical efficiency in stochastic frontiers 
using fixed, random and maximum likelihood techniques. 
 
 
2.2.7.2 Time-Varying SFA Panel Models 
Dissimilar to time invariant model, the panel models that are time varying allow for the 
technical efficiency to change over time.  
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            𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑡 +  
  ′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡           (2.19) 
Making 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
                                           𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑖𝑡 +  
  ′𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                 (2.20) 
In the earlier time fixed SFA models, the very advantage of panel data being the ability to 
analyse data over time is overlooked. However, in a more recent random effects models 
attention is given to include time-variant inefficiency. It will be unfair to disregard the works 
of Cornwell, Schmidt and Robin C. Sickles (1990) and Coelli (1992) as they are the most 
popular with contributions in this stead. As noted by other authors Farsi and Filippini (2008) 
though a very good addition, in both models, firm-specific heterogeneity is treated as 
inefficiency which is problematic especially if they are correlated with the regressors or 
explanatory variables. Greene (2004) suggests that there is a possibility for the random effect 
model to be affected by a bias in heterogeneity while the fixed effects model may be 
consistent (for cost frontier slopes) but may usually overestimate the inefficiency variances. 
Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) using the assumption of “no correlation between the 
random effects and a sufficient number of the explanatory variables” corrects this by applying 
an instrumental variables methodology extending the works of Hausman and Taylor (1981).  
By this approach, they develop a model that considers heterogeneity in slopes as well as 
intercept.  
Another feature that runs through all the models accounting for heterogeneity is that they 
are unable to separate the sources of these heterogeneous factors and the inefficiency at the 
firm or production unit level. Further extensions have been able to tackle this very important 
constraint in reaching a much more accurate efficiency estimators. Though few in the 
literature, sufficient contributions come from Polachek and Yoon (1996) and Greene (2002). 
The former authors rather used a simplistic approach on the stochastic frontier by 
incorporating firm specific dummies. It was clear as stated by Greene (2002) how numerical 
impediments contributed to the delay of such models. The larger the number of firms the 
harder it is to capture all the firms specific dummies even though it is not unsurmountable. 
Following his critique he proposed solutions for both random and fixed effects models and 
called them True Fixed Effects and True Random Effects models while alerting that “True” did 
not bear a sense of actuality or correctness of a model but to cause a distinction between the 
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classical cases and effects treatment in his extended model. These models are well discussed 
and applied to the electricity distribution sector of West Africa in chapter four.  
However, it must be emphasised that many more techniques have been invented which look 
at the probable presence of heterogeneity in the input factors, the distribution of the 
inefficiency term and exogenous factors. The common place being the presence or absence 
of heterogeneity across firms but also the location of the same in the model, production 
process or otherwise. Also, subsequent to disputing that the heterogeneity of firms will 
always be located in the mean of the efficiency term, other models that allow 
heteroscedasticity in u and v at firm level have become extended models. Caudill and Ford 
(1993); Caudill et al (1995) Hadri (1999) and Wang (2002) are some of the applied examples.  
The possibility of omitted variables as a set-back on the advancement of the models discussed 
so far motivated Mundlak (1978) to capture the correlation between the individual effects 
and the regressors in order to reduce heterogeneity bias.  Another area of analysis on the 
efficiency estimation and heterogeneity of TFEM and TREM distinguishes between transient 
and persistent parts of the productive model. It is assumed that all time-persistent 
inefficiency is absolutely absorbed into the constant term in both models. Practically, they 
explain that inefficiency could be overestimated if the production process is characterised by 
a certain source of inefficiency that can result in time-invariant excess of inputs. Foundation 
of this concept was produced by Colombi (2010), Colombi et al. (2011, 2014), Kumbhakar and 
Tsionas (2012) among others. However, it was Filippini and Greene (2014), who empirically 
modelled transient and permanent efficiency using the Simulated Likelihood Approach.  
2.2.8 Applications of SFA Techniques 
In this section, there are some examples of empirical work executed using some of the 
techniques discussed above. There are many more that cut across different industries. 
Significant work has been done on the airline, banking, health, railway, education, network 
(gas and electricity) etc. For the purpose of the empirical work and the objectives of this 
thesis, it is a motivation to consider applications in the energy industry.  SFA applications have 
been applied mostly for benchmarking regulation in utility companies. There are many studies 
or applications that estimate productive or cost efficiency in electricity and gas distribution 
networks. Furthering these models in chapter 4, the role of efficiency measurement and firm 
ranking will be elaborated to give more meaning to regulatory economics. 
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SFA has also been applied in energy demand models where energy is treated as a production 
factor used together with other inputs to produce energy services.  Here, an energy demand 
frontier is established to indicate the minimum amount of energy that is needed to produce 
a level of energy service (Filippini and Hunt 2011, 2013). The inefficiency levels are inferred 
from the deviations from the frontier which is contained in u (a non-negative random term). 
These models have advanced to consider the effect of rebound on the efficiency levels. Here, 
rebound refers to the decrease in the unit cost of energy services when the energy system 
becomes more efficient which then leads to a reduction in the price to consumers who 
respond by increasing their demand and consequently netting off some efficiency gains. This 
linkage of energy demand functions and rebound was first announced by Orea et al. (2014) 
A review of the literature in Africa has not exposed any works done on SFA as far as it is 
known. However, an analysis done using DEA on regional units of the main electricity 
distribution company of Ghana was executed by Sarpong (2013, unpublished).  SFA methods 
have been applied across different sectors including energy, agriculture, health, bank etc. in 
many other jurisdictions apart from Africa and this work draws experiences from them. 
In the light of the different schools of thought on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
parametric and non-parametric approaches, Farsi and Filippini (2009) applied the three 
approaches to 52 utilities in the Swiss electricity sector. The results showed lower efficiency 
estimates for the COLS with the average efficiency estimates of SFA and DEA being Similar. 
Further, there was a higher correlation between estimates of COLS and SFA than between 
estimates of these parametric estimates and the non-parametric DEA approach. Their results 
suggested that, efficiency ranking of firms could vary considerably depending on the approach 
used.  
Pardina and Rossi (2000) investigate performance development of 36 Latin American 
distribution utilities between 1994 and 1997 using SFA. In this study, there was no evidence 
of catching up among the utilities sector during the period. Their findings also suggest 
improved performance among the utilities operating in countries which have implemented 
power sector reforms.  Whilst those in countries without such reforms have increased their 
labour share, the study finds that utilities operating in a reformed power sector have 
increased their capital share. The increase in capital share by these companies could be 
attributed to the investment in capital to improve technical efficiency as well as allocative 
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efficiency. Addition of capital could continue until optimal levels are reached, above which 
the utility would be inefficient. 
Filippini et al. (2004) adopted the Stochastic Cost Frontier approach on Slovenian electricity 
sector where the companies were estimated to be cost inefficient. Another finding was the 
presence of increasing return to scale suggesting the opportunity for economies of scale 
which also calls for merger of relatively small-sized firms.  
Pollitt (1995) examines the effects of the public versus private ownership on performance 
through an international comparison of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution 
utilities using DEA, COLS, and SFA models). There was no strong evidence that performance 
is affected by ownership. His findings suggests that RECs in the UK were not less efficient than 
US distribution utilities prior to privatisation.  
In the table below, some examples of SFA applications are provided in the energy sector. 
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Table 2.3: Applications of Stochastic Frontier Studies in the Energy Industry 
 
 
Author Data Inputs Outputs Method
Pollitt (1995) 129 US  Transmission firms Labour Electricity Input DEA and OLS
136 US Distribution Firms Grid Length,Voltage Max Demand
9 UK Distribution Firms Transformer Cap. Network Size
1990 Data Network Size No. of Customers
Sales
Service Area
Electricity Output
Pardina and 
Rossi (2000)
36 Latin American Dist 
Util ities
Unit Sold No. of Customers SFA
1994-1997 Data No. of employees
Transformer Cap.
Service Area
Network Size
Residential Sales
Whiteman 
(1999)
7 Australian and 32 other 
Util ities
Units Sold
Electricity Generated 
(Gwh)
DEA and SFA
1994/1995 Data No. of employess
Hydro Power Cap.
Thermal Power Cap.
Fil ippini (1998)
39 Swiss Municipal Dist 
Util ities
Labour Unit Delivered
Stochastic 
Cost Function
1988-1991 Load Factor Load factor
Purchased Power Service area
No. of Customers
Meibodi (1998)
26 LDCs, 30 Iranian Plants 
and Dist. Util ities
No. of Employees Residential Sales SFA and DEA
1995 Data Labour Industrial Sales
Network Size
No. of Residential 
Customers
Transformer Cap.
No. of Industrial 
Customers
Fuel Efficiency
Generating Cap.
Burns and 
Weyman-Jones 
(1996)
UK RECs 1980-1993 Max. Demand Opex
SFA (Cross Sec 
and Panel)
No. of Customers
Customer Dispersion
Service Area
Units Sold
Network
Transformer Cap.
Ind. Demand
Capex 
Opex
Filippini and 
Hunt (2012)
Residential Demand Disposable Income Energy Consumption
48 USA states Price of Energy
1995-2007 Data Population
Household size
HDD
CDD
Detached Houses %
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Having discussed the applications of the stochastic frontier, the moot issue of which 
underlying distribution used for the inefficiency term is the most appropriate is re-visited.  In 
the section below, the discussion is even further advanced to debate whether the choice of a 
certain distribution really matters. 
2.2.9 Does the Underlying Distribution Matter? 
Typical specification of SFA is normal distribution, N (0, σ2V), for the noise and some specified 
one-sided distribution for u, such as Expo (λ) or |N (0, σ2U)|. These parametric models are 
well described and distinguished in the survey conducted by Kumbhakar and Lovel (2000). 
Adequate fitting of the data to the underlying assumption of the probability density 
distribution of the noise term and or efficiency term is the motivation of these modifications 
as authors perceive that data may not be really distributed normally. With this view, the 
classical SFA could lead to over or under estimation of efficiency. Testing different shapes of 
distribution from exponential, truncated, half normal, gamma to Rayleigh was expected to 
produce significant differences in results. Green (2005) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2005), 
suggest that little has been done to empirically test if the difference in efficiency scores from 
the various modifications are significant or not to the ranking of firms on efficiency. Yet, Green 
(2005) agrees by arguing that even though no analytical studies have been done to confirm 
the impact the different distributions have on efficiency ranking, the various models of 
varying distributions have been robust as per their specifications.  Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) report estimates based on the cost frontier estimated in Greene (1990) using the 
Christensen and Greene (1976) electricity data. Kumbhakar and Lovell obtained rank 
correlations for estimates of inefficiencies from the four known distributions that ranged from 
a low of 0.7467 (exponential and gamma) to a high of 0.9803 (half normal and truncated 
normal).   Green (2005) admits that their results based on the same data used in Christensen 
and Greene (1976) are considerably stronger. However, the author associates the strong 
evidence of the impact of the distribution types and their corresponding correlation rankings 
to the difference in specifications (translog cost function against translog production function) 
and the algorithm (simulation based estimator against the Brute Force Estimator) used.  
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), agree that it is apt for sample efficiency means to be sensitive 
to the underlying distributions and that many empirical studies have confirmed the sensitivity 
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of mean efficiency. However, the authors suggest that it is unclear how the distribution 
chosen could change the ranking in efficiency of the sample firms. 
The review at this point appeals for models which are more accommodative to fit different 
data types and shapes of distribution density of the error term or the inefficiency term. 
Reviewing literature in other areas other than energy such as applied reliability studies in 
health services and insurance companies, make use of burr distribution in their model 
specification. It is thus possible to look into how burr distribution could be utilised to enhance 
SFA models. Preceding this compelling task will be to examine the feature and applications of 
Burr distribution in the next section. 
2.2.9.1 Features and Applications of Burr Distribution 
Burr (1942) introduced twelve different forms of cumulative distribution functions for 
modelling data. Among those twelve distribution functions, Burr-Type X and Burr-Type XII 
received the maximum attention. However, its application was put in recess until Cox (1961) 
initiated an investigation to identify the best distribution for data. This attempt thus advanced 
the argument and theoretical research into the subject matter. He constructed a problem in 
terms of a significance test to measure the departure of the observed data from a null 
distribution in the direction of an alternative distribution. In his other paper, Cox (1977) 
declares that formulating other distribution representing the direction of the departure from 
the null distribution is weaker than embedding the null distribution in a family of competing 
models, each of which could be the true representative of the observed data. It implies that 
considering general family of distributions could fit data if none of the individual competing 
models is appropriate. 
From Cox’s discussion in terms of survival analyses or reliability studies where he suggests 
that a general family of parametric distributions should be given the first option for 
robustness, it is in order to employ Burr distribution on SFA in the estimation of technical 
efficiency.  Given the most common distribution fits to be half-normal and truncated for SFA, 
experimenting with Burr distribution could improve on the robustness of the model. The 
strengths of  Burr Distribution is confirmed by Rodriguez (1977) who suggests that it covers 
large range of distribution shapes useful in real world applications. For example, the Type XII 
distributions include characteristics of the normal, lognormal, gamma, logistic, and 
exponential distributions as well as other characteristics associated with the Pearson family 
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of distributions. Also, the peculiarity of the variables of data sets in certain jurisdictions like 
Africa with many shocks and structural breaks in observations adds to the motivation of this 
investigation. There could be a wide deviation from normality and other forms of distribution 
which may make the derived model of the stochastic frontier insensitive to energy efficiency 
measurements. In essence, there is a possibility of underrating or overrating energy efficiency 
measurements when the true distributions of underlying parameters deviate from the 
assumed distributions. 
Figure: 2 29: Different Density Functions of Burr XII (c, k, α) Distribution with Different Values of α 
and Fixed Values of c and k 
 
Source: An output from the study 
 
The figure above illustrates the different density functions of Burr XII with one varying 
parameter and two fixed parameters.  The various shapes of distribution can be seen to be 
contained in Burr distribution indicating that it forms a family of various distributions. A 
detailed account of Burr XI distribution is important to the research. As such, the section 
following will explore the foundations of the distribution and how it can be assimilated into 
the SFA model. 
Examples in Okasha and Matter (2015); Surles and Padgett (2001) show that Burr-type 
distributions are one of the very popular distribution families for modelling lifetime data as 
well as  modelling phenomenon with monotone and unimodal failure rates. Korkmaz et al. 
(2017) suggests that Burr distribution is very versatile and confirms that a variety of 
uncertainties can be modelled by it. It has several applications in actuarial science, economics, 
finance, life testing, survival analysis and telecommunications because of its heavy tail 
properties. Burr XII especially, has been appraised for hydrological applications and it proves 
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to be very useful given its flexibility and ability to adequately adapt many different shapes of 
frequency curves and flow duration curves (FDC). The appraisal yields that the disadvantage 
of Burr XII distribution among other three parameter distributions is that the practical 
applications are hampered due to the difficulties in implementing and controlling the 
estimation procedure.  
According to Das and Nath (2016), the three-parameter Burr XII distribution was originally 
used in the analysis of lifetime data and is becoming increasingly useful in the context of 
actuarial science. They agree that a typical attribute of the occurrence of large but infrequent 
claims necessitates the need to fit and use a statistical distribution characterised with heavy 
tails and a rightward skew. In this regard, different distributions such as Pareto, Weibull and 
Burr are suitable candidates for loss modelling in motor insurance.  
The above discussion on the features and applications of Burr distribution offers adequate 
revelations that provides the basis to research on the incorporation of Burr distribution into 
the stochastic frontier model.  
So far, the measuring techniques have been discussed extensively in this chapter. It is realised 
that there is an opportunity to improve on the stochastic frontier model by considering a 
more flexible Burr distribution based on its features and potentials discussed above.  
Considering that this study employs a multi-disciplinary approach and tools to achieve the set 
objectives discussed in chapter one, it is appropriate to depart from the frontiers of efficiency 
measurement to review the political economy analysis tool which will be found useful in 
chapter five the study seeks to understand the inefficiency problem of the electricity 
distribution sector of West Africa. In section 2.3, the underlying theory and its applications in 
the energy landscape is explored. 
2.3 Theory of Political Economy Analysis  
Preceding the explanation of the PEA framework is an important undertaking to explain the 
political economy approach to development used in many disciplines and popularised by the 
view of the development community. Considering John Arndt’s position on linking the 
political economy paradigm to theory building in marketing in Arndt (1983) it is not out of 
place when it comes to explaining the paradigm and its connection with the development 
work.  
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To start with, according to Bagozzi (1974), paradigms can be explained as statements in 
science that answer questions and attempts to indicate rules followed in giving meaning to 
result findings. Kuhn (1962) had previously simplified what paradigms mean by stating that 
they “provide models from which emerges particular articulate traditions of scientific 
research.” The interpretation is that paradigms are not theories and thus may rise and fall 
since they lack testable propositions and law-like generalisations. They are thus foundations 
from which theories may evolve. An understanding of the paradigm of microeconomics is 
crucial as it builds a good foundation for alternatives of Political Economy Analysis. This 
paradigm may be argued to be one of the dominant view in contemporary social sciences as 
it is well elucidated by Arndt (1983). He also admits that the core mission of this paradigm 
concerns prices, market establishments and income distribution among others. Apart from 
microeconomics being given an entrenched position in Economics, its traits of optimality and 
cogent logic continues to make it applicable in other related fields. Riding on its tenet of 
efficient allocation of resources, it has been applied to various fields including marketing, 
business management, engineering, industrial ecology and even at the national levels of 
reforms. In spite of the valuable role played by the microeconomic paradigm in providing 
normative decision rules or models for practitioners, a common view shared by social scientist 
and development partners is that it is inadequate in providing positive theory to solving 
problems that involve many interest groups within and outside organisations. For solving 
problems that go beyond the maximisation of returns of one actor to build a theory of 
organisations involving many actors, there will be the need to develop a paradigm that 
considers interests as well as potential conflicts within and between organisations to impact 
the shaping of external relationships. The political economy approach could therefore 
complement the typical microeconomics paradigm to bring an understanding to problems 
with the motive of reaching sustainable solutions. 
Due to the variability in the political economy paradigm, the choice of organisational 
approach of political economy is the one which brings to light the foundations of PEA which 
the section intends to explicate. Political Economy is considered by Stern and Reve (1980) as 
one that understands social systems as “comprising interacting sets of major economic and 
socio-political forces which affect collective behaviour and performance. “ The Marxian 
tradition in development theory in the time of Lenin’s imperialism is an example of the 
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application of political or political economy tools to development. In addition, Adam and 
Dercon (2009) accede that the use of political economy was apparent in the structuralist 
economics tradition which led the discussions on economic development in Latin America for 
nearly four decades. This presupposes that the concept of political economy has been used 
in the past except to say in neo classical development economics the emergence of the new 
political economy of development is more evident. It is not surprising therefore that the 
diagnosis and recommended policy actions of the “development problem” by international 
agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, ADB, OEDC and others show traces of political 
economy. A case in point is the capital-shortage diagnosis at a time where low incomes and 
the significant low private and social returns characterised the developing world between the 
1950s and 1970s with which the short-term capital inflows through governments as an 
approach to development assistance had little success especially in Africa. Critiques of foreign 
aid including Peter Bauer (1974) were quick to suggest that failure of the countries comes 
from the view taken to sacrifice inclusive economic development for more acquisitive 
objectives. At this stage, international development partners came to the realisation that low 
levels of growth and development are symptomatic of weightier concerns regarding political 
and institutional foundations on which societies are constructed and that resonates the 
choices of economic policies.  Traditions of African political economy had been conveniently 
suggested by Robert Bates (1986) and Richard Sandbrook (1985) as the main attribute 
embedding institutional failures in systems where the use of patronage, opposing regulatory 
agencies and weakening of competing centres of political power as “coherent” strategies of 
African leaders.  
This “institutional failure” diagnosis brought to the attention of international development 
agencies to consider a range of policy instruments that uses aid flows but with the object of 
moving the political equilibrium to enforce transparency and accountability on political 
groups and elites. The emergence of good governance in international engagements as an 
alternative laid a foundation for macroeconomic policy choices, investment options and trade 
reforms to contest with a wide range of concerns regarding Governance, regulation, 
corruption and institutional foundations of policy.  The concept of good governance is defined 
by the Swedish Government as “a good system of government encompassing the state’s way 
of exercising its political, economic and administrative powers”. SIDA (2002) suggests that the 
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institutions and processes should be based on principles of rule of law and should show traits 
of responsibility, integrity, openness and efficiency. 
The UNDP definition relates to governance for sustainable Human Development and it is 
defined as “characterised by participation, transparency and accountability, efficiency and 
purposefulness, equality and justice, and the rule of law. Good governance should ensure that 
political, social and economic priorities are based on a broadly common view in society and 
that the poorest and most vulnerable groups have an influence over decisions on the division 
of development resources”   
The World Bank defined governance as “a predictable, open and enlightened policy 
formulation (i.e. transparent processes), a public sector characterised by a professional ethos, 
the rulers’ executive branch taking responsibility for their actions and a strong civil society’s 
participation in public undertakings, all on basis of a society founded on the rule of law”. The 
good governance methodology or diagnosis had been the back-bone or guiding principle for 
many recommended policy actions by the development community until recently when a 
second thought was given to its relatively unsuccessful results in some jurisdictions.  
The confusion of how certain good and tested reforms which worked well in certain regions, 
countries or even communities failed to yield expected results opened up the discussion for 
more inputs. In these discussions, recent literature including IDS (2005), IDS (2010) and 
Grindle (2011) equally critiqued the good governance approach and suggested that the 
classical good governance approach is based on normative assumptions that enhanced 
governance and institutional models practiced successfully elsewhere can be simply 
transferred to the developing world to yield similar results. These critiques proposed an 
approach that does not only impose good practice but one that considers measures befitting 
to the political and social context.  The Political Economy Analysis as an alternative to the 
good governance approach provides an understanding on state-building as well as managing 
or limiting conflicts, managing economic rents, understanding the formal and informal 
institutions and lastly, appreciating the form and structure of political competition. 
A reflection on this issue has called for investigating how political processes within which such 
projects or programmes are implemented. As Barnet (2016) indicates, the unintended focus 
has been rather “what needs to be done” and not “how to make it happen” in the 
development community. He suggests that generally the solutions have been designed 
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around the suspected issues of the lack of political will or vested interest against reforms, lack 
of competent policy implementers and others. The motive of understanding the underlying 
factors that promote or inhibit the expected outcomes could be unveiled as long as these 
investigations go beyond the existing policy and take a deeper view on other factors that 
characterise the incentives and potentials of agents against positive change. A Political 
Economy Analysis is therefore one of the requisite tools required to traverse this very critical 
stage of policy design and implementation. According to the DFID (2009), PEA is described as 
multi-disciplinary field of enquiry which seeks to put together the insights of the old political 
economy with ‘new institutional economics’ and understanding of social processes, cultural 
norms and ethnicity. The Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides another 
explanation which could enhance the understanding of the major components of Political 
Economy Analysis. In their view “Political Economy Analysis is concerned with the interactions 
of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and 
transform these relationships over time.” By this definition, the negotiation or bargaining 
manifested as interest groups compete over their rights to resources cannot be ignored. In 
the same vein, the economic process or reward implications is not overlooked in the 
definition as one of the motives of contesting the rights over resources not reduced to just 
ownership but also the economic incentives which contributes to their societal influence 
affecting also the political choices made in the society. ADB (2013) propose that the dynamics 
of political and economic processes can therefore be challenging to disentangle from the 
success or failure of policies. In support of the use of PEA, Barnett, Stockbridge and Kingsmill 
(2016) suggest that the use of PEA should help to understand why socially and economically 
desirable plans and policies exhibit some difficulties to implement by policymakers to yield 
expected results.   
There are different PEA frameworks and the structure of each framework is based on what 
the PEA is attempting to achieve. Country level PEA is centred on general macro scale analysis 
of a policy, issue or a problem. Sector focused PEA deals with identifying specific barriers and 
opportunities in a particular sector. Within a country or a particular sector, PEA can be 
employed to understand a certain problem with policy or reform.  As discussed earlier, the 
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development community agencies have developed varied frameworks that seek to cover the 
different PEA applications.  
Referring to figure 2.30, PEA can be carried out at the country level and at the sector level. 
Figure 2.30: Types of Applications of Political Economy Analysis 
Source: DFID (2009) 
 
At the country level, DFID’s Drivers of Change (DOC) approach is one of the earliest tools used 
in analysing political economy by a donor agency. A macro –scale question of how policy 
benefit the poor and the vulnerable in a sustainable way is the main principle behind the 
approach. Many of countries have been explored with this approach and the drivers of change 
analysis on Ghana by Booth et al. (2005) is a popular example. The analytical framework is set 
out to determine possible drivers of change within the country’s structural features, 
institutions and agents. 
Structural features cover the country’s economic and social structures, natural resources, 
demographics etc. while the formal and informal rules form the country’s institutions. The 
agents’ section of the analysis determines the drivers of change embedded in political leaders, 
political parties and trade unions as well as external actors including foreign governments and 
even donor partners. 
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Figure 2.31: Drivers of Change Framework 
 
Source: (DFID, 2009) 
 
There were some initial limitations of the above framework. First, the lack of guidance 
allowed for inconsistencies in the methodology and quality. Also, the inability for the 
framework to translate findings into practical and operational actions added to its limitations. 
The politics of development approach was therefore designed to resolve these problems. 
There are other PEA frameworks developed by other development agencies. The Netherland 
Foreign Affairs use the Strategic Governance and Corruption Assessment (SGACA). Power 
Analysis is the framework developed by SIDA. “Problem Driven’” approach is the framework 
of the World Bank used for Country, Sector and Project PEA. 
Sectoral PEA concerns understanding the incentives and constraints that influence actors or 
change agents in a particular sector and to use such knowledge to enhance the explanation 
of why reforms fail. It could be applied to sectors such as education, health, water, power, 
Agriculture etc. DFID provides tools for sectoral and issue-based political economy.  
Problem driven which is stated as a level of PEA in the DFID topology is rather contested by 
ODI (2012) as being applicable to all the levels discussed including the two levels in the 
former’s typology shown below: 
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They suggest that in place of the problem driven level in DFIDs classification, a representation 
of specific policies or projects will be more coherent in the typology of PEA. It is further 
highlighted that efforts in distinguishing between levels of application of PEA is by no means 
to suggest that the different levels should be treated as alternatives but should be seen as 
complementary. This is because in practice the issues in different levels interact with the 
different levels.  
The World Bank’s approach to PEA is well detailed in the problem driven framework 
supported by ODI (2013) and well detailed in Fritz et al. (2009) seen in figure 2.32 below: 
Figure 2.32: Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis Framework 
 
Source: Fritz et al. (2009) 
 
Barnett, Stockbridge and Kingsmill (2016) provide a framework that simplifies the political 
economy analysis and further provide the sources of political economy signals along the value 
chain of the power sector of Africa in figures 2.33 and 2.34 below: 
 
 
  
80 
 
Figure 2.33: PEA Framework 
 
Source: Barnett et al. (2016) 
 
 
Figure 2.34: Sources of Rents along the Supply Chain in the Power Industry. 
 
Source: Barnett et al. (2016) 
 
It is believed that the problem in the power sector is a vicious circle. The fact that the power 
sector runs on a system implies a problem in one part could be caused by another part or 
could affect other parts. Therefore, it is important to always have a holistic view of the 
activities of the supply chain with the objective of identifying possible sources of rent 
extraction, interest and political economy. For example, awarding less value for money 
contracts will push cost of production high would compel consumers to pay for higher tariffs 
or government to subsidise tariffs. Such interactions in the system and the related 
transmitted effects compounds the inefficiency problem in the power sector. Solving 
 
  
81 
 
inefficiencies in one part of the chain is only part of the solution but not a complete solution 
as inefficiencies in the other sector can reintroduce same in that sector.  Barnett et al (2016) 
analogise that by saying “It does not matter where the toothpaste tube is pressed as long as 
the tooth paste rent comes out.” Inefficiencies could therefore be introduced in the whole 
system due to the inefficiencies of one or two parts of the chain. They suggest that 
procurement activities, inefficient pricing or costing as well as less productive staff form a 
common grounds for rent extraction in all parts of the value chain. 
The literature on political economy analysis abound at least within the last twenty or so years. 
There is therefore a significant number of empirical work in the literature of political economy 
analysis which is unsurprisingly dominated by the writers from donor agencies in the 
development economy. The world bank, SNV, DFID USAID are main contributors in this field. 
The Policy Practice and other consultancies have also written extensively on policy briefs 
explaining the concept of PEA at various levels and in different jurisdictions and sectors as 
well as applying the technique in various fields. The table below details some of the PEA 
studies in the energy industry. 
Table 2.4: Applications of Political Economy Analysis in the Energy Sector 
Authors Title Key Findings 
Barnett et al. (2016) 
Political Economy of Africa’s 
Power Sector 
Donors to help build technical and 
financial capacity but be more 
flexible 
Barnett (2014) 
Political Considerations relevant 
to Energy and Economic Growth 
All energy systems, private or 
public need some form of 
regulation and are governed by 
important tax and subsidy regimes 
linked with lobbying, rent seeking 
with winners and losers 
Nwajiaku-Dahou (2012) 
The political economy of oil and 
'rebellion' in Nigeria's Niger 
Delta 
 
The systematic smuggling of 
refined oil products across porous 
West African borders by state 
officials responsible for endemic 
shortages in the downstream 
sector has been common practice 
in Nigeria for decades, as has 
under-invoicing by oil companies, 
and pipeline tapping by oil-
company employees past and 
present 
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Authors Title Key Findings 
Obi (2010) 
Oil as a ‘curse’ of conflict in 
Africa: peering through the 
smoke and mirrors 
The resource curse perspective 
cannot fully explain conflict in 
African oil states. It is argued that 
the class relations, contradictions 
and conflicts rooted in the 
reduction of the continent and its 
resources to transnational 
processes and elites ingrained in 
globalised capitalist relations may 
be a befitting explanation from a 
political economy perspective. 
William (2010) 
Making a liberal state: ‘good 
governance’ in Ghana 
The construction of a liberal state 
involves a establishing of the state 
as a governmental agency with 
the capability to institute reforms 
on its society. 
Stiftung  (2013) 
Powering Africa thorough Feed-
in-tariffs 
The overall costs of Refit project 
development and the lack of 
affordable financing options are 
major constraints to Renewable 
Energy FiT 
 
Energy Group, Africa Region 
(2013) 
Energizing Economic Growth in 
Ghana: Making the Power and 
Petroleum Sectors Rise to the 
Challenge 
A common challenge to the power 
and petroleum sectors revolves 
around unplanned investments, 
unsatisfactory performance of 
energy enterprises and 
unsustainable pricing policies. 
 
2.4 Summary 
Chapter two is structured to give an extensive background to the electricity industry of West 
Africa in the first part. This is important for the purposes of giving the necessary foundation 
to the investigations done in chapters four and five. This chapter examined the state of 
electricity along the power supply chain of various West African countries and illuminated on 
their marker structure, regulatory regimes or models and challenges. It revealed that the 
persistent problems that necessitated reforms hinge on the inefficiency of the power sector. 
It was revealed that the region continues to have a supply and demand gap with high prices 
of electricity making a significant section of the population unable to access electricity. Also, 
that if the system could not add to the generation capacity or reduce the cost of electricity, 
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the least it could do was to reduce the level of inefficiency. That task continues to be looked 
at by national policy reformers as well as regional policy reformers giving it a significant level 
of attention. However, properly estimating the level of inefficiency is probably the first step 
to minimising it but unfortunately, the literature also revealed the lack of a holistic model for 
measuring efficiency of the operations of utilities in the value chain and that simplistic ratios 
that are less representative of the overall efficiency are used instead.  
Understanding the concept of efficiency, theoretical underpinnings of frontier economics and 
the various techniques for measuring efficiency is the general motive of part two of the 
chapter. Specifically, the main aim was to narrow down on the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA) or technique for modelling efficiency. Different sub-models have been discussed in this 
section with the future benefit of being applied in our empirical study of estimating the 
efficiency of electricity distribution companies in West Africa. In the end, the moot issue of 
which distribution underlying the inefficiency term in the SFA technique is resurrected with 
much credence to Burr Distribution as a likely contender. In order to lay a good foundation 
for further analysis in chapter five, it was also prudent to explain the political economy 
analysis framework while reviewing the underlying theories and applications accordingly.   
Having successfully executed the objectives of the chapter, this research proceeds to chapter 
three to investigate the potentials of Burr type x as an assumed distribution of Stochastic 
frontier approach.  
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Chapter 3 
Formulation and Analyses of the Normal-Burr X Stochastic Production 
Frontier Model 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter two, the Stochastic Frontier Model, primarily was developed to 
measure technical efficiency of production units. In the model, these production units (firms, 
regions, countries, etc.) are assumed to produce according to a common technology and are 
considered efficient when they lie on the frontier as they produce the maximum possible 
output for a given set of inputs. Otherwise, the firms are relatively inefficient which could be 
due to structural problems or market imperfections and other factors which cause firms to 
produce below their maximum attainable output. Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt’s (1977) and 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), who independently proposed the stochastic frontier 
model simultaneously accounts for statistical noise and technical inefficiency.  
The stochastic frontier model is usually estimated by a maximum likelihood estimation, which 
requires distributional assumptions of the error terms. Most often, it is assumed that the 
noise term follows a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance. For the 
estimation of the technical inefficiency term, other distributional assumptions have been 
proposed in the literature and they include a one parameter half normal introduced by Aigner 
et al. (1977) and exponential by Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). For the two parameter 
distributions, Stevenson (1980) constructed the stochastic frontier model based on truncated 
normal while Greene (1980, 1990) introduced the gamma distributions. There is no 
theoretical justification for the selection of any particular distributional form over the other 
(Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998). 
All the inefficiency distributions in the literature have different strengths and weaknesses. For 
instance, the exponential and half-normal distributions have a mode at zero, suggesting that 
a high percentage of the firms under study are perfectly efficient. The distributions like 
truncated normal and gamma distribution could have non-zero modes. Thus they are more 
flexible than exponential and half-normal. However, according to Ritter and Simar (1997) it 
may be difficulty and if not inept to identify the best estimate of the values of the two gamma 
parameters. The choices of models used in the stochastic frontier in the literature seem to be 
somewhat arbitrary. 
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In this work, Burr X distribution is proposed to be the assumed distribution of technical 
inefficiency term in the SFA model.  The potential of Burr X distributions has been discussed 
in the chapter 2 and it is expected to be more flexible with the ability to encapsulate the 
already known and assumed distributions for the inefficiency term (i.e. half normal, 
truncated, exponential, gamma and Rayleigh). Burr X is known to have some interesting 
relations with the Rayleigh, Gamma and Weibull distributions.  It is also related to the recently 
proposed Exponentiated exponential and Exponentiated Weibull distributions.  
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the stochastic frontier 
model for cross-section; Section 3.3 discusses the specification of the Burr X distribution in 
detail; section 3.4 illustrates the maximum likelihood estimation of Burr parameters; section 
3.5 presents the designing stage of the Normal-Burr X SFA followed by log likelihood 
estimation of the proposed model in section 3.6.  Sections 3.7, 3 8 and 3.9 respectively 
present efficiency estimation of the proposed model, results of the Monte Carlo simulations 
and conclusion of the chapter. 
3.2 Model Specification 
The original stochastic frontier production for cross-sectional data had an error term which 
had two components, one to account for the usual random noise (V) and another to account 
for technical inefficiency (U). This model can be expressed as: 
Y𝑖 = βX𝑖 + (𝑉𝑖 − 𝑈𝑖) 
 
(3.1) 
 
where for any  i = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛; and: 
 Y𝑖 is the production function (or the logarithm of the production) for i𝑡ℎ  firm. 
X𝑖 is a kx1 vector of (transformations of the) input quantities of the  i𝑡ℎ  firm. 
β is a vector of unknown parameters. 
Furthermore, for i = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛,   𝑉𝑖 is the random error term or noise assumed to be identical 
and independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance   𝜎𝑣
2; 𝑈𝑖  is a non-negative 
random variable which is assumed to account for technical inefficiency and often assumed to 
be identical and independent normally distributed with mean 0 and variance   𝜎𝑢
2. In the 
model (1) 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖 are also assumed to be independent of one another.  Technical efficiency 
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is defined as  TE𝑖 = exp (−𝑈𝑖) , and the point of the model is to estimate 𝑈𝑖 or  TE𝑖 .  The 
value of exp(−𝑈𝑖) ∗ 100 is the percentage of the maximum possible output obtained by a 
producer i. This original stochastic production frontier specification has been modified and 
extended in the literature as discussed in chapter two. Aside the four main distributional 
assumptions discussed earlier, recent engagements in this field of research have introduced 
other distributional assumptions including Weibull by Tsionas (2007) and Rayleigh 
constructed independently by Oliviero (2014) and Hajargasht (2014). Model specification 
(3.1) has also been modified to accommodate panel data and time-varying technical 
inefficiencies.  
In order to modify the stochastic frontier production model given in equation (3.1) by allowing 
the technical inefficiency term  𝑈𝑖 to have two-parameter Burr type x distributions, section 
3.3 provides the distributional functions of Burr x . 
3.3 The Burr X Distribution  
Burr (1942) introduced twelve different forms of cumulative distribution functions for 
modeling data. Among those distributions, Burr Type X and Burr Type XII are the most popular 
ones. Several authors consider different aspects of the Burr Type X and Burr Type XII 
distributions and these examples could be seen in Ahmad, Fakhry and Jaheen (1997), Jaheen 
(1995, 1996), Raqab (1998), Rodriguez (1977), Sartawi and Abu-Salih (1991), Surles and 
Padgett (1998) and Wongo (1993). For a review for the two distributions the readers are 
referred to Johnson, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1995). Recently, Surles and Padgett (2001) 
introduced two-parameter Burr Type X distribution and named as the generalized Rayleigh 
distribution. The two-parameter Burr X distribution has the following cumulative distribution 
function: 
𝐹(𝑥) = (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥2
𝜎2)
𝛼
 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥 > 0;  𝛼, 𝜎 > 0 
where α is the shape parameter and 𝜎 is the scale parameter of the distribution. When α =1 
and 𝜎 = 𝜎√2, the Burr type X reduces to the Rayleigh distribution. If the random variable X 
has a Burr X distribution then it has the density function: 
                           𝑓(𝑥) =
2𝛼𝑥
𝜎2
𝑒
−
𝑥2
𝜎2 (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥2
𝜎2)
𝛼−1
 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥 > 0;  𝛼, 𝜎 > 0 (3.2) 
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When 𝛼 ≤ 1/2 the Burr X distribution has a decreasing probability density function and when 
𝛼 > 1/2  density function is a right-skewed unimodal. The Maximum likelihood estimators 
for the parameters of the Burr X have been obtained by Kundu and Raqab (2005).  
The Burr X is a member of a more general class of distributions known as the Exponentiated 
Weibull family. The Burr X distribution covers large range of distribution shapes useful in real 
world applications. For example the Type X distribution includes characteristics of the normal, 
Rayleigh, gamma, Weibull, and exponential distributions, so that a wide variety of 
distributions may be approximated by a Burr X.  The Maximum likelihood estimators for the 
parameters of the Burr type X is given by Kundu and Raqab (2005). The versatility and 
flexibility of Burr X distribution makes it an attractive tentative model for technical inefficiency 
term in stochastic frontier production analysis. The graph below shows Burr type X 
distribution densities for several values of the shape parameter (𝛼 = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1.2) 
Figure 3.1 Burr Type X Distributions with various Scales for its Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Produced by the Author  
 
Burr X is quite similar in nature to the other two-parameter families like Weibull, gamma or 
generalized exponential family. Raqab and Kundu (2006) studied the relationship of Burr X 
with Weibull, Gamma and Generalized Exponential while Lio et al. (2014) studied the control 
charts for monitoring Burr X. Smith et al. (2015) studied the higher order inference for stress–
strength reliability with independent Burr X. The kth non-central moment for the Burr X 
distribution is defined in Surles and Padgett (2005) 
 = 𝟎. 𝟏     =0.25    =0.5   =1.2 
 
 
  
88 
 
μ𝑥
(𝑘)
= 𝛼𝜎𝑘Γ(
𝑘
2
+ 1) ∑(−1)𝑖 (
𝛼 − 1
𝑖
)
1
(𝑖 + 1)
𝑘
2+1
𝛼−1
𝑖=0
 
Where Γ() is a complete gamma function. Therefore putting k = 1; the means are obtained 
as: 
μ𝑥
(1)
= 𝛼𝜎Γ (
1
2
+ 1) ∑(−1)𝑖 (
𝛼 − 1
𝑖
)
1
(𝑖 + 1)
1
2+1
𝛼−1
𝑖=0
 
For example, when 𝛼 = 1, that is for a Rayleigh distribution, the mean value of X is 
μ𝑥
(1)
= 𝜎Γ (
1
2
+ 1) = 𝜎√
𝜋
2
 
The variance of X is 
var(X) = μ𝑥
(2)
− (μ𝑥
(1))
2
=
2 − 𝜋
2
𝜎2 
The mode of the density function can be estimated as 𝜎𝛾  where 𝛾0 is the solution of the 
non-linear equation: 
1 − 2𝛾2 − 𝑒−𝛾
2
(1 − 2𝛼𝛾2) = 0 
3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation Burr X Parameters 
Kundu and Raqab (2005) obtained the Maximum likelihood estimators for the parameters of 
the Burr X and If {𝑋1, ⋯ , 𝑋𝑛} denotes a random sample from Burr X, then the log-likelihood 
function, L(α, σ), can be written as: 
 
L(α, σ) = 𝑙𝑛2 + 𝑛𝑙𝑛α − 2𝑛𝑙𝑛σ + ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
−
1
σ2
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (α
− 1) ∑ ln (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(3.3) 
The maximum likelihood estimators for α and σ can be obtained by taking the derivatives of 
equation (3.3) with respect to both α and σ to result in two equations. The resulting equations 
can be set equal to 0 and solved to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of α and 
σ. 
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∂L
∂α
=
𝑛
𝛼
+ ∑ ln (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 0 (3.4) 
∂L
∂σ
= 2𝑛σ −
2
σ
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
+
2
σ
(α − 1) ∑
𝑥𝑖
2𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2
1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 0 
 
(3.5) 
From equation (3.4), it is possible to obtain the MLE of α as a function of σ, denoted by α̂(𝜎) 
as found below: 
α̂(𝜎) = −
𝑛
∑ ln (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2)𝑛𝑖=1
 
Putting α̂(𝜎) into equation (3.3), the profile log-likelihood of σ can be written as (ignoring the 
constant);  
L(α̂(𝜎) , σ) = −𝑛𝑙𝑛 (− ∑ ln (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
) − 2𝑛𝑙𝑛σ −
1
σ2
∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
− ∑ ln (1 − 𝑒
−
𝑥𝑖
2
𝜎2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The MLE of σ can be obtained by maximizing L(α̂(𝜎) , σ) given above with respect to σ. This 
can be done by differentiating L(α̂(𝜎) , σ) with respect to σ, equating it to 0 and then 
solving for σ. 
3.5 The Normal-Burr X Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
In this section, the stochastic frontier production model given in equation (3.1) is modified by 
allowing the technical inefficiency term  𝑢 to have a two parameter Burr x distribution defined 
in equation (3.2). Thus the probability density function for the technical inefficiency term  𝑢 
can be written as  
𝑓𝑢(𝑢) =
2𝛼𝑢
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1
 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑢 > 0;  𝛼, 𝜎𝑢 > 0 
From the model specification (3.1) it is assumed that statistical noise term  𝑣  has a standard 
normal probability density function: 
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𝑓𝑣(𝑣) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣
2
, 𝜎𝑣 > 0 
Given the independence assumption, the joint density function of 𝑣 and 𝑢 is the product of 
their individual density functions,  
𝑓(𝑣, 𝑢) = 𝑓𝑣(𝑣)𝑓𝑢(𝑢) 
Letting the composed error, 𝜀 = 𝑣 − 𝑢, so that the joint density for 𝜀 and 𝑢  can be obtained 
as: 
𝑓(𝜀, 𝑢) = 𝑓𝑣(𝜀 + 𝑢)𝑓𝑢(𝑢) 
Since the Jacobian of the transformation from (v, u) to (ε, u) is equal to 1, then; 
𝑓(𝜀, 𝑢) =
2𝛼𝑢
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
(𝜀+𝑢)2
2𝜎𝑣
2
 (3.6) 
The marginal density function of 𝜀 is then obtained by integrating out 𝑢 from the joint density 
given by equation (6), which gives  
𝑓(𝜀) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜀, 𝑢)
∞
0
𝑑𝑢 
𝑓(𝜀) = ∫
2𝛼𝑢
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1∞
0
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
(𝜀+𝑢)2
2𝜎𝑣
2
𝑑𝑢 
This density is required in estimation of the parameters by maximum likelihood estimation. 
However, it is not available in closed form. By making the change-of-variable  𝑥 =
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
  and the 
substitution 𝜆 = 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
2𝜎𝑣
2  and =
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2  , the following is obtained 
𝑓(𝜀) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
∫ 2𝛼𝑥𝑒−𝜆𝑥
2
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 
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Now since  0 < 1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
< 1 , for x > 0, therefore, by using the series representation (finite 
or infinite) of  (1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
, when the shape parameter 𝛼 is not a natural number, the 
following is obtained.  
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
= ∑(−1)𝑗 (
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
𝑒−𝑗𝑥
2
 
Where (𝛼−1
𝑗
) =
(𝛼−1)⋯(𝛼−𝑗)
𝑗!
, the integral below is obtained 
∫ 2𝛼𝑥𝑒−𝜆𝑥
2
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥
= 2𝛼 ∑(−1)𝑗 (
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
∫ 𝑥𝑒−𝑥
2(𝜆+𝑗)
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 
 
(3.7) 
For integer values of 𝛼, equation (3.7) can be presented as a finite series representation. 
Using Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007) (pp. 365), the following is arrived at. 
∫ 𝑥𝑒−𝑥
2(𝜆+𝑗)
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 =
1
2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
−
𝑞
4(𝜆 + 𝑗)
√𝜋
√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
𝑒
𝑞2
4(𝜆+𝑗) [1 − erf (
𝑞
2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)] 
Where erf(𝑥) is the error function defined as:   
erf(𝑥) =
2
√𝜋
∫ 𝑒−𝑡
2
𝑥
0
𝑑𝑡 
Thus,  
𝑓(𝜀) =
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
[1 − 𝑒
𝑞2
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝑞√𝜋
2√𝜆 + 𝑗
[1 − erf (
𝑞
2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)]] 
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The error function has the following property  
erf(−𝑥) = −erf(𝑥) 
 In addition, it has a relationship with the cumulative distribution of a standard normal Φ, 
given by 
  
Φ(x) =
1
2
(1 + erf (
𝑥
√2
)) 
Using these relations, the function below is obtained; 
1 − erf (
𝑞
2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
) = 1 + erf (
−𝑞
2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
) = 2Φ (
−𝑞
√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
) 
And therefore, 
𝑓(𝜀) =
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
[1 − 𝑒
𝑞2
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝑞√𝜋
√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝑞
√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)] 
Substituting 𝑞 =
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2 , gives 
𝑓(𝜀) =
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
[1
− 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)] 
 
(3.8) 
It is important to note the following series expression 
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
=
Γ(𝜆 + 1)Γ(𝛼)
𝜆Γ(𝜆 + 𝛼)
 
Which gives the following expression: 
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𝑓(𝜀) =
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
[
Γ(𝜆 + 1)Γ(𝛼)
𝜆Γ(𝜆 + 𝛼)
− ∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)] 
 
Then, if taking two terms in the partial sum, the following approximation for 𝑓(𝜀) is obtained 
below: 
𝑓(𝜀) ≈
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
[
Γ(𝜆 + 1)Γ(𝛼)
𝜆Γ(𝜆 + 𝛼)
− 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜆𝜎𝑣2√𝜆
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2𝜆
)
+
(𝛼 − 1)
𝜆 + 1
𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+1)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 1
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2𝜆 + 2
) − ⋯ ] 
 
(3.9) 
When the shape parameter 𝛼 is a natural number, then the probability density function for 
the composed error given in equation (8) reduced to the finite sum 
𝑓(𝜀) =
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
𝛼−1
𝑗=0
[1
− 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)] 
 
(3.10) 
Equations (3.8) and (3.10) are new formulae for probability density functions for the 
composed error 𝜀. Since 𝛼 need not be an integer, there will be no closed form for𝑓(𝜀). It is 
important to remark that the closed-form expression for 𝑓(𝜀) only exists for a single-
parameter distribution for the inefficiency term u such as the half normal, exponential and 
truncated normal. In other cases such as a two-parameter gamma or Weibull distribution 
numerical or simulation based techniques are usually used to approximate the density 
function𝑓(𝜀). 
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Sub-model 
For α =1, the density function of composed error   𝜀, 𝑓(𝜀),  is given by: 
𝑓(𝜀) =
1
𝜆√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2
[1 − 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2𝜆
)] 
Substituting for   𝜆 = 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
2𝜎𝑣
2, and setting   𝜎𝑢 = 𝜎𝑢√2, gives 
𝑓(𝜀) =
𝜎𝑣
(𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑢
2)
1
√2𝜋
𝑒
−
𝜀2
2𝜎𝑣
2 [1 −
𝜀𝜎𝑢√2𝜋
𝜎𝑣√𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑢
2
𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
2𝜎𝑣
2(𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑢
2 )Φ (−
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣√𝜎𝑣
2+𝜎𝑢
2
)] (3.11) 
The above expression is the probability density function for the composed error 𝜀 when the 
technical inefficiency term  𝑢 is assumed to have a Rayleigh distribution. Thus if α =1 and 𝜎𝑢 =
𝜎𝑢√2, the Burr X distributions reduces to a Rayleigh distribution. Oliviero (2014) and 
Hajargasht (2014) independently introduced a stochastic frontier model with the Rayleigh 
distribution with some promising results compared with the frequently used exponential and 
half-normal models. The model introduced in this research may be called a stochastic frontier 
model with a generalized Rayleigh distribution.  
3.6 Log Likelihood for the Normal-Burr Type X Stochastic Frontier Model 
There are several methods for estimating the parameters of a stochastic frontier model. The 
most widely used method of statistical estimation is that of maximum likelihood estimation 
which has good optimality properties.  
The estimation begins by denoting 𝜀𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜷𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 for   i = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛; and 𝜀 =
(𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑛). The likelihood function of the sample as discussed is the product of the density 
functions of the individual observations because of the independence assumption of the 
distributions treated. Thus the likelihood function is given by  
𝐿(𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒) = ∏ 𝑓(𝜀𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1   (3.12) 
The conventional approach is to take log of the likelihood function to get the log-likelihood 
equation 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒) = 𝑙(𝛽, 𝜎𝑣, 𝜎𝑢, 𝛼|𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑛) = ∑ log 𝑓(𝜀𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖
 
Using equation (3.9), the log of the likelihood function is given by 
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∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
Γ(𝜆+1)Γ(𝛼)
𝜆Γ(𝜆+𝛼)
− 𝑒
𝜀𝑖
2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜆𝜎𝑣
2√𝜆
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2√2𝜆
) +
(𝛼−1)
𝜆+1
𝑒
𝜀𝑖
2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+1)
𝜀𝑖𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣
2√𝜆+1
Φ (
−𝜀𝑖𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2√2𝜆+2
)] +𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝛼
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
) −
1
2𝜎𝑣
2 ∑ 𝜀𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=𝑖        (3.13) 
Then maximize the log-likelihood function using first order conditions to obtain unbiased 
parameter estimates for the stochastic frontier model. However, for the model (equation 3. 
9) described above, there is no direct closed-form solution for maximum likelihood. That is 
the likelihood functions cannot be evaluated analytically. Here, in order to calculate the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters 𝛽, 𝜎𝑣, 𝜎𝑢 and 𝛼, optimizing values are found 
using direct numerical method. Other methods such as maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) 
and Bayesian methods can also be used to estimate the parameters. Aigner, Lovell, and 
Schmidt (1977) were the first to use log-likelihood function for stochastic frontier analytic 
framework. The Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) method and maximum likelihood are 
same. The only difference is that simulated probabilities are used instead of the precise 
probabilities in MLS. Gourieroux and Monfort (1993), Lee (1995), and Hajivassiliou and Ruud 
(1994) have documented the properties of MSL. The MSL is usually implemented using the so 
called Halton draws instead of uniform draws (see Greene, 2003).  
3.7 Efficiency Estimation 
The main purpose of stochastic frontier analysis is the estimation of technical efficiency. The 
conditional distribution of 𝑢 given 𝜀 is usually exploited to get estimates of efficiency. This 
was first established by Jondrow et al., (1982)  Either the mean or the mode of this conditional 
distribution can be used.  Following Jondrow et al. (1982) the conditional mean function,  
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) is obtained. 
 Let ?̂? to be the MLE of   𝛽, and 𝜀?̂? = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖?̂?. Then the usual estimate of   𝑢𝑖, suggested by 
Jondrow et al. (1982), is 𝐸(𝑢|𝜀), evaluated at  𝜀 = 𝜀?̂? . The technical efficiency TE𝑖 can also be 
estimated by TÊ𝑖 = exp (−𝑢𝑖). However, a preferred estimate is  TÊ𝑖 = 𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} or  
𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝐸(𝑢|𝜀)} , evaluated at 𝜀 = 𝜀?̂?. See Battese and Coelli (1988), who also show how to 
define 𝑢𝑖  and TÊ𝑖 in the case of panel data. To obtain 𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) it is proper to begin with 
𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) =
𝑓(𝑢,𝜀)
𝑓(𝜀)
         (3.14) 
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Substituting the results from equations (6) and (10) and cancelling out like terms in the 
fraction, the following expression is obtained 
𝑓(𝑢|𝜀) =
2𝑢
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1
𝑒
−
(2𝑢𝜀+𝑢2)
2𝜎𝑣
2
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗 (
𝛼−1
𝑗
)𝛼−1𝑗=0 [1 − 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗) 𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)]
 
Noting that  
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) = ∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢|𝜀)
∞
0
𝑑𝑢 
Then, 
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) =
1
𝐾(𝜀)
∫
2𝑢2
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1
𝑒
−
(2𝑢𝜀+𝑢2)
2𝜎𝑣
2
∞
0
𝑑𝑢 
Where 
𝐾(𝜀) = ∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗
(
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
𝛼−1
𝑗=0
[1 − 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)] 
Setting  𝑥 =
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
 , 𝜆 = 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
2𝜎𝑣
2  and 𝑞 =
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2   as per earlier substitution, the resultant expression 
is:  
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) =
2𝜎𝑢
𝐾(𝜀)
∫ 𝑥2𝑒−𝜆𝑥
2
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 
Since  
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
= ∑(−1)𝑗 (
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
𝛼−1
𝑗=𝑜
𝑒−𝑗𝑥
2
 
When the shape parameter 𝛼 is a natural number, the following is obtained: 
∫ 𝑥2𝑒−𝜆𝑥
2
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 = ∑(−1)𝑗 (
𝛼 − 1
𝑗
)
𝛼−1
𝑗=0
∫ 𝑥2𝑒−𝑥
2(𝜆+𝑗)
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 
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The integral ∫ 𝑥2𝑒−𝑥
2(𝜆+𝑗)∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 can then be evaluated as (see Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 
2007 pp. 365), 
∫ 𝑥2𝑒−𝑥
2(𝜆+𝑗)
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥
= −
𝑞
4(𝜆 + 𝑗)2
+
√𝜋
4(𝜆 + 𝑗)
5
2
(
𝑞2
2
+ 𝜆 + 𝑗) 𝑒
𝑞2
4(𝜆+𝑗) (1 − erf (
𝑞
2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)) 
 
∫ 𝑥2𝑒−𝑥
2(𝜆+𝑗)
∞
0
𝑒−𝑞𝑥𝑑𝑥 =
√𝜋(2(𝜆 + 𝑗) + 𝑞2)𝑒
𝑞2
4(𝜆+𝑗) (1 − erf (
𝑞
2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)) − 2√(𝜆 + 𝑗)𝑞
8(𝜆 + 𝑗)5/2
 
Since 𝑞 =
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2  and 1 − erf (
𝑞
2√(𝜆+𝑗)
) = 2Φ (
−𝑞
√2(𝜆+𝑗)
), then; 
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀)
=
𝜎𝑢 ∑
(−1)𝑗
2(𝜆 + 𝑗)5/2
(𝛼−1
𝑗
)𝛼−1𝑗=0 [√𝜋(2(𝜆 + 𝑗) +
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣4
)𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗)Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
) − √(𝜆 + 𝑗)
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2
]
𝐾(𝜀)
 
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀)
=
𝜎𝑢 ∑
(−1)𝑗
2(𝜆 + 𝑗)5/2
(𝛼−1
𝑗
)𝛼−1𝑗=0 [√𝜋(2(𝜆 + 𝑗) +
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣4
)𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗)Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
) − √(𝜆 + 𝑗)
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2
]
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆 + 𝑗 (
𝛼−1
𝑗
)𝛼−1𝑗=0 [1 − 𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4(𝜆+𝑗) 𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣2√𝜆 + 𝑗
Φ (
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣2√2(𝜆 + 𝑗)
)]
 
 
For a sub-model, that is for α =1 or using the first term,  𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) can be simplified as  
𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) =
𝜎𝑢
2𝜆3/2
[√𝜋(2𝜆+
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑣
4 )𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4𝜆Φ(
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2√2𝜆
)−√𝜆
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2 ]
[1−𝑒
𝜀2𝜎𝑢
2
4𝜎𝑣
4𝜆𝜀𝜎𝑢√𝜋
𝜎𝑣
2√𝜆
Φ(
−𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2√2𝜆
)]
 (3.15) 
The estimate 𝐸(𝑢|𝜀) is the point estimate of  𝑢 and approximating the technical inefficiency 
of production. Once the point estimates of 𝑢 are obtained, the technical efficiency TE𝑖 can be 
estimated as the exponential of conditional expectation of 𝑢𝑖  given 𝜀𝑖 (i.e. 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝐸(𝑢|𝜀)}) as 
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suggested by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982), evaluated at the fitted values of 
𝜀𝑖 and the estimated values of the parameters. 
Battese and Coelli (1988) alternative estimator for the technical efficiency TE𝑖 can be 
estimated by 𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} 
𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} = ∫ exp(−𝑢) 𝑓(𝑢|𝜀)
∞
0
𝑑𝑢 
𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} =
1
𝐾(𝜀)
∫
2𝑢
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒−𝑢𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1
𝑒
−
(2𝑢𝜀+𝑢2)
2𝜎𝑣
2
∞
0
𝑑𝑢 
Setting  𝑥 =
𝑢
𝜎𝑢
 , 𝜆 = 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
2𝜎𝑣
2  and   𝑔 = 𝜎𝑢 +
𝜀𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
2  , gives: 
𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} =
2
𝐾(𝜀)
∫
𝑢
𝜎𝑢2
𝑒−𝑢𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
(1 − 𝑒
−
𝑢2
𝜎𝑢
2
)
𝛼−1
𝑒
−
(2𝑢𝜀+𝑢2)
2𝜎𝑣
2
∞
0
𝑑𝑢 
Thus 
𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} =
2
𝐾(𝜀)
∫ 𝑥𝑒−𝜆𝑥
2
(1 − 𝑒−𝑥
2
)
𝛼−1
∞
0
𝑒−𝑔𝑥𝑑𝑥 
From equation (3.7), 
𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} =
2
𝐾(𝜀)
∑
(−1)𝑗
𝜆+𝑗
(𝛼−1
𝑗
)𝛼−1𝑗=0 [1 − 𝑒
𝑔2
4(𝜆+𝑗)
𝑔√𝜋
√𝜆+𝑗
Φ (
−𝑔
√2(𝜆+𝑗)
)]  (3.16) 
Thus it is possible to estimate 𝐸{exp(−𝑢𝑖) |𝜀} by substituting in the maximum likelihood 
estimation of 𝜆 and 𝑔.  
In the section below, the different simulation data is generated and modelled with different 
SFA models with various statistical distributions. The stochastic frontier models used in the 
section include the Normal–Half-Normal, Normal-Exponential, Normal-Burr x and the 
Normal-Rayleigh models. Also in the next section, the models are tested against one another 
in order to conclude on the competitiveness of the proposed SFA Burr x model.  
3.8 Monte Carlo Simulation 
In order to assess the performance of the proposed normal-Burr X stochastic frontier model, 
a series of Monte Carlo simulations was conducted for the different cross-sectional stochastic 
frontier models. The estimation of individual inefficiencies by Burr type x is compared with 
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Raleigh, exponential and half-normal models. The Monte Carlo simulations are based on 1000 
replications using a standard simulation setting: 
y𝑖 = 𝛽0 + βx𝑖 + (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖) 
With the random noise (𝑣𝑖  ) generated from standard normal distribution with zero mean and 
standard deviation 𝜎𝑣  and technical inefficiency (𝑢𝑖) generated from half-normal with mean 
zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝑢 = {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6} and 𝜎𝑣  =sqrt (0.4 – 𝜎𝑢^2). The input 
x was drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1). Sample sizes are n = {20, 50, 
100, 250 and 500}. These sample sizes were chosen in order to analyse the behaviour of the 
estimations in small samples as well as in medium-sized and large samples. The parameters 
𝛽0 and β are set to 1. The generation of the output values y proceeds in the following steps: 
First obtain the deterministic output  
y𝑖 = 𝛽0 + βx𝑖  
This gives the true production relation in the absence of both inefficiency and random noise.  
Generate random inefficiency terms and random noise for each firm according to the 
distributional assumptions. 
Add the half-normal inefficiency terms u and the random noise v to the true production   
Subsequently, the various stochastic frontier models (Burr x, Raleigh, exponential and half-
normal models) were fitted to the simulated data. 
For each parameter, the standard deviation (SD) and the mean observed in the 1000 
replications are calculated. To assess the performance of the efficiency estimation, the mean 
square error (MSE) is calculated as seen below: 
MSE =
1
𝑛
∑ (TE𝑖 −  TÊ𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1  (3.17) 
Where TE𝑖 is the true technical efficiency for firm i and TÊ𝑖 is the estimated technical 
efficiency. The MSE shows the difference between true and estimated efficiency scores for 
the n firms. In addition, the Spearman rank correlations between estimated efficiencies of 
various models are calculated and analysed. 
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3.9 Simulation Data, Results and Analyses 
In this section, the simulation results are presented. First, the estimated mean values of sigma 
v and sigma u for various models are summarised in Appendix 3A. The standard deviations 
and squared mean errors are used to assess the performance of different SFA models. The 
results are presented in Tables 3.1 to 3.3.  The density curve of the estimated efficiency term, 
u, is illustrated figure 3.2 for Normal- Burr x and Normal-Rayleigh. 
Table 3.1: Standard Deviation of 𝝈𝒖 for various SFA Models 
 SD of  u for Normal-Half Normal SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.41 0.4 0.38 0.33 0.26 
50 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.17 
100 0.3 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.1 
250 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.06 
500 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.04 
 SD of u for Normal-Exponential SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 
50 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.13 
100 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.09 
250 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.05 
500 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.03 
  SD of u for Normal-Rayleigh  SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
        
20 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.21 
50 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.14 
100 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.08 
250 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.18 0.04 
500 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.12 0.03 
 SD of u for Normal-Burr x  SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.21 0.49 0.45 0.31 0.28 
50 0.28 0.25 0.39 0.36 0.5 
100 0.37 0.42 0.52 0.46 0.29 
250 0.29 0.36 0.15 0.44 0.28 
500 0.31 0.28 0.39 0.54 0.31 
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Table 3.2: Standard Deviation of 𝝈𝒗 for various SFA Models 
 SD of  v for Normal-Half Normal SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.22 0.21 0.2 0.18 0.14 
50 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.1 
100 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 
250 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 
500 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 
 SD of v for Normal-Exponential SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 
50 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 
100 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
250 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
500 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 SD of v for Normal-Rayleigh  SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
        
20 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.13 
50 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.11 
100 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.09 
250 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 
500 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 SD of v for Normal-Burr x  SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.16 
50 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.07 
100 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 
250 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 
500 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.1 0.12 
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Table 3.3: Mean Squared Error of Efficiency Estimates for various SFA Models 
n/scale MSE of efficiency estimates of Normal-Half Normal SFA 
 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
      
20 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 
50 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 
100 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 
250 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 
500 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 
n/scale MSE of efficiency estimates of Normal-Exponential SFA 
 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 
50 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 
100 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 
250 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 
500 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
   MSE of efficiency estimates of Normal-Rayleigh SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
        
20 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.05 
50 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.04 
100 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.03 
250 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03 
500 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 
n/scale MSE of efficiency estimates of Normal-Burr SFA 
 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 
50 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 
100 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.05 
250 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 
500 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 
*scale=sigmau, sigmav=sqrt (0.4-sigmau^2) 
Tables 3.1-3.3 are some of the outputs of the simulation exercise. In appendices 3A, 3B and 
3C, the mean estimates of sigma u, sigma v, BO and B1 are presented. For BO and B1, it is 
observed that all the models approximate 1 which was fixed in the simulation process. The 
Rayleigh model has relatively higher estimates of these parameters while the Burr x model 
has relatively lower values close to that of Normal-Half Normal. 
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Using the tables above, the SD and MSE are analysed in order to arrive at the performance of 
the different SFA models. Since the inefficiency term was simulated using half-normal 
distribution, it is not surprising the normal-half normal SFA model has the minimum SD and 
MSE for all cases considered as shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.3. Therefore the estimates of the 
normal-half normal SFA model are considered benchmark estimates while the other three are 
the ones subjected to the test. 
According to Table 3.3, it is obvious to see that the Rayleigh model’s performance is out of 
place when compared with the rest of the models. Both Burr X and Exponential models are 
quite competitive on the MSE test and have very low MSEs that nearly approximates that of 
the Normal-Half Normal model. This means they perform nearly the same in terms of 
accuracy of the efficiency estimation. In terms of increasing sample sizes, there is no clear 
trend and so it cannot be concluded that the models perform better or worse on MSE values 
when samples sizes decrease or increase. However, with the Rayleigh model, the MSEs of the 
efficiency estimates seems to improve with increasing sample size and may even get better 
as samples sizes exceed 500. It is important to note that Burr X SFA’s performance on the 
standard deviation criterion is generally not the best especially, for sigma u, the performance 
of Burr X on the standard deviation is probably the worst. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the standard deviations of sigma v and sigma u. For the SDs of sigma 
v, the exponential, half-normal and Rayleigh models generally have lower values. That of Burr 
are generally relatively higher. Using Half-normal as a benchmark, it can be concluded that 
both exponential and Rayleigh seems to fit the simulated data better than the Burr model. In 
terms of the SDs of sigma u, the trend is quite different as it is rather Burr X and the Rayleigh 
models that fit the values of the Half-normal model better than that of the exponential model 
which are generally low. 
However, for the means square error measure, the Burr X seems to perform better in both 
lower samples and larger samples. The Rayleigh, exponential and Burr x are compared in 
terms of their densities of the inefficiency term, u, as seen below: 
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Figure 3.2: Density Plot for Normal-Half Normal Efficiency Estimates (Median Efficiency of 0.9) 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Density Plot for Normal-Burr X Efficiency Estimates (Median Efficiency of 0.87) 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Density Plot For Normal-Rayleigh Efficiency Estimates (median efficiency of 0.87) 
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Figure 3.5: Kernel Density Plot of the Efficiency Estimates for Normal- Half Normal and Normal -
Burr SFA Model*1 
 
The Rayleigh seems to relatively overestimate the efficiency term more than that of the Burr 
X. In the plots above, there is evidence of skewness which is very important in the SFA 
efficiency technique.  
Figure 3.6: Correlation between Normal- Half Normal Residuals and the True Residual (v-u) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Mean efficiency for Normal-Burr X =0.7809778, Normal-Half Normal =0.8733968, Normal-
Rayleigh=0.9999885. True mean efficiency=0.8800 
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Figure 3.7: Correlation between Normal-Rayleigh Residual and the True Residual (v-u) 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Correlation between Normal- Burr X Residuals and the True Residual (v-u) 
 
Figure 3.9: Correlation between Normal- Exponential Residuals and the True Residual (v-u) 
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Table 3.4 Spearman Rank Correlations between Estimated Efficiencies of Various Models (σu=0.2, 
σv=0.6, n=100) 
  Half-Normal Exponential Rayleigh Burr –type x 
Half-Normal 1       
Exponential 0.9992559 1     
Rayleigh 1 0.9992559 1   
Burr –type x 0.9962196 0.9940594 0.9962196 1 
 
Table 3.4 shows the Spearman rank correlations between estimated efficiencies of various 
models (𝜎𝑢=0.2, 𝜎𝑣=0.6, n=100). It is obvious to see that the rank correlation for the efficiency 
measurements is really high in all the distribution types. It does suggest that applying different 
methods to the same data does not affect efficiency rankings. This observation is consistent 
with most of the literature aimed at comparing the different SFA distributions, the ranking of 
the firms rarely change and this study confirms it too.  
In summary, the Burr SFA is a competitive candidate for measuring technical efficiency. The 
experiments conducted used cross-sectional data and there is a possibility the behaviour of 
the model in question may even perform better in panel models. This could be an area of 
further research. 
3.10 Summary 
The objective of the chapter was to derive an SFA model based on Burr X distribution and to 
test it against other existing SFA models with different distributions.  First, the Maximum 
likelihood approach was used to determine the parameters of the new SFA-Burr X model. 
Simulation experiments were carried out to assess the performance of the proposed Burr x in 
terms of mean values, SDs and MSEs and compared with that for half-normal, exponential 
and Rayleigh. The exponential and half-normal distributions have a mode at zero, suggesting 
that a high percentage of the firms under study are perfectly efficient. The Burr x like 
truncated normal and gamma distribution capture wide range of shapes and also can have 
non-zero mode. 
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A comparison was done and a conclusion was arrived at regarding the competiveness of the 
SFA –Burr X model. There are opportunities to use other ways of testing for the robustness of 
the Burr X SFA model. A neutral distribution like a Laplace could have been used to also assess 
the performance of the half-normal SFA model which was not possible in this study as the 
data generated was biased towards the latter model. Another testing methodology would be 
to test the different models against their distribution types in order to judge which model 
performs well in almost all the distribution types.  Also, the performance of Burr X SFA could 
be enhanced in the panel form and therefore another study could explore the construction 
and testing of the panel forms of the Burr X SFA against existing panel models.  
In the following chapter, there is a practical application of the SFA panel models in testing the 
efficiency of the electricity distribution sector of West Africa. It would have been apt to try 
the newly constructed Burr X model in the applications to West Africa EDCs but unfortunately 
its panel counterpart has as yet to be developed. 
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Chapter 4 
Stochastic Cost Frontier Analysis: Efficiency of West African Electricity 
Distribution Companies 
4.1 Introduction 
Power sector reforms in Africa have been on-going for the last two decades, although at 
various levels of implementation across the continent. Undeniably, challenges facing the 
African power sector and other sectors vary across the continent but with significant 
differences between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa primarily due to disproportions in 
the levels of power sector development. The various sub-sectors of the electricity industry 
have evolved through the many reforms that have been deployed in the past. In spite of these 
reforms, the power sector of Sub-Saharan Africa is saddled with inadequate and unreliable 
power supply, frequent power outages and high technical and commercial losses. On the 
contrary, according to AfDB (2013) electricity prices in Africa are relatively high with an 
average of 0.17 USD/KWh compared to the East Asian and South Asian regions with an 
average of 0.07 USD/KWh and 0.04 USD/KWh respectively. The above presupposes that 
consumers are made to procure poor services at relatively higher prices while suppliers in the 
continue to post high technical and commercial losses midst of limited electricity supply  
Given the above and other issues discussed in detail in chapter two, it was therefore not out 
of place to see the involvement of the West African regional community in attempting to 
address this regional problem. Other multilateral funding agencies and donor agencies 
equally have been involved in assisting some West African countries to come out of this 
predicament.  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in addressing the 
energy issues of the Region established two regulatory institutions namely the West African 
Power Pool (WAPP) and ECOWAS Region Regulatory Authority (ERERA) in 2006 and 2008 
respectively by the decision of heads of state and governments (ECOWAS, 2008) in order to 
address energy security issues. These institutions have been charged to establish a regulated 
regional market as well as increasing inter-country connections and power generation. 
Regional markets require regulation and there are various types of this task depending on the 
objective intended to achieve. Nonetheless, agreeing with Farsi and Filippini (2008) and 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2001), benchmarking in incentive regulation is becoming increasingly 
accepted as a core component of all regulation types (rate of return or price cap) and it is 
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important in price setting or price control. In particular, efficiency targets are set for utility 
companies with the objective that their operations would be improved upon to reduce 
inefficiencies and make electricity more affordable.  The motive is that they will perform to 
achieve such targets to justify price increases during the tariff review period. It incorporates 
the reward and punish scheme that encourages efficient operations in utilities. 
Relative efficiency measurement is a principal component of most price control models in the 
electricity market and adequately measuring it provides accuracy in setting targets to regulate 
prices for the purposes of preventing utility companies from passing on unjustified cost to 
consumers. It follows therefore that in order to have an effective regulatory regime nationally 
or regionally, it is prudent for regulators to have an initial efficiency measuring exercise 
conducted on the existing utility companies in new markets with the motive that a benchmark 
of performance can be established. 
In the same vein and considering the establishment of a regional market in West Africa, where 
most EDCs are perceived inefficient, conducting an empirical study with a technique that 
holistically measures efficiency would be apt for two reasons. First, it provides an opportunity 
to estimate the baseline relative efficiencies of the participating EDCs. Secondly, it could 
confirm or otherwise the many narratives including that of Eberhard and Shkaratan (2012) 
and Kumi (2017)) that regard most EDCs in West Africa as inefficient. The level of (in)efficiency 
of EDCs in the region is normally “estimated” using uni-directional indicators involving simple 
ratios such as labour productivity, customer density, output per staff, technical and non-
technical losses, commercial losses and others. These indicators though relevant, do not 
measure the totality of technical efficiency, allocative efficiency or the combination of both 
referred to as economic efficiency. Therefore, the voluminous literature reviewed in chapter 
two offers an array of techniques that could be used to measure relative efficiency in a much 
holistic way. 
The main aim of this work therefore is to model the relative efficiencies of the EDCs of West 
Africa using an approach that captures both technical and allocative efficiency. The stochastic 
frontier approach is largely used as one of the techniques for analysing efficiency is employed. 
In this work, the stochastic cost frontier model is applied to estimate the level of inefficiency 
or otherwise in a sample of 14 West African EDCs and 1 East African EDC (Comparator firm). 
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By this technique, a stochastic cost frontier is randomly constructed for each firm with which 
their observed costs can be compared.  
The results of this research could be very important to the regional regulator (ERERA) as well 
as regulators of the individual host countries of the EDCs included in this research. Specifically, 
the estimated frontier cost model could be used to regulate prices for distribution networks 
that would access the Grid of the Power Pool.  Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) indicate that the 
endogenous measurement of efficiency is much appreciated in markets that are very young 
and there is need to set up initial performance benchmarks. This suggestion could take a 
central-stage given that the regionalisation of the West African Electricity Market is young 
and thus requires an initial efficiency estimates. 
The chapter is organised as follows: an overview of the stochastic cost frontier model is given 
followed by its econometric estimations and analyses of the various panel models. It is 
followed with an estimation and analysis of relative efficiency scores and subsequently 
concluding and offering some policy recommendations. An explanation or exposition to the 
stochastic cost frontier model and other sub-models is made available in the next section. 
4.2. Efficiency Measurement Using the Stochastic Cost Frontier Model 
A convincing and appropriate approach will be to briefly clarify the concept of efficiency and 
how the stochastic cost frontier could be used to measure it among other approaches already 
discussed in detail in chapter two. First, in the figure below, a distinction is made between 
the types of efficiency in a production function and how they are theoretically measured. 
Farrell (1957) clarifies the differences between allocative and technical efficiency (AE and TE). 
Figure 4.1: Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
 
Source: Daude and Pascal (2016) 
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With SS’ as an isoquant line, any firm (Q) that produces using a combination of x1 x2 to 
produce y and found on the isoquant is technically efficient. Firms (P) that lie above the 
isoquant are technically inefficient because they use more input than required. With an iso-
cost or budget line (AA’), firm Q’ is allocatively efficient since its inputs prices and quantities 
touch the cost line. A combination of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency estimated 
in figure 4.1 gives the level of Economic Efficiency (EE). 
In order to estimate these efficiencies various techniques have been developed all geared 
towards the construction of an optimum or appropriate frontier where both parametric and 
non-parametric options have been explored. 
One of such parametric approaches is the stochastic frontier model originally developed by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) is famous for estimating efficiency of production units 
through either maximisation of output, revenue, profit or the minimisation of cost. Depending 
on the objective of the model and the choice of a particular consumer behaviour many types 
of models can be estimated. There are also other extensions that are extensively reviewed in 
chapter two. The stochastic cost frontier was however excluded in the review in order to be 
elucidated and applied in this chapter.  
Therefore, this chapter focuses on the stochastic cost frontier methodology which assumes a 
cost minimisation behaviour to produce a particular output level, given input prices and the 
prevailing production or transformation technology. Due to the variation in managerial, 
supervisory capacities of managements of firms, it is implausible that all firms may operate 
on the optimum frontier.  Not operating on the frontier may infer that there exists technical 
and allocative inefficiency in the operations of the firm in question. 
In this investigation, a stochastic frontier cost function using panel data is considered. It 
commences by using the basic SFA panel cost function which is illustrated below as: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡   (4.1) 
 
𝑈 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1,2,3 … , 𝑇 
 
In this specification the error term is composed of two parts: the first,  𝑢𝑖  ; is a one-sided non-
negative disturbance reflecting the effect of costs; the second, 𝑣𝑖𝑡, is a two-sided disturbance 
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capturing the effect of noise. The statistical noise is assumed to follow a normal distribution, 
and the inefficiency term 𝑢𝑖, is generally assumed to follow a half-normal, truncated, 
exponential, Rayleigh or gamma distributions. 
According to Pitt and Lee (1981) panel data is preferred in efficiency analysis for at least four 
reasons. First, it is possible to observe structural changes in a firms production function over 
time. Panel data approaches offer the opportunity to estimate the efficiency of individual 
firms from a single cross-section. A third reason is that the use of pooled data permits the 
comparison of pooled approach to the traditional analysis of covariance approach. Fourth, it 
permits us to investigate whether the inefficiency of firms is time variant or time invariant, 
and if it is time variant, whether or not it varies randomly or not. Therefore, panel data models 
provide information about the behaviour of firms over time which cannot be revealed from 
cross-sectional data. 
The above features of panel models have consequently caused the stochastic frontier model 
to evolve from one form to another in order to offer more opportunities to analyse efficiency. 
The stochastic panel model with time-invariant inefficiency can be estimated under either the 
fixed effects’ or random effects’ framework as suggested by Greene (2005). These form 
avenues to explore heterogeneity within and between firms or units. The type of panel model 
to select depends on the level of relationship that is assumed between the inefficiency and 
the covariates of the model. Under the fixed effects framework correlation is allowed 
between 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖  whereas under the random effects framework, no correlation is present 
between 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖. The idea of the standard fixed and random effect models as applied in 
SFA is to produce a simple transformation and interpret the transformed individual effects as 
time-invariant inefficiency as opposed to pure firm heterogeneity. As such with the SFA panel 
models, it is possible to separate inefficiency from individual heterogeneity as opposed to the 
standard panel models that account for effects.  
Many other models that separate firm heterogeneity from inefficiency have been developed 
in the stochastic frontier approach to allow both effects to be identified and estimated with 
various types of assumptions for the type and interactions of heterogeneity. Some of these 
models will be subsequently explained in detail to enhance the methods chosen in this 
investigation. 
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A starting point with SFA panel will thus be the time-invariant model using a Cost frontier -
Cobb-Douglas function specified as follows: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝛽𝑖𝑡 +  𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖   (4.2) 
Where 𝛽0 − 𝑈𝑖 ≡ α𝑖  
α𝑖  and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 by the way they behave and as to whether they are correlated or not defines 
whether it is a standard fixed effects’ or random effects’ model. 
The notable drawback of the standard fixed effects’ and random effect’ models has been 
reemphasised in Greene (2005) motivates further extension of these panel models. Illustrated 
in two folds, the first is the inability to distinguish individual heterogeneity from inefficiency 
making all time invariant heterogeneity to be confused with inefficiency and the second, the 
implausibility of the level of inefficiency of a firm to stay constant as T becomes large. 
The model is thus further modified as seen below to include a time-variant efficiency term. 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡    (4.3) 
Compared to standard panel models and the time invariant model discussed in (4.2), there is 
a modification of the inefficiency term (𝑈𝑖) to accommodate changes overtime and hence the 
term  𝑈𝑖𝑡 in equation (4.3).   If one treats α𝑖  , i = 1, · · · , N, as a random variable that is 
correlated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 but does not capture inefficiency, then the above model becomes what 
has been termed the ‘true fixed effects’ panel stochastic frontier model (Greene 2005). Unlike 
the initially developed frontier fixed effect model by Schmidt and Sickles (1984),  Green shows 
that the true fixed effects model captures unobserved heterogeneity as the fixed effects.    A 
model is considered as the ‘true random effects’ stochastic frontier model when α𝑖   is treated 
as uncorrelated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in addition to an introduced random constant assumed to be 
normally distributed and reconstitutes the constant term to be symmetrical with a finite 
variance. 
In this chapter, the techniques employed include the time invariant Pitt and Lee (1981) model 
which is a random effects model with a time invariant inefficiency term (𝑈𝑖) and the Pooled 
SFA model which considers an inefficient term that is time varying. The True Random Effects’ 
Model (TREM) and True Fixed Effects’ Model (TFEM) are also used as proposed in Greene 
(2004). These two models allows for a separate stochastic term that encapsulates the time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The main difference as stated earlier is that the TFEM 
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permits correlation with the regressors while in the TREM, 𝑈𝑖𝑡  is independent of 𝑋𝑖𝑡.  As 
discussed earlier in chapters 2 and 3, the stochastic frontier model can assume different 
distributions. Thus the above models are estimated using various distribution assumptions of 
half-normal, truncated-normal and exponential distributions.  
Regardless of the distribution chosen, for efficiency measurement and scores analyses, the 
composed error term needs to be decomposed and the efficiency score computed.  Jondrow 
et al. (1982) showed that for the half-normal case, the expected value of  𝑢𝑖  conditional on 
the composed error term, 𝑒𝑖 is computed as: 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖] =
σλ
1+𝜆2
[
𝜙(𝑒𝑖𝜆 σ)⁄
𝛷−𝑒𝑖𝜆 σ⁄
−
𝑒𝑖𝜆
σ
]  (4.4) 
With 𝜙(. ) being the density of the standard normal distribution, 𝛷(. ) the cumulative density 
function,𝜆 = σ𝑢 σ𝑣⁄ , 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝜷𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖  and σ = (σ𝑢
2 + σ𝑣
2)1 2⁄   
The technical efficiency estimates for each unit was computable once Jondrow et al. (1982) 
obtained the conditional estimates of 𝑢𝑖  found below as 
𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 1 − 𝐸[𝑢𝑖|𝑒𝑖]  (4.5) 
Thus, in a stochastic cost frontier setting, efficiency is measured as the ratio of actual costs to 
the least-cost of production and can simply be shown as: 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 =
𝐸(𝐶|𝑢𝑖,𝑋𝑖)
(𝐸(𝐶|𝑢𝑖 0,𝑋𝑖)
  (4.6) 
Cost efficiency (EFF) predictions are therefore computed using the following expression: 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 =
𝐸(𝑋𝛽𝑖𝑡+𝑢𝑖,)
(𝐸(𝑋𝛽𝑖𝑡)
 ≥ 1 (4.7) 
There are other definitions suggested by other authors including Battese and Coelli (1988) 
Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar and Heshmati  (1996) and Bera and Sharma (1999) concerning point 
estimations of technical efficiency.  However, the point estimator of Jondrow et al. (1982) 
also referred to as “JMLS point estimator”, is much popular and used in many SFA packages 
as a default estimator of efficiency. 
In this section, the foundations of the Stochastic Cost Frontier Approach and its related 
models have been explained. This was a very important step towards achieving the objective 
of measuring the efficiency levels of the EDCs in West Africa which is the focus of the next 
section. The next section therefore presents the methodology and data used in estimating 
the cost efficiencies of the West African electricity distributions sector. 
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4.3. Methodology and Data 
This section gives details of the methods and data used in the research. It begins with the 
specification of the stochastic cost frontier function the electricity distribution. It shows the 
constituents of a representative cost function for the production units (EDCs) as well as 
factors that determine total cost in an electricity distribution system.  It is followed by a 
description of the data as well as the data collection process.   
In the efficiency estimation process, the cost frontier is applied to different panel models as 
well as different statistical distribution types. The Pooled, Pitt and Lee, TFEM and TREM are 
therefore assumed under different distribution types including Normal-Half Normal, Normal 
–Truncated and Normal –Exponential. The sub-models that are robust with significant 
variables are selected for further analyses and inference while models that do not fit the data 
are eliminated. Subsequently, empirical analysis is carried out and the cost efficiencies 
analysed. The Limited Dependent Variable Programme (LimDep) is the package used for the 
estimation of the above models. An understanding of the service provision as well as the cost 
variables of electricity distribution aids in the specifying a good model as well as making the 
making meaningful interpretations or inferences from the stochastic cost frontier model 
employed. The next section therefore explains the model specifications or the cost function. 
4.3.1 Specifications of the Frontier Cost Functions for Electricity Distribution Utilities 
The specification of the cost frontier model accounts for both endogenous and exogenous 
factors and can be seen below as: 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑓(𝑌, 𝑃𝑙 , 𝑃𝑐 , 𝐶𝐷, 𝐿𝐹)  (4.8) 
Where TC is total cost of electricity distribution and Y is the output represented by the total 
number of GWh delivered to consumers, while PC and Pl represent the prices of capital and 
labour, respectively. CD is incorporated to introduce some observable heterogeneity and it is 
the customer density which is computed as the ratio of the number of customers to the length 
of the distribution lines measured in kilometres. LF is the load factor, which captures intensity 
of capacity utilisation of the electricity distribution system. These linkages have cost 
implications and therefore the LF is a very important variable in frontier analysis of electricity 
distribution companies and  It is a derived variable from the peak demand of the system and 
the output delivered in a certain period (a year in this case). The variables CD and LF are 
therefore introduced in the model as output characteristics which create fair grounds for 
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comparison of firms. This is because most of the EDCs are normally limited by choice in 
determining which jurisdiction to operate as well as the initial consumer profiles which could 
significantly vary among the firms. For example, some EDCs have naturally low customer 
densities while other EDCs may have naturally high customer densities in some areas.  
The variables or drivers of the total cost of electricity distribution were established through 
an understanding of the daily operations of electricity distribution companies.  Building and 
maintaining the system of service lines, mains and transformers, metering or billing and 
collection of revenue form the core activities of electricity distribution companies. However, 
the costs associated with these activities can vary depending on total number of customers 
served, the concentration of consumers in the service area, the size of the distribution area, 
the total power sold, the length of distribution line, the security of supply and maximum 
demand. Other factors that could enhance the treatment of heterogeneity include, variables 
that can control for differences in quality of output, vegetation types, wind speed and size of 
area of operations but unfortunately due to the paucity of data, the specifications in this study 
could not include them. For example the quality related variables including hours of power 
cuts, frequency of low voltage, hours of low voltage, customer complaints etc. are very 
important in levelling the floor for companies that incur additional cost in achieving high 
quality standards of service. Unfortunately, the data on EDCs in West Africa for such 
controlling variables were mostly unobtainable. Even if they were available, they did not seem 
reliable enough and could have rather caused more modelling challenges. The lack of such 
variables are obvious limitations of this study and the cost function could have been enhanced 
were they made available to be included in the model specification.  
The specification in a Cobb-Douglass functional form is simplified with the primary inputs of 
labour and capital. Equation (4.9) represents the cross-sectional2 version while the other 
models are the various panel extensions. 
𝑙𝑛
𝑇𝐶
𝑃𝐶
=∝0+∝𝑦 𝑙𝑛𝑌 +∝𝑃𝑙 𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑙
𝑃𝑐
+ ∝𝑐𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷 + ∝𝑙𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖 
𝑙𝑛
𝑇𝐶
𝑃𝐶
=∝0+∝𝑦 𝑙𝑛𝑌 +∝𝑃𝑙 𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑙
𝑃𝑐
+ ∝𝑐𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷 + ∝𝑙𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹 + 𝑈𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖   (4.9) 
                                                          
2 This is discussed to offer a logical extension of the SFA model as it graduates from the cross sectional, Aigner 
et al. (1977) model. 
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Equation (4.10) specifies the Pitt & Lee model which argued as the basic or first extension of 
the stochastic frontier in a panel data and it is a random effects model with time invariant 
inefficiency term. 
Let 𝑙𝑛
𝑇𝐶
𝑃𝐶
= 𝑙𝑛𝑻𝑪  and   𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑙
𝑃𝑐
= 𝑙𝑛𝑷𝒍 
𝑙𝑛𝑻𝑪𝑖𝑡 = ∝0+∝𝑦 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑃𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝑷𝒍𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑐𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑙𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖  (4.10) 
𝑈𝑖 is time-invariant 
The pooled model is specified in (4.11) and it differs from the Pitt and Lee only by a time 
invariant inefficiency term. 
𝑙𝑛𝑻𝑪𝑖𝑡 = ∝0+∝𝑦 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑃𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝑷𝒍𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑐𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑙𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (4.11) 
Below is the specification of the true fixed effects model: 
𝑙𝑛𝑻𝑪𝑖𝑡 =∝0𝑖+∝𝑦 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑃𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝑷𝒍𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑐𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑙𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 (4.12) 
∝0𝑖  = time fixed constant and captures unobserved time invariant heterogeneity 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 is time-varying, correlation between the regressors and the inefficiency term is allowed 
The true random effects model is also specified below in (4.13) 
𝑙𝑛𝑻𝑪𝑖𝑡 = (∝0𝑖+ 𝑤𝑖) +∝𝑦 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑃𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝑷𝒍𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑐𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑙𝑓 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡   (4.13) 
(∝0𝑖+ 𝑤𝑖) is a random constant with 𝑤𝑖 distributed with mean o and finite variance. Here 
correlation between the regressors and the inefficiency term is disallowed. 
A log-log functional form is employed and input prices further normalised by dividing them 
by the price of capital (pc). Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2004) argue that such modifications 
impose a theoretical restriction that the cost function is linearly homogeneous in input prices. 
The idea is adopted in this investigation forming the basis for the adjustment made to the 
input prices in equation (4.9).  
4.3.2. Data and Data Collection Method 
This research is based on an unbalanced-panel data set for 14 West African electricity 
distribution companies. The time frame of the data spanned from 2007 to 2016. Data was 
obtained using utilities’ annual reports collected from firms upon request as well as published 
reports on their web-sites. The annual reports included financial statements and technical 
 
  
119 
 
reports from the EDCs and the regulators. Both published and unpublished data from the 
EDCs and regulatory agencies were collected, cleaned and used for enriching the data pool. 
By using other sources other than those provided by the EDCs, it was possible to detect the 
veracity of data being used. It was impossible to collect data for earlier periods from the 
Nigerian EDCs because their operations after the privatisation of the erstwhile NEPA (National 
Electric Power Authority) began in 2012. Electricity Distribution Companies in Ghana, La Cote 
D’Ivoire and Togo had annual reports from 2007 to 2014. An EDC from East Africa- Kenya 
Power was also included in the analysis to serve as a comparator to the West African EDCs.  
Some of the main unidirectional measures of “efficiency” are presented in Table 4.1 using 
2012 figures. Substantial differences are noted in average costs, labour productivity and 
capital productivity. On the other hand, differences regarding the load factor, which measures 
the utilisation of the electricity distribution system (production or transformation system) 
over time, are significantly diverse, ranging from around 29% to 72%. Descriptive statistics of 
the variables included in the model are presented in Table 4.2.  
Following, Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2004), total distribution cost computed as  total 
expenditures, excluding cost of purchased power from generators.   By doing so the analysis 
is not flawed with the influence of external factors not under the control of the EDC. For 
example, in most of the electricity markets analysed, the EDC has limited choice on what 
generator to purchase from as there are usually one main producer or very few producers in 
the market. That apart, proximity is put into perspective when deciding on its suppliers and 
thus may not be reasonable to investigate the level of efficiency in negotiation and cost 
management at that level.  Nonetheless, it should be considered as a vital input in markets 
which are competitive enough to offer the EDC to choose within a pool of suppliers at any 
point in time. In the context considered, the EDC has very little influence on deciding the 
company to purchase power and therefore including costs to reflect power purchased could 
flaw the level-ground created in the model used.  
Average annual wages are estimated as the total labour expenditures divided by the number 
of employees. Finally, in our models, the price of capital is calculated as the ratio of total 
capital stock and the GWh distributed (Capital/GWh). This approach is different from those 
adopted in many studies where added capital or residual capital is used to estimate the cost 
/price of capital. The justification comes from the belief that the quantity and quality of 
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distributed power depends on the entirety of the company’s capital including old and new 
distribution capital. This idea is adopted and perceived to be a better determinant of the cost 
of capital factor than the flow concept used in many studies. 
All cost variables are converted to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) using 2011 US dollars to 
allow for comparison considering that the sample of EDCs are in different countries with 
different currencies and price levels.  
The field work presented many data-collecting challenges but three main ones stand out and 
are listed below as: 
 There was no uniformity in reporting (both financial and technical reports). It 
therefore became a difficult task to understand the elements of the reports to make 
meaning of the cost components. 
 The EDCs, despite having a high level of public ownership, were reluctant in providing 
even financial reports that should have been a public document. 
 Different accounting principles were applied in different countries and this proved a 
challenge since components of the reports had to be disaggregated and recomposed 
to offer the right cost information needed. An example comes from the different 
treatment of labour cost or staff cost as well as the different ways depreciation was 
treated in the various financial reports. Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) suggest that the 
different cost treatments in various jurisdictions could pose distortions in most 
intercountry efficiency analysis. 
As a result of these problems, cost elements in financial statements had to be thoroughly 
regrouped and estimated to achieve accurate measure of cost variables which though 
meticulous could have been more efficient and avoidable. Particularly for Nigeria, the caveat 
by the regulator (Nigeria Electricity Commission) instructing all EDCs to publish their financials 
eventually sped up the data collection process. Having said that, data from most of the EDCs 
in the other countries were made available or could be found on their websites. 
In the next section, the empirical results are presented and analysed. The section reports on 
the estimation results from which the drivers of the cost of electricity distribution are 
explained. Also, the efficiency levels are presented and discussed in the context of the 
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performance of West African EDCs against Kenya Power (East Africa) and Nigerian EDCs 
against other West African EDCs.  
Table 4.1: Efficiency Attributes of 15 EDCs used in this Study (2014 data) 
Utilities Host Country 
Output 
(GWh) 
Capital 
Cost/Output 
(GWh/USD 
(PPP of 2011)) 
Labour 
Cost/Worker 
Load 
Factors (%) 
Customer 
Density 
(Cus/km) 
PHEDC Nigeria 1799 222689.36 29998.78 27.38 27.67 
YEDC Nigeria 730 33240.43 23909.47 34.01 6.81 
AEDC Nigeria 3458 293613.74 36855.46 47.91 72.40 
BEDC Nigeria 2589 130652.90 37482.63 29.44 49.77 
Eko EDC Nigeria 3164 213399.15 44469.58 32.99 102.76 
Enugu 
EDC 
Nigeria 3740 121716.40 27744.96 41.73 56.94 
IEDC Nigeria 3740 344509.57 36290.99 38.29 48.92 
IKEDC Nigeria 5500 193180.50 36057.24 48.67 28.63 
JEDC Nigeria 1582 252481.34 24143.34 32.25 22.22 
KEDC Nigeria 2933 262128.25 29575.15 58.74 76.69 
Kaduna 
EDC 
Nigeria 1936 237586.33 28198.88 52.54 43.16 
ECG Ghana 8370 881668.27 41940.90 64.98 34.56 
CIE 
La Cote 
D’Ivoire 
7319 29810.58 34806.61 72.00 29.12 
CEET Togo 784 250995.10 36620.69 65.00 37.70 
KPEDC Kenya 8087 497115.24 22309.03 62.89 48.73 
 
In Table 4.1, the attributes of the EDCs used in the study are presented. There is evidence of 
heterogeneity as some are relatively small, medium or large. It will be imperative to include 
controlling factors in order to level the grounds before any assessment is carried out. Table 
4.1 makes a more vivid case as the mean, minimum and maximum of the variables are made 
available. Especially, with customer density, load factors and output, the EDCs can be said to 
be very different. YEDC which operates in the upper most north of Nigeria is particularly low 
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in customer density of about 7 customers per km network distance unlike Eko EDC which is in 
the southern part of Nigeria (in the capital Lagos) and operates in a more dense area. 
4.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
In this section, the results of the estimation of the stochastic cost frontier model is discussed 
and the preferred model chosen for further analysis. The relative cost efficiencies are 
reported and discussed with the results presented in terms of efficiency scores of the Nigerian 
EDCs, other West African EDCs (EDCs from Ghana, Togo and La Cote D’Ivoire) and East African 
EDC (KPEDC).  
4.4.1 Stochastic Cost Frontier Estimation Results 
Before proceeding to present and discuss the estimation results, it is prudent to show the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the mode. Table 4.2 therefore indicates the 
logged variables that were used to model efficiencies of the firms under review. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables included in the Stochastic Cost Frontier Model 
Variable (ln) Description Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Minimum Maximum 
TC/PC 
Total Cost/Capital 
Price (PPP$) 
0.6920 
4.8450 
 
3.0853 6.4583 
Y 
Distributed 
Electricity(GWh) 
0.7982 7.9930 6.0753 9.0870 
PL/PC 
Labour 
Price/Capital 
Price(PPP$) 
0.4661 4.6127 3.0777 5.6445 
LF Load factor 0.3346 3.8696 3.2222 4.2777 
CD Customer density 1.0505 3.3780 0.2999 4.6968 
 
ln
TC
PC
= ln𝐓𝐂   and   ln
PL
PC
= ln 𝐏𝐋 
 
In the above table, it can be seen that the variables employed show some level of diversity. 
The customer density (CD) variable shows significant diversity with a mean of 3.3780, a 
maximum 4.6968 and a minimum as low as 0.2999. The suspicion of heterogeneity in between 
the firms for which the variable was included is becoming stronger and confirmed by a high 
standard deviation. 
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Table 4.3: SFA Cost Models 
Independent 
Variables (ln) 
Dependent 
Variable (ln𝐓𝐂) 
Coefficients of  Normal -Half Normal SFA Panel Models 
Pooled Model Pitt & Lee Model 
Constant 0.67212 -3.73207** 
Y 0.34302*** 0.36084 
PL 0.50578*** 0.51326*** 
LF -0.40447** 0.72599 
CD -0.02061 -0.09722 
Lambda 3.03739*** 2.75095 
sigma 0.96158*** 1.12986 
Independent 
Variables (ln) 
Dependent 
Variable (ln𝐓𝐂) 
Coefficients of SFA Normal-Exponential Panel Models 
Pooled Model P&L Model 
Constant 1.19069 -3.16358** 
Y 0.29917*** 0.35938 
PL 0.53605*** 0.53090*** 
LF -0.38129* 0.57666 
CD -0.05260* -0.08235 
Lambda 2.25446* 1.17994 
Sigma 0.45526*** 0.41981*** 
Independent 
Variables (ln) 
Dependent 
Variable (ln𝐓𝐂) 
Coefficients of SFA Normal-Truncated Normal Panel Models 
Pooled Model P&L Model 
Constant 0.55896 -5.52837 
Y 0.34065*** 0.56347* 
PL 0.51095*** 0.48323*** 
LF -0.39004 0.75130 
CD -0.02240 -0.16951 
Lambda 2.79863 1.80428 
sigma 0.85208** 0.70905 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant levels respectively. 
 
Also, as discussed in Jondrow et.al. (1982), lambda for cost frontier, λ=
𝑢
𝑣
 and  sigma for 
cost frontier, =√𝑣2 + 𝑢2 
The results of the estimation are set out in Table 4.3 above. The four stochastic cost frontier 
panel models discussed in the methodology were estimated using a half normal, exponential 
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and truncated normal distributions. Gamma was one of the chosen distribution but failed to 
yield meaningful results and as suggested earlier, stochastic frontier models based on gamma 
distribution are known to be problematic in its application in various data sets.  
Also, out of the four panel models used, results produced by TFEM and TREM was inconsistent 
and not robust with insignificant Log likelihood ratios. Generally they overshot the efficiency 
levels in excess of 80% and sometimes 99% in the case of the TREM. That apart, the 
estimations of TFEM did not produce estimates that conform to the apriori signs (from theory 
and application) expected for most of the variables.  Due to these shortcomings of the TFEM 
and TREM models, they have been eliminated and will not be included. The strict assumptions 
of these models may be violated as well as the panel problem of small size and could be a 
cause for the behaviour of the TFEM and TREM.  
The Pitt and Lee model is essentially a random effects model constructed for the stochastic 
frontier technique with a time-invariant inefficiency term.  Similar to a standard random 
effect, it is assumed that there is no correlation between the error term and the independent 
variables. The Pitt and Lee model produced consistent estimates but not robust enough 
compared to the pooled model.  
The pooled model is a basic panel data model which does not make any assumptions of effects 
but constructed to accommodate the stochastic frontier technique. In terms of the estimation 
results, the pooled model fits the data better and shows more robust and significant results 
with relatively higher efficiency levels than that of the Pitt and Lee model. It appears that 
certain unobserved variables in the model possess some random effect which creates the 
high inefficiency estimates captured by the Pitt and Lee model.  
In terms of the performance of the two chosen models on the assumed distribution types, 
the half-normal and the exponential seem to outperform the truncated-normal in terms of 
robustness and significant statistical estimates.  
The sub-models (with the various assumed distributions) of the two preferred models (pooled 
and Pitt & Lee) generally produced estimates with their expected signs. However, not all of 
the sub-models yielded significant variables. The Normal-Half Normal Pooled model and the 
Normal –Exponential model were selected to be the most competitive sub models with the 
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former being more robust and a better fit. Using the log-likelihood ratio test3, AIC4 (Akaike 
information criterion AIC) goodness of fit test and not ignoring discussion above, the Normal-
Half Normal Pooled model exhibits a better fit and it is the preferred model for analysis. 
Appendices 4A1 and 4A2 show the regression and test outputs of the two models compared. 
𝑻𝑪 = 0.67212 + 0.34302𝒀 + 0.50578 𝑷𝒍  − 0.02061𝐶𝐷 − 0.40447𝐿𝐹  (4.14) 
Where  
𝑻𝑪 =
𝑇𝐶
𝑃𝑐
 and 𝑷𝒍 =
𝑃𝑙
𝑃𝑐
 
Inference from the most preferred model in equation 4.10 can now be made to explain how 
the variables drive the cost of electricity distribution.  
As evidenced in Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2004)  the positive coefficient of the labour and 
capital cost shares indicate that the cost function is monotonically increasing in input prices. 
The coefficient of output is also positive which suggest that total cost (not unit cost) increases 
with increasing output and this is expected regardless of the modification of the model in the 
linearization task as discussed earlier during the model specification.  For the two factors 
controlling for heterogeneity (CD and LF), their negative coefficient suggest that as these 
variables increase, the total cost of electricity distribution decreases.  
The model was estimated using logged dependent and independent variables and so the 
estimated coefficients can be interpreted as cost elasticities. Therefore, for the the pooled 
half-normal model, a 1% increase in output could increase total distribution costs by 
approximately 0.30% while a 1% increase in labour cost could drive a 0.51% increase in the 
total distribution cost. For the factors accounting for heterogeneity, a 1% increase customer 
density could reduce the total distribution cost by approximately 0.1%.while a 1% increase in 
the load factor could effect a 0.38% reduction in total distribution cost. The load factor has a 
                                                          
3 The null that OLS (u=o) as a preferred model is rejected given that the λ< C (Kodde-Palm critical static). The 
pooled normal-half normal and the pooled normal-exponential models both were better models than the OLS 
alternatives. 
4Between the two models the pooled normal-half normal model had a lower AIC and hence could be 
suggested to fit the data better. It is therefore chosen as the preferred model from which further analysis can 
be executed  
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relationship with the capacity of plants and the peak demand of a distribution system and for 
a capital intensive sector it is not unusual to see the high impact it has on the total cost of 
electricity distribution. 
4.4.2 Cost Efficiency Estimates 
In this section, the results of the relative cost efficiencies of the West African EDCs are 
analysed and discussed. The approach is to look at the individual performance of the EDCs, 
sub-group performance (Nigerian, Other EDCs and Kenya EDCs) as well as the global 
performance. Year on year trends are examined and discussed accordingly. Tables 4.4-4.7 and 
figures 4.2 -4.7 are presented to aid the analysis and discussions. 
Table 4.4: Efficiency Estimates of the Stochastic Cost Frontier Panel Models 
Half Normal-Model Mean Efficiency Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Pooled Model 0.532983 0.208451 0.180192 0.874072 
P&L Model 0.503796 0.273277 0.170336 0.878942 
Exponential-Model  
Pooled Model 0.667324      0.162899 0.210497 0.864627 
P&L Model 0.418181 0.194281 0.153623 0.68549 
Truncated-Normal  
Pooled Model 0.506749 0.203718 0.197907 0.867606 
P&L Model 0.334982 0.239325 0.088716 0.782721 
 
In Table 4.4, the means of the Pooled and Pitt & Lee models for the various statistical 
distribution assumptions are computed and presented as above. The efficiency estimates 
produced show significant variability with high standard deviation values. The pooled models 
generally show higher efficiency estimates than the Pitt & Lee models. 
In Table 4.5, mean efficiency estimates for Nigerian EDCs, Other West African EDCs, East 
African EDC are shown across the various sub-models. Mean efficiency for Nigerian EDCs is 
the lowest when comparing all sub-models. 
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Table 4.5: Efficiency Scores for Different Segments of the Pool 
 
Normal-Half Normal Normal -Exponential Normal Truncated Normal 
Pooled Pitt & Lee Pooled Pitt & Lee Pooled Pitt & Lee 
Nigerian EDCs 49% 30% 62% 28% 44% 17% 
Other WA EDCs 63% 84% 75% 65% 61% 60% 
Kenya EDC. KPEDC 63% 81% 74% 63% 59% 58% 
Overall Mean Efficiency 53% 50% 67% 42% 51% 33% 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean Cost Efficiencies of EDCs 
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Figure 4. 3: Cost Efficiency Scores for Nigerian EDCs 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Annual Cost Efficiency of Benin Electricity Distribution Company (BEDC) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Annual Cost Efficiencies of Electricity Company of Ghana  
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The efficiency score estimates for three pooled SFA models are contained in Table 4.5. It 
shows a summary statistics of efficiency scores for the EDCs in our sample. The mean 
efficiency estimates for the EDCs for the Pooled and Pitt & Lee models are 53% and 50% 
respectively. The inefficiency or efficiency indicator (EFF) can be interpreted as the ratio of 
actual costs to the efficient level of costs and it is presented as in equations 4.6 and 4.7.  
Estimates for the Nigerian EDCs recorded an average of 49% with BEDC measuring the highest 
at 78%. It is by far the most cost efficient EDC in West Africa and shows a consistent increase 
in cost efficiency.  It is important to note that for BEDC to be the highest among its peers in 
West Africa requires further investigation. The results provide evidence that though Nigeria 
as a whole may be regarded as most inefficient in the public domain, not all of the EDCs can 
be labelled as such. Year on year efficiency scores for the individual firms can be seen in 
Appendix 4B. 
For the other West African EDCs, ECG of Ghana recorded an average of 59% with a steady 
increase from 2010 to 2014 and a specular performance of 87% in 2014. There was as sharp 
decline from 2008 to 2010 and the reasons for such a performance could be explored.  Both 
CIE and CEET of La Cote D’Ivoire and Togo respectively recorded an average of 70% and 62%. 
These companies performed relatively well but show a declining trend from 2010 onwards. 
The average efficiency estimates for more than half of the sampled companies had average 
efficiency levels of the less than 50% and this shows the extent of inefficiency in the electricity 
distribution sector of West Africa.  
Also, it is noticed that at certain periods attributed to a particular EDC, performance was very 
low and out of place. It will therefore be prudent to investigate the characteristics of the 
periods or time in order to appreciate the outliers or any peculiarities at the time. It might 
well be that these companies operate in a region characterised by other constraints peculiar 
distribution entity which were not considered in the specifications of the model. The use of 
more heterogeneous control factors or variables was avoided because of the possibility of the 
presence of multi-collinearity. More so, due to paucity of reliable and relevant data, such 
variables were not readily available to impose additional firm specific characteristics. The 
same problem is encountered by Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2004) in the Slovenian 
Electricity Distribution Sector. Growitsch, Jamasb and Wetzel (2010) proposed and applied 
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models with geographical and weather factors in estimating efficiencies of Norwegian 
distribution utilities with some of the models affecting significantly firm performance.  
Average cost efficiencies of the distribution companies are illustrated in figure 4.3 above. The 
inclusion of Kenya Power (KPEDC) in the analyses allows a comparison of the West African 
electricity distribution companies with an East African electricity distribution company.  
Figure 4.6: Efficiency Scores of Kenya Power  
 
 
The KPEDC records an average efficiency of 65% which is higher than the West African average 
of 52%. KPEDC also performs better than the average of the EDCs in other West African 
Countries even when the very inefficient Nigerian EDCs are excluded in the analyses.  
It may be concluded from the mean cost efficiency estimates that within the time frame of 
the analyses, the comparator from East Africa performs better that the West African countries 
except to say that CIE from La Cote D’Ivoire is the only EDC in the group under review that 
performed better than KPEDC (70% against 65%).  However, it is important to note that 
KPEDC’s performance in recent years has not been as good as its average and shows a decline 
from 2013 (70%) to 2014 (63%) while some West African EDCs show improvements in those 
years.  ECG for instance increased its cost efficiency from 70% to 87% from 2013 to 2014 while 
BEDC of Nigeria showed improvement from 67% to 77% in the same period. It is not 
farfetched to conclude that KPEDC in the past has performed better than EDCs in the West 
African Region but in recent years there seem to be a decline in its performance. This is 
reflected in a year to year analysis within a recent time frame of 2012-2014 where KPEDC is 
out performed by BEDC, ECG and CIE. The figure below is the average efficiency scores for the 
various EDCs with the 2012- 2014 period. 
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Figure 4.7: Average Cost Efficiencies for EDCs (2012-2014) 
 
 
By the findings so far, it would thus be prudent for KPEDC to review what steps or strategies 
were executed or not executed in the last few years to account for such a decline in 
performance. On the other hand, it is equally important to understand the current strategies 
of the other three, particularly ECG and BEDC in order understand what caused the significant 
improvements in recent times. 
Performance of EDCs in Nigeria after privatisation is another important analysis considered in 
this chapter. The results indicate that while some EDCs in Nigeria show an increase in cost 
efficiency from 2012 to 2016, most trend downwards which is normally not an expected 
outcome after the recent power sector reform in the country.  Only three EDCs (PHEDC, BEDC 
and Enugu EDC) showed an increase in cost efficiency. These results though shocking may be 
explained by the high cost of uncompleted projects which could have affected the total cost 
but are not producing any outputs. A situation where an EDC has a substantial value of work 
in progress could significantly affect its capital productivity which could affect the cost 
efficiencies for that period under review.  If that is the prevailing reason then judging EDCs in 
Nigeria a few years after privatisation may be unfair. However, they may be genuinely 
inefficient and such trends may well be representing the state of affairs. In that case the 
regulators may need to revise their monitoring strategy to incentivise innovation for the 
companies to offer quality and efficient services. 
4.5 Summary 
The deregulation of the West African electricity industry has changed the structure of the 
distribution sector. The establishment of WAPP and ERERA as institutions in the ECOWAS 
Commission was aimed at regulating the national and regional markets.  In regulation or 
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specifically Benchmarking, the efficiency indicator is very important in initiating price or 
costing mechanisms. The electricity generating capacities of the countries under review are 
already inadequate and therefore the utility companies cannot afford to worsen the situation 
by running at very low efficiency levels. Inefficiencies of electricity utility companies have dire 
consequences on consumers and governments with regard to access, reliability and 
affordability of electric power.  Regulating these companies may involve the use of incentive 
regulation and the benchmarking tools which give an indication of best practice in relation to 
the efficiency of an EDC’s technology and its cost of operation.  
In this chapter, the stochastic cost frontier technique is applied to technologies in 14 
Electricity Distribution Companies in West African Power Pool or ECOWAS region in order to 
estimate their cost efficiencies. Based on our findings, the presence of inefficiency at a mean 
level of 47% is confirmed. Comparing with East Africa, on the average even though EDC, CIE 
and BEDC seem to have outperformed KPEDC, the Kenyan EDC performed better than most 
of the other West African EDCs. It was poor in Nigeria as the cost efficiency levels showed a 
lower average of 49% with a declining trend in 8 out of 11 companies.  To experience this 
immediately after privatisation could be further explored as it is widely accepted notion that 
privatisation enhances efficiency. It is worthy to note that among the many reasons could be 
the high cost of unyielding investments as well as the cost of restructuring after take-over. In 
some regards the cost efficiencies observed may well be due to pure inefficiency of 
management or some constraints not captured by the model. 
The aim of this chapter was to determine the relative efficiencies of the EDCs in the ECOWAS 
region. The stochastic cost frontier model was applied using different statistical distributions 
to model different panel sub models.  The pooled sub model was found to be the best-
behaved with statistically significant coefficients and robust results. The West African EDCs 
recorded a mean efficiency of 53% showing a high inefficiency level of 47%. The narratives 
regarding the inefficient distribution sector have therefore been validated by the results of 
this chapter. It suggests that while few EDCs are improving on their efficiency levels, most are 
persistently inefficient and sometimes with a declining trend. This is worrisome and requires 
further investigation.  
It is thus recommended that regulators, management of the EDCs investigate and if possible 
emulate and improve on the strategies adopted by ECG, CIE and BEDC. National and Regional 
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Regulators could rely on these estimations to regulate prices using price controls that 
incentivises efficiency as was practised in the UK RPI-X regime.5  
At least, this study gives the state of affairs of EDCs in the sub-region which is a good place to 
start when thinking of regulating a regional market. Nonetheless, another important task is 
to understand the causes and solutions of inefficiency using approaches that can capture the 
rent seeking and opposing efforts of political and economic agents based on their level of 
influence and incentives.  
The objects of many power sector reforms of West African countries never fail to prioritise 
efficiency of power distribution. Accordingly, significant efforts and investments have been 
put into the power sector to reduce both technical and commercial losses. However, the 
results from this chapter give empirical evidence of a substantial level of inefficiency in the 
sector which confirms the narratives in the public domain. With the foregoing, there is the 
need to investigate the problem from a political economy angle to comprehend and deal with 
the formal and informal rules in electricity distribution in West Africa.  An understanding of 
how political and economic agents influence reforms in the distribution sector may uncover 
actions or inactions of some of the interested parties that eventually culminates into 
inefficiency.  Thus, using a case of Ghana in the subsequent chapter, the Political Economy 
Analysis (PEA) framework is employed to understand the causes and solutions of the 
persistent inefficiency problem in the West African Region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The UK regulatory framework until recently controls prices of network by incorporating retail price index and 
an x factor that includes specific targets to incentivise efficiency. 
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Chapter 5 
Political Economy Analyses: Inefficiencies of Electricity Distribution 
Companies in West Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
The inefficient state of institutional and sectoral reforms of the electricity industry of West 
Africa calls for further investigation. First, to some extent, most of the countries have had 
reforms with the focus on increasing accessibility and affordability. The underlying 
impediment to achieving these two important features of a good electricity market is the high 
levels of inefficiency in the various segments of the market. The link is that if there is an 
inefficient distribution sector for example, there could be high levels of losses that will hinder 
investments to increase, extend and maintain network systems and eventually reduce 
accessibility. In the same vein, an inefficient system has the potential of suppliers pushing 
additional cost to consumers and thereby increasing the price of electricity and making it less 
affordable. Even though there has been some progress in efficiency, there is still more to be 
done on this front as the level of inefficiency is still very high especially at the distribution 
segment. Therefore, it may well be the case that the import of improving efficiency which 
features as a common denominator to most electricity sector reforms has not been realised 
yet.  
Notwithstanding, while trying to understand the failure of such reforms, it is imperative to 
note that there is emerging evidence that reflect the notion that power sector reforms in 
Africa continue to be designed with the object of addressing technical, economic and in 
particular financial concerns. However, recent studies concerning interventions have realised 
the need for considering the differences in social and political factors across different 
jurisdictions and how they affect reforms in the power sector. As a result,  Scott and Seth 
(2013) suggest that it is very usual to find most of the reform designs and evaluations focus 
on technical, economic and financial issues without exploring interactions of the social, 
political and institutional factors that can affect outcomes of reforms. These expected 
interactions depart from mere stakeholder meetings which some policy makers adopt as a 
formality to indicate inclusiveness during decision making to a level where such useful 
inclusiveness can yield solutions that are acceptable, internalised and actionable. There is 
little or no attention paid to the politics, culture and economics that characterise or define 
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the stakeholders or change agents of the reforms that could enhance ownership and 
promotion of the policy actions for the common good of the whole society.   
In pooling energy resources together to ensure energy security, access and affordability - 
which are the main objectives of the West African Power Pool - the individual countries may 
navigate into a cul-de-sac, if issues regarding inefficiencies are not thoroughly investigated 
and dealt with. Efficiency studies conducted in chapter four have shown the existence of cost 
inefficiency in the Electricity Distribution Companies (EDCs) in West Africa. An average cost 
efficiency of 53% as presented in chapter four can only illustrate the gravity of the problem.  
Annual financial and technical reports of the EDCs considered in the study recorded technical 
and commercial losses in excess of 30% for even the relatively efficient companies. 
Regrettably, the consumers of these firms are saddled with power outages and bad quality of 
supply due to low generation capacities and fuel challenges regarding available generation 
plants. To this end, there is no better time to investigate and understand factors that drive 
inefficiency of the distribution sector as well as comprehend what catalyses its persistence 
after a long phase of unyielding reforms and policy actions. Fundamental to these intentions 
should be our understanding on the trends and dynamics of the interplay of politics and 
economics of relevant stakeholders or change agents which could provide meaning to the 
status quo. The drive to appreciate reform opposition and prevailing incentives which tend to 
nullify or reduce the impact of reform and investment efforts is the motivation behind this 
study and in particular the methodology chosen. Thinking politically to understand a problem 
can be useful in acting politically to solve sector problems. Infusing this in tools for 
development theory could enhance the building of “winning coalitions” that can enrich 
reforms as well as deactivate reform opposition as suggested by The Asia Foundation (2013).  
In chapter two, a background of PEA tool is well detailed and explained with the motive of 
providing adequate background to achieving the objectives of this chapter. In that section a 
review on competing methodologies was carried out with a succinct elucidation of the benefit 
of the PEA tool.   Political economy is the study of both politics and economics with more 
focus on the interaction that exists between these two elements.  Specific to the electricity 
industry, the interest is to understand the way political power and resources are allocated to 
incentivise rent seeking of influential and powerful stakeholders.  An additional concern 
relates to the commitment to revealing the implications of such dynamics on an electricity 
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distribution reform performance.  By using the Political Economy Analysis framework, the 
focus is therefore to investigate why several reforms have ensued and yet the sector under 
review continues to be faced with inefficiency challenges. The type of Political Economy 
Analyses (PEA) applied in the chapter is the problem-driven approach and  this calls for a 
thorough assessment that looks systematically at institutional structures and culture, the 
formal and informal rules of the game that characterise the institutions and even the problem 
DFID (2009). A key focus of the PEA framework is development entrepreneurship which 
employs an iterative process that progresses through three stages of technical and political 
economy analysis, development of strategies as well as technical and political action with the 
aim to understand why a particular reform has worked or failed.  
The PEA begins with a survey that seeks to investigate stakeholders’ perception on the causes 
and solutions to the inefficiency problem in the distribution sector. An attempt is made to 
understand consumers’ behaviour or reaction to the effects of an inefficient distribution 
system. The research employs a quantitative method to understand the end-user and experts’ 
point of view and perception of the problem.  In-depth interviews are conducted with key 
informants in order to clarify, verify and appreciate the results from the quantitative survey.   
While the overall study targets the West African electricity distribution sector, the PEA 
focusses on Ghana as an important case study, while drawing on relevant narratives and 
commentaries from other West African Countries to give meaning to the regional context. 
The focus of the chapter therefore to investigate and analyse the possible causes and 
solutions of the persistent high inefficiency levels in West African EDCs.   
The overarching aim of the Political Economy Analyses is therefore to understand the sources 
of inefficiency and accordingly propose an action framework or recommendations vital to the 
efficient distribution of electricity in Ghana and West Africa. 
The objectives of the PEA therefore include: 
 To understand consumer and stakeholder perceptions and reactions to inefficiency 
in the electricity distribution system 
 To identify the interests of actors and institutions that contribute to inefficiency as 
well as finding the related sources. 
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 To identify important concerns and related recommendations for policy and 
management to address.  
Subsequent to this section the research explores the politico-socio-economic context of 
Ghana. This chapter proceeds thereafter with a snap shot of the electricity sector by exploring 
key issues pertaining to reforms, associated stakeholders and its linkages to efficiency. The 
third gives an overview on the methodology and data employed. The fourth section discusses 
the results and analyses of the diagnostic stage of the PEA while the final section discusses 
the prognosis as well as the intervention stages before arriving at a conclusion.  
The PEA framework suggests an overview of the history, culture, politics and the general 
social setting of the people or change agents in the jurisdiction of investigations as a first and 
an important step. Therefore in the section following, the contextual characteristics of Ghana, 
its people, political structure and economic profile are presented. 
5.2 A Brief Profile of Ghana 
Ghana has a distinct profile in terms of its geographical location, natural resources and socio-
cultural setting. The political and economic history of Ghana is unique and could play a vital 
role in understanding the current state of affairs of its institutions and reforms in general. In 
this section, the above features are reviewed and exposed to bring more understanding to 
the inefficiency problem of the power sector of Ghana. 
5.2.1 The Place, People and Politics 
Ghana which is a former British colony is centrally situated in West Africa with Togo, La Cote 
D’Ivoire and Burkina Faso as neighbours to the East, West and North respectively. The Atlantic 
Ocean links the south of Ghana. It covers an area of about 239,000 km2 and comprises three 
broad distinct ecological zones: a small coastal zone, a forest zone and a large savannah zone 
in the North (McKay et al., 2005). The Ghana Statistics Service estimates the country’s 
population to be about 28.3 million in 2016.  The population is distributed unevenly across 10 
administrative regions which are further segmented into 216 districts. There is a clear regional 
development inequalities and almost all the political regimes endeavour to restore equality 
through various policies. Unfortunately, this dream has not being accomplished yet since 
dating back independence till present there continuous to be a significant differences in the 
economics and welfare of the Southern and Northern regions. Ghana is broadly divided into 
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North and South and the physical geography, the people and welfare contribute to this 
distinction with the former being worse off. 
The Northern part of Ghana was formerly under colonial rule and titled the Northern Territory 
was occupied by the British in 1897 and formally annexed to the Gold Coast (now Ghana) in 
1902. The North consists of 41% of the land area of Ghana, although it is home to only about 
20% of its total population. After the struggle for self-government, the British eventually 
handed the sovereign rule to the people of Ghana who became independent in March 1957. 
There is an inconsistent overlap between ethnicity and administrative regions in Ghana, both 
along the broader North-South divide and within individual regions. It is therefore not unusual 
to find the same ethnic group come from two different regions. According to Langer (2009), 
the country’s estimated ninety-two ethnic groups are often classified into four large groups 
that together comprise around 86% of the population. These include the Akan, Mole-Dagbani, 
Ewe and Ga-Adagbe where the Akans constitute the largest ethnic group (49%), and dominate 
in all the Southern regions, except in Greater Accra and Volta Regions. 
The second largest group are the Mole-Dagbanis who constitute around 17% of the 
population and are largely found in the North. The Ewes are concentrated in the Volta Region 
close to Togo and are the third largest with a population of about 13%.  The Ga-Adangbes 
representing 8% have the Greater Accra Region as their home. About 19 percent of the 
population is represented by a highly dispersed Guan people who live scattered in a great 
curve from Gonja in the Northern Region all the way south of Winneba in the Central Coastal 
Region.  And the Lodagaa in the north-western part of the country.  Ghana is known for 
attracting foreigners from neighbouring countries and many cases ethnic groups spill over 
these borders making it difficult to distinguish between citizens and non-citizen. That apart, 
other Africans have come from further afield. Due to the British Colonial days, inhabitants of 
fellow colonies like Gambia, Sierra Leon and Nigeria also migrated to Ghana and settled in 
pockets dispersed in the country. The largest of these are the Nigerians who dominate the 
group under review. After the Liberian War, some refugees that migrated to Ghana have 
stayed and settled and also forming a small minority around the Greater Accra Region and 
the Central Region.  
For the purposes of the objectives of this research, the sophisticated ethnic mix is very 
important in understanding the politics of electricity access and the management of utilities 
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in Ghana as well as its implications for energy inequalities. The exploitation done by political 
and cultural entrepreneurs as a result of the divisions and sub-classification will be dealt with 
in a later chapter. However, it could be less challenging to appreciate after considerable 
analysis to agree with Asante and Gyima5h-Boadi (2004) on how allocation of public 
expenditure could be linked to cultural and political divide elements. Political agents find it a 
normal practice to favour those groups and cultures that they are aligned with even in sharing 
the national cake.  
Figure 5.1: Map of Ghana and its Neighbouring Countries 
 
 
Important timelines in the politics and history of Ghana dates back in the 15th century where 
the Portuguese settlers arrived and commenced trading in gold, ivory and timber can be 
followed in boxes 5.1 and 5.2.  
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Box 5.1: Economic History of Ghana 
1482 Portuguese settlers arrive and begin trading in gold, ivory and timber. 
1500s Slave trade: Slavery overtakes gold as the main export in the region. 
1600s Dutch, English, Danish, and Swedish settlers arrive; slave trade becomes highly  organised. 
1642 The Portuguese relinquish their territory to the Dutch and leave the Gold Coast. 
1807 British dominance: British ban on slave trade from the Gold Coast becomes effective. 
1874  The Gold Coast is officially proclaimed a British crown colony. 
1957 Independence: Ghana becomes first black African colony to declare independence. 
1964 Military rule: Succession of destabilising coups, Ghana is predominantly a one-party 
 state. 
1992 New constitution, multi-party system is restored. 
2010- Economic woes: Offshore oil production starts, fuelling Africa's fast-growing economy. 
 Public deficit spirals. 
Source: BBC News (2018) 
 
Box 5.2: Political History of Ghana 
 
:  
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The political history of Ghana post-independence is composed of both military and 
democratic regimes. Until after the 4th republic in 2001, governance was interspersed with 
many military coups causing moments of fear and panic that curtailed the rights of citizens 
even though the leaders of these governments aimed to disallow economic injustices and 
marginalisation in many regards at the commencements of their regimes. They came with the 
intention to sanitise the economy but it might be a moot issue to suggest any achievement 
during this period of coup d’états. Nordlinger (1977) supports the above by suggesting that 
the military regimes in many countries have been associated with the same ills and failures, 
incompetence and corruption which they charged their predecessors of’. 
The last military rule that lasted for nearly 12 years eventually came to an end before the start 
of the fourth republic. It is worthy to note that such violent takeover of power has a potential 
to affect the psyche of the people of Ghana especially in the frequency at which they came. 
A certain generation still in the system must have lived in some fear and uncertainty and are 
likely to extend these attributes to their progeny or next generations.  The effect of coups on 
a group of people can contribute to some characteristics of a people.  Nevertheless, there has 
been a smooth transition of power from government to government from 2001 to date. All 
matters regarding elections have been dealt with in peace through petitions to the courts or 
otherwise. In the fourth republic, there has been many human rights acts that continue to 
enhance or improve democracy in the system. However, there are still signs of fear and panic 
regarding being discriminated against when some citizens air their views. People are normally 
tagged to a particular political party as long as they do not agree with certain policies or acts 
of a political party. This has degenerated into very essential elements of an economy including 
recruitments and award of contracts giving little regards to expertise and rather selecting 
based on political affiliations.  
In Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) that emerged from the erstwhile 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), a military government and the National 
Patriotic Party are the two main political parties that have been taking turns since the 4th 
republic. The NDC is supposed to have a leftist ideology and consider themselves as social 
democrats as they show a bit of the rightist attributes like divestiture of state assets. On the 
other hand, the NPP are rather more of a rightist but also show some main feature of the 
socialism such as the National Health Insurance Scheme, School Feeding Programme and Free 
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Education. Along the lines of electoral strongholds, the Akans have a strong affinity for the 
NPP whiles the Northerners and the Ewes are generally attracted to the NDC. It is not 
extremely polarised along the tribal lines in recent years as both parties have won some seats 
in areas known to be for their opponent. 
5.2.2 Economic Context of Ghana: Welfare and Macroeconomics of Ghana  
Present-day Ghana was involved in international trade because of its high gold-reserves, an 
asset that bestowed on it the name Gold Coast. European, North African and Saharan traders 
did not only exchange gold but also kola nuts and slaves. It was the Asante State that 
controlled prices through production and marketing. In the fifteenth century, and in 1482, the 
Portuguese were the first among the Europeans to come to Ghana to establish a trading post 
where gold, ivory and pepper from coastal merchants were purchased. In the era of improved 
navigation, the Dutch and the English traders also joined the search of direct trade at the 
West African coast where they eventually arrived on the shores of Ghana. The British 
eventually took control and engaged in domestic production of gold, palm oil and timber. 
With the inflow of luxurious or new products or consumables from Britain and other European 
traders, some African products (textiles especially) were displaced.  In 1878 cocoa trees were 
introduced from the America’s and cocoa eventually became a competing international 
commodity to gold. Ghana in 1920 recorded nearly half of the global production of cocoa.  
Gold, cocoa and timber have for many years been the main export commodities of Ghana 
until recently when oil was found in commercial quantities.  The structure of the economy 
has been export led with high import levels that have consequences on the strength of the 
Ghana Cedi. 
Ghana Statistical Service (2016) states in the labour force report of 2015 that not much has 
changed over decades regarding the structure of economy and its related employment 
structure. Agriculture, forestry and fishing remains the industry the employs most Ghanaians 
and engages about 3.3 million people in Ghana. This is followed by Wholesale and retail trade 
and the repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles (1.9 million). Manufacturing is the third 
major industry of employment, engaging about 1.2 million of the currently employed. In 2015, 
it is reported that more than half of the population (67.9%) above 15 years are employed. 
Unemployment in the region of 30% is still very high. 
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By the Ghana statistical services data in 2006, two revelations show that Ghana has made 
considerable progress in poverty reduction but there is still a high level of poverty in the rural 
areas particular as we move northwards of the country. In the rural areas there are more 
severely poor people than non-severely poor people. At the national level, poverty level 
stands at 28.5% and quite low in the urban areas at 10%. The inequality level estimated with 
a Gini coefficient of 43% is therefore expected. Inequality is confirmed by the Cooke and 
Mckay (2016) to rise in Ghana since 1992 but at a slow pace. They also suggest that highest 
levels of inequality are rather pervasive within particular regions.  
Figure 5.2: Aggregate and Sectoral GDP of Ghana 
 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2017) 
 
Figure 5.3 National Poverty Rates (1992 to 2013) 
 
Source: Cooke and Mckay ( 2016) 
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Increasing labour productivity is definitely a requirement for improving economic production 
and thereby it is a key requirement for a country’s development. To improve on labour 
productivity, it is important to continuously improve on the health and education of the 
country’s human capital. In Ghana and most African countries, it is believed that the high 
unemployment rate could be linked to the low level of education which prevents the access 
to gainful employment. According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2013) 28.5% of the working 
age population in 2010 had no formal education. About 48% of the working class have basic 
education while only 3% have university education with 21% having a secondary education or 
better. The country’s educational profile as well as the quality of the quality of labour force 
produced can seriously affect economic production especially when the standard does not 
meet industrial expectations. The narratives seem to suggest that there is a gap between the 
expectation of industry and the quality of students produced by the educational system. 
Current and previous governments have worked on the progressive free compulsory basic 
and secondary education agenda to increase the level of literates by supporting and financing 
the education of all Ghanaians in public schools. This intervention is geared towards 
producing skilled labour for the Ghanaian industry to increase productivity and production. 
This task accounts heavily for the budget deficit of the Ghanaian economy and its 
sustainability depends on how the government can continuously fund it without affecting its 
obligations in other sectors such as health, agriculture, energy etc. With high increases in 
population (refer to figure 5.8) government’s expenditure on education and health is 
expected to rise and the necessity of sustainable funding sources is therefore indispensable. 
Figure 5.4: GDP Growth Rates of Ghana 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
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Figure 5.5: Population of Ghana 
 
Source: United Nations Statistical Division 
 
5.3.2 A Recap of the Ghanaian Electricity Sector  
In part one of chapter two, a detailed analysis of the electricity sector of Ghana as a whole 
was considered. In this chapter and under this section, the focus is on the distribution sector 
with the aim to dovetail into the essentials that concern the running of an efficient 
distribution network. The goal is to understand the distribution subsector for onward 
utilisation in achieving the objectives set out in the introduction of the chapter.  
Ghana’s agenda to achieve universal access to electricity by the 2020 was initiated in the late 
1980s. In 1989 the National Electrification Scheme was established to serve as the principal 
agent or instrument to front the extension of electricity to all parts of the country in a space 
of 30years. The most recent access review suggests a national access rate of 82.5% in 2016 
from as low as about 20% in 1990. With an annual growth rate of 2.6%, the performance of 
the scheme can be viewed as satisfactory especially when compared to its peers in West 
Africa, however, it appears Ghana may not be able to achieve universal access to electricity 
by 2020.  As confirmed by Kumi (2017), there must be a special drive to attain full access by 
2020 and that comes with a herculean task of huge investments in all segments of the 
industry. Additional generation, reinforcement and grid extension must be carried out in the 
next three years for the 2020 target to be achieved.  
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Figure 5.6: Electricity Access Rates of Ghana 
 
Source: Kumi (2017) 
 
In the National Electrification Master Plan, a special scheme called the SHEP (Self Help 
Electrification) Scheme contributed immensely to the increase in accessibility. In this scheme, 
communities were willing to support in terms of logistics and labour as part of their equity in 
extending electricity lines to them before the planned time as suggested by Kemausuor and 
Ackom (2017) Government was therefore supported particularly in terms of electricity pole 
and meter procurement as the communities financed that from their internal resources. 
Apart from the supply of poles, the communities were committed to connecting 30% of 
households with installed meters to the grid.  
Electricity consumption continues to increase and the evidence of suppressed demand in the 
figure below suggests same. In periods, where the consumption detracts should not be 
misrepresented as a reduction in demand but rather a reduction in supply capacity. Though 
there is adequate installed capacity, the available capacity is always less than the actual 
demand.  There is a deficit in the supply and actual demand.  The required margins are 
depleted exposing the system to high risk.  In 2016 the consumption levels stood at 17700 
GWh after the system suffered a shock in 2015 as a result of unavailable capacity due to 
unplanned repair schedules, fuel related issues and other factors. The implications are much 
serious for the economy especially as over 55% of total consumption is the suppressed 
demand for the Industrial and commercial segments. To appreciate the extent to which the 
supply-demand gap poses significant risk, the energy requirements of the country is expected 
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to increase given the many policies of industrialisation yet to be realised by every regime of 
government. However, with an ambitious vision of one factory in every district, it is time to 
address issues relating to reliability, security and affordable power. Without a supporting 
power sector, the country will be heading for many redundant assets and waste of the limited 
resources. Like in other jurisdictions, captive power and community energy for industrial 
zones may have to be encouraged using if possible renewable sources. 
Table 5.1: Electricity Consumption by Customer Classes 
 
Source: Energy Statistics from Energy Commission of Ghana 2017 
 
 
Figure 5.7:  Electricity Demand by Sectors and Losses 
 
Source: Energy Commission (2016) 
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Figure 5.8: End-User Average Prices of Electricity 
 
Source: Energy Commission (2017) 
 
From figure 5.7, it is agreeable that the distribution system is overwhelmed with a 
considerable level of losses in transmission and distribution. From the figure above, total 
losses would be about 20%. This is really huge and are considered unaccounted power which 
continue to put the distribution companies in financial distress. High related tariffs make 
consumers unyielding to further increases as utilities propose cost-reflective tariffs. From 
figure 5.8 above, end user tariffs are running into 25 cents per kWh and the implications of 
that includes social exclusion and poor competitiveness of the Ghanaian producer to its 
international competitors.  If the system is allowed to run in the manner in which it is 
managed, the sustainability of it will eventually become an impossibility. There is therefore a 
sense of urgency in reducing inefficiency in the system. The narratives seem to support what 
is on ground as the network companies continue to suffer from revenue theft, power theft, 
mismanagement and lack of investment. The supply infrastructure needs reinforcement and 
capital injection to conform to modern practices that have led to reduced inefficiency.  
Chapter two explored the structure of the Ghanaian Electricity sector and showed the various 
stakeholders and their respective roles. Figure 5.9 below does same to recapitulate the 
players in the sector.  
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Figure 5.9: Power Sector Stakeholders  
 
Source: Kumi (2017)  
 
The power industry is segmented into generation, transmission and distribution. The 
generation segment is dominated by Volta River Authority, Bui Power Authority and various 
Independent Power Producers. A combination of hydro and thermal plants constitute the 
energy mix. Renewables is almost missing in this mix even though the country can boast of a 
5mw solar plant and potential solar and wind projects on the drawing board Generation is 
the most competitive of the segments and power from private participation accounts for over 
25%. Transmission is executed by Ghana Grid Company (Gridco) which is responsible for 
transporting power from the generators to distribution points. The distribution segment are 
therefore also responsible for retailing and there is not competition at that point of the value 
chain. Two main distribution companies exist and they are ECG and NEDCo. The former covers 
the southern sector while the latter is in charge of distribution in the norther sector of Ghana. 
Enclave power is a small network that is specialised for a few energy intensive industrial 
customers. 
There are national commitments supervised by the national regulatory bodies which are 
Energy Commission and Public Utilities Regulatory Commission. Regional (ECOWAS) 
regulators include WAPP, ECREEE and ERERA. Power sector reforms count from the moment 
of its proposal to establishment of a regulatory framework where EC and PURC were borne. 
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Unbundling of Volta River Authority followed then the establishment of the unregulated 
market for IPPs. Later on performance contracts for ECG and VRA including NEDCo were 
designed to be implemented. The creation of five demarcated regions of electricity 
distribution with only thee one in the Tema Enclave established and operational. Finally the 
rules and the technical issues spelt out in a regulatory framework or codes for grid operations 
were established to make the market work. There has been a call for reforms ever since with 
increasing inefficiency of the two main distribution companies. The usual rescue plan of 
privatisation of publicly owned utilities was proposed and ECG especially is going through the 
process to hand management to a private company. Manilla from Philippines has won the bid 
and is expected to operate the main distribution company of Ghana for a period of 25 years. 
The state of affairs calls for retrospection dwelling on an effort to unpack the narratives 
regarding politics of the power sector. The idea is to link the narratives to implications on 
realistic pricing, independent regulation, strategic investment decisions, and corruption in the 
sector.  
5.4 The Narratives and Politics of Electricity Distribution 
Distribution of electricity seem to be the crux of the matter when quality of service is 
concerned. This is because they are the closest to majority of final consumers (except bulk 
buyers like the mines and VALCO). There are significant losses in the technical and commercial 
operations of the distribution companies. The Energy Commission reports an average 
technical loss of in the range 24%-30% for both NEDCo and ECG. This loss is significant 
explaining mainly why a country with a generation capacity of 2936MW cannot manage an 
average dependable peak in the range of 1980 MW-2300MW. Thus the solution does not lie 
only in increasing the generation of capacities but also managing the technical and economic 
inefficiencies of these distribution companies. As suggested by the Executive Director of KITE 
(Kumasi Institute of Technology) in 2016, the low cost recovery and unpaid electricity bills 
leading to low investments in replacing deteriorated distribution assets accounts for the high 
levels of technical losses in the distribution sector. He suggests that the opening up of the 
market to competition in 2007 has not seen enough private participation or investment 
because over the years tariffs have not been great to attract the private sector. Also the other 
limitations refers to the exchange rate instability or depreciation of the cedi which reduces 
margins of profits.  
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The fact that electricity pricing does not match the cost of producing, transmitting and 
distributing of power as well as the subsidy policy of the government have significantly 
disadvantaged the entire power industry and thus require urgent deeper attention. The IMF 
in 2016 reported that the power firms in Ghana were in a GHS 19 Billion maze of debt. The 
borrowings of four state owned Enterprises (SOEs) including VRA, ECG, GRIDCo and the Tema 
Oil Refinery (TOR) owed such an amount to banks and their suppliers. They cautioned that a 
systemic crisis was imminent if the government did not take immediate measures to remedy 
the situation. The Energy Sector Levies Act (ESLA)6 came into force to accumulate funds to 
pay off the restructured loans of these SOEs in order to offer liquidity into the banking 
industry as well as reduce the financial obligations of the energy companies. The strides in 
improvement in technical and financial efficiencies have not been particularly satisfactory 
given that losses still are in the range 23%-30% of distributed power and an increasing trend 
in operating profit margin of 32.1% in 2009 to loss margin of 94.5% in 2012 (Energy 
Commission of Ghana, 2014). These indicators should be doing well in the era of increased 
turnover (increased customer size and per capita consumption) and revised prices but it is not 
the case with Electricity Company of Ghana.  Quality of service to final consumer continues 
to deteriorate but the blame certainly cannot entirely be that of the distribution companies 
since there are also issues with generation and transmission. In plain language, the 
distribution companies can only distribute what is generated and any problems that curtail 
the availability of power for distribution has the potential to contribute to some of the 
problems faced in this segment of the market. 
The above discussions and suggestions are common knowledge in the domains of power 
supply in Ghana, nevertheless, for many years, plans, policies, strategies etc. have not been 
able to adequately solve issues regarding security, reliability and affordability. This very 
dilemma propels the discussion around the politics of the power industry in Ghana. The many 
narratives seem to suggest that collective action of interest groups, political objects, and the 
economic and social attitude of the people overstep the common interest of all and eventually 
inhibit functional decision making. Discussions surrounding, Grid Extension, Tariffs, Power 
theft, uncollected revenue, lack of a common energy policies across different regimes, and 
                                                          
6These levies (GH¢ 0.41 per litre on petrol and diesel) serve as collateral and funding for 
energy debt restructuring with banks  
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others will reflect how inefficiency is perceived to be an outcome of the interest of political 
and economic agents.  
As suggested in other jurisdictions especially in the Indian case by Kannan abarnend Pillai 
(2001), in Ghana and most West African countries, political parties promise electricity 
extension to rural areas even before they look at the economics of it. They do so to win the 
peoples votes and may or may not even ensure such promises are fulfilled. In cases where 
they are honoured, transmission and distribution companies that are wholly or partly owned 
by the government are coerced to providing such services without any frantic cost benefit 
analyses. Sometimes, certain projects are rushed and higher costs incurred because elections 
are close by and the government in power dreads to lose power. In such cases, investment 
decisions are not necessarily the best. The misgivings of the cost efficiency of such projects 
seems to be justifiable apparent in the circumstance. An extension of this behaviour is 
observed by Scott and Seth (2013) who suggest that during these periods, projects including 
grid extensions create avenues for rent seeking and to justify “judicious” use of funds, 
politicians are more attracted to tangible infrastructure than improving reliability of service, 
regulation and efficiency. 
Electricity tariffs are normally decided by the relevant regulatory authority. There are 
normally price control models designed by experts but it is true that the real cost of electricity 
is not reflected. Political parties are known to have declared prices before consulting the 
supposedly independent regulator. In cases, where they do, it is perceived to be manipulated 
by the incumbent government for their political interest. The norm seems to be that the 
opposition parties tends to be quite critical of the regulators and seem to fight for the general 
consumer and the private enterprise engaged in the power sector.  
According to ESMAP (2005) in their report on Ghana,  the price of electricity is a dangerous 
“political tool” such that any government anticipates dire electoral consequences especially 
when tariffs are increased during periods close to elections. It is noted that residential 
consumers have little influence on tariff setting during periods within elections but become 
very powerful negotiators during election years. This and the related economic hardship on 
the citizens are some of the reasons why electricity price increases tends to be contested 
vehemently governments even if it is intended to make utilities more financially and 
technically sustainable. Examples in Ghana are numerous with the most recent one being the 
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price increases during 2016 by the Electricity Company of Ghana. Prices were increased to 
over 50% by the then NDC government that needed to repay outstanding debt to the IPPs in 
face of power shortages. With such a courage, the protest by unionist, Association of Ghana 
Industries, opposition parties and the citizenry as whole caused the government to remove 
taxes and reduce the price of electricity towards the commencement of the 2016 elections. 
The opposition party then promised a massive reduction of prices should they be voted in 
power. 
In order to deliver their manifesto promises or otherwise, then opposition power reduced 
electricity prices not long after they were voted into power in 2017. However, the contrast is 
that, the government will be penalised as well when the system suffers power outages 
because of the unsustainable operations of the utilities. There is not much of a choice than to 
continuously declare subsidies and respites that leave the distribution companies in huge 
debt. Organised Unions are aggressive when it comes to power price increases and will do 
within their rights and power to threaten and eventually stop government from supporting 
such increment. 
 It is true also, that because of government’s ability to control the utilities, some consumers 
also suspect issues around wrong metering as a strategic way of secretly increasing prices 
even though the utilities continue to defend it as genuine malfunctioning of pricing software.  
Power theft is thought of as a social problem that is exacerbated by the economic woes of 
the lower income bracket. Nonetheless, even consumers in higher income brackets have been 
charged for power theft. A longstanding solution around power theft regarding smart 
metering, prepaid meters and whistle blowing have not achieved much. Investigations 
conducted by Anas (2012) among many narratives suggest that there is some level of internal 
opposition impeding the fight against power theft and non-payment for electricity usage by 
even high load consumers. They found that there is some collusion between the contracted 
meter readers, ECG staff and disconnected consumers. In the investigations, moneys were 
paid to staff to either stop or postpone meter disconnection.  
With prepaid consumers, the same staff are alleged to be bribed so as to stop reporting by-
passing or meter tempering cases. The public perception is that there are many under-
dealings where ECG staff are involved with the burning of warehouses stocked with meters 
cited as one of the controversial cases. Over 25000 prepaid metres worth $2 Million were 
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burnt in the fire that broke out at the Kumasi warehouse.  More so, the reluctant efforts of 
distribution utilities to find other ways of ensuring 100% prepaid meters for consumers 
especially in areas or localities known for power theft. Unrecovered revenue losses prevails 
at a rate that is alarming and yet not much has been done to intensify collection and 
prosecution. There is enough evidence in the narrative that some agents may be collectively 
truncating the process for their personal gain. Last but not the least, the politics regarding 
abandoning projects of past governments extend to all sectors including energy, housing, 
health, education, transportation, infrastructure development and many more. Many authors 
have suggested the lack of consistency in the policies on energy from one regime to the other. 
In the narratives, it seems to suggest that policies are changed partly for the purpose of 
assuming ownership or entitlement but not for the motive of enhancing its intended aims for 
the general welfare of the people. A case in point is the pending investigation into the 
purchase of electricity budges at a critical time of energy shortages where the then party in 
opposition suspected over-invoicing and later renegotiated terms that are considered worse 
of the previous Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with AMERI7. The influence of other witty 
influential people in the communities could be another factor that may influence the rules of 
the games.  
Renewable energy at the moment is a minute part of the total generation. There has been a 
policy direction to increase renewable energy in the energy mix to account for 20% in the 
2030. In order to meet these targets, a renewable energy master plan has been developed. 
The Energy Commission working with different governmental and non-governmental 
agencies promotes alternative energy by granting licenses for their respective operations. 
Similar to securing licenses for generating conventional energy, many influential and elite 
have secured these limited licenses and hold it high in esteem without commencing projects. 
This is done at the expense of industrious entrepreneurs who have the desire and skills to 
operate.  Regarding contracts of renewable energy generation with the utilities, feed in tariffs 
are negotiated by all parties. Interest groups may push for more compensation in which the 
increased cost of production is absorbed by the consumers. Others have explained the 
bureaucracy in the application of licenses to offer services to the electricity distribution 
                                                          
7 Africa Middle East Resources Investment Limited is a privately owned group that has an Energy subsidiary 
with an object of providing innovative and clean energy solutions. 
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sector. There are many such narratives such as those discussed above that could add to the 
inefficiency problem of the Electricity Supply Industry of Ghana. The Political Economy 
Analysis therefore intends to investigate empirically to substantiate or debunk these 
assertions, allegations or perception in the public domain as well as profess possible pathways 
for managerial and policy actions  
5.5 Methodology and Data 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, using Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) as a case 
study, a political economy analysis framework is adopted to understand the interplay of 
politics and economics that contribute to the inefficiency of the distribution system. It is 
important to recap the analytical framework of the PEA framework (explained in section 2.3) 
in order to enhance the comprehension of the methodology chosen. At this point, the 
problem of inefficiency of the distribution sector has been identified from previous chapters 
and therefore the diagnostic stage comes next where features of political economy are 
identified. The prognosis stage has the ability to uncover potential for change and the most 
realistic avenues or pathways for change. The intervention stage which is the final stage of 
the framework details the specific actors are that could reshape the incentives in a manner 
that enhances the required change.  
To accomplish the three last stages of the framework, the PEA employs both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to capture the perception and opinions of stakeholders on the issue 
at stake. The interest in understanding the perception of the consumers on inefficiency is key 
to validating their responses beforehand. The way consumers respond to an inefficient 
distribution system is also important in the discussion of the causes and solutions of the 
inefficiency problem. Investigating consumers’ reactions to an inefficient system could 
therefore augment the understanding of the existing system. The methodology and data used 
are based on the three objectives highlighted in the introduction section of the chapter. First, 
a survey is used to explore the perception of consumers and their reaction to an inefficient 
distribution system. Secondly, the core of the PEA framework is used to find possible political 
economy avenues that contributes to the problem. Finally, it is the objective of this 
investigation to find plausible recommendations to policy makers and management of EDCs 
to consider in tackling the problem.  
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In the first phase, consumers of electricity including industrial, commercial and residential 
users of electricity were the participants in the survey conducted using a questionnaire that 
is tested and verified using a structural equation model. The second phase of data collection 
was accomplished by using in-depth face-to-face interviews, video interviews and transcribed 
interviews in newspaper articles conducted by third parties.  Therefore a mixed approach was 
utilised to augment the PEA analysis and such an approach is in line with the suggestions 
made by Barnet (2016) in relation to supporting PEA with ‘factual evidence’ especially in 
measuring the perception of stakeholders on reform changes. Incorporating such an element 
is useful to determine whether the actors’ perceptions of the impacts of change are valid 
before considering such information into building coalitions for change. 
The output of the questionnaire designed for the study is used to solicit opinions on both 
consumer perception and consumer reactions towards an inefficient distribution system. This 
chapter focuses on key issues identified in the survey and further interrogates these using 
interviews of selected stake-holders which then becomes useful data for the diagnostic stage 
of the political economy analyses task.  
In view that the questionnaire designed has not been tested before, there is a need to validate 
it before the data collection stage. This task is the first to be carried out before the 
quantitative analysis can be conducted. This is followed by the qualitative analysis after which 
recommended change factors or actions are identified and discussed for the necessary 
stakeholders or interest groups to consider for action. 
A Structural Equation Model (discussed in the next section) is used to validate the survey 
instrument as well as confirm the perception of the respondents on the efficiency of the 
electricity distribution sector before subjecting any information collected to analysis. A brief 
overview of the theoretical framework of SEM is given in the succeeding section in order to 
bring adequate understanding to the validation technique.  
5.5.1 Structural Equation Modelling Framework 
Structural Equation Model (SEM) is suggested by Kaplan (2001) as one of the most popular 
statistical methodologies used in quantitative analyses by social scientists. As an extension of 
factor analysis, SEM is constructed to mainly test fundamental theory using empirical data. 
For example, in the questionnaire used in the PEA analyses, it is suggested that variables that 
determine the benefit of an efficient system and the variables that determine the attribute 
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of an inefficient electricity distribution system could determine how consumers or 
stakeholder perceive efficiency of electricity distribution by a particular utility.  In SEM, the 
focus normally is on latent constructs which are abstract psychological or mental variables 
like “perception”, “intelligence” or “attitude “regarding a certain service or product. However, 
to do so, the manifest variables that measure these constructs though not the main interest 
are the measurable determinants or factors called items. 
In general, the SEM is a system of linear equations with several unobservable variables 
(constructs) and observed variables.  A structural part links the constructs to each other and 
a measurement part that connects the construct to observed measurements. This framework 
is normally displayed in a visual form called a path diagram.  The SEM is estimated from a 
measurable data set and inferences drawn with other tests performed to validate the 
substantive theory (Sinharay, 2010). To this end, SEM allows multiple measures to be 
associated with a single latent construct. A structural equation model implies a structure of 
the covariance matrix of the measures. Once the model's parameters have been estimated, 
the resulting model-implied covariance matrix can then be compared to an empirical or data-
based covariance matrix. If the two matrices are consistent with one another, then the 
structural equation model can be considered a plausible explanation for relations between 
the measures. 
Using SEM in this investigation, the interest is in the validation of the questionnaires as a 
research tool for measuring accurately the views of the participants in the sample used. In 
this case, it is important to measure the perception of the respondents on an inefficient 
distribution utility before carrying out our political economy analysis which is the aim for using 
SEM. Also with this exercise, it can be established whether the respondents did have an 
appreciation of the concept of efficiency in electricity distribution before taking part in the 
survey and also to find how consistent they were with their responses. Therefore, using the 
SEM in our PEA analysis, consistency and confidence in the survey responses are explored 
before subjecting them to any rigorous analysis. Our two factors of inefficiency attributes and 
benefits of efficiency are assumed to relate to the latent construct of inefficiency perception. 
The two factors are also determined by measurable variables called items. In figure 5.10 
below the components of the SEM used for determining the perception of stakeholders on 
power distribution is illustrated. 
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Figure 5.10: Framework of SEM  
 
 
 
The items of the factors are measured using responses from Likert-scaled questions or 
variables that determine the factors A and B. (refer to Appendix 5A: Questions 5 and 12)   
 Usually with SEM an exploratory analysis is first executed which randomly conducts a factor 
analysis on the constructs. The output of the exploratory analysis indicates how all the 
constructs may be relating to the latent construct without classifying the intended factors. It 
normally confirms the possible factor classes that load on to the latent construct. A 
confirmatory factor analysis then follows using the items that satisfactorily load on to the 
constructs. For validation purposes, various tests are normally conducted on the SEM and 
include convergent validity, discriminant validity and the fitness tests which are briefly 
explained below. 
Convergent validity is conducted and this is manifested when each item correlates strongly 
with its intended construct. Thus the items that are indicative of the construct should share a 
high proportion of variance in common. Convergent validity evaluated by measuring statistics 
such as the individual item reliability, construct reliability (CR) and average variance extract 
(AVE).  The items should all be correlated with each other to varying degrees and this means 
that the average inter-item correlation should be in the moderate range. (0.2 to 0.80 is 
assumed to be moderate range to item-total correlations). Fornell and Larcker (1981) 
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proposed a three- condition criterion that must hold to be convergent valid. First, all item 
factor loadings should be significant and exceed 0.5. Also, construct reliabilities should not be 
less than 0.7. Lastly the AVE by each construct should exceed the variance due to 
measurement error for the construct (i.e. AVE should exceed 0.5) 
If AVE is less than 0.5 then the variance due to measurement error is larger than the variance 
explained by the construct. A scenario of this kind tells us the validity of the items as well as 
the construct is questionable (Fornell and Larcker (1981)). A rule of thumb with AVE in excess 
of 0.5 is proposed for convergent validity according to Hair et al. (2010). 
Discriminant validity measures the extent to which a construct is truly distinct from other 
constructs (Bagozzi, Yi, and Philips, 1991). This implies that a construct should explain better 
the variance of its own items than the variance of other assessment objectives. Fornell and 
Larcker (1981) suggest that discriminant validity is established if a construct accounts for 
more variance in its associated item variables than it shares with other constructs in the same 
model. The discriminant validity is therefore evaluated by comparing the AVEs with the 
squared correlations for each of the constructs. The AVE of the construct should thus be 
higher than the squared correlations between the construct and all the other constructs. 
Model fitness of SEM is another way of validating our model. The model fit measures the 
extent to which the covariance predicted by the model corresponds to the observed 
covariance in the data.  A common approach used for model performance is the model 
convergence which suggests whether the model converged within the limited iterations or 
not (within 500 iteration in our study) The model goodness of fit approach which is evaluated 
using the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI) 
and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI).  
With adequate elucidation of the methods and approaches employed, the next section 
describes the type of data, their sources and collection procedure used. 
5.5.2 Sampling and Data Collection Methods 
For the quantitative survey, the study administered questionnaires to all stakeholder types in 
the electricity industry. The response rate was 57% for 100 questionnaires distributed. The 
questionnaires were disseminated to residential consumers, commercial consumers, 
industrial consumers and experts/consumers using various approaches. Survey Monkey was 
used for the design and electronic dissemination of survey questionnaires. A portion of the 
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questionnaires were delivered manually by post. Since the primary focus of the quantitative 
analyses was to give direction or guidelines to the details of the in-depth interviews in the 
qualitative analysis, the sample size of 57 used was fit for purpose. The area covered by the 
survey falls in the jurisdiction of Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) with its operations in the 
Southern Sector of Ghana and covering cities including Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast, Koforidua 
and Takoradi. Most of the experts and staff were located in the Accra and Kumasi where the 
Utility has its Strategic Business Units and a Head Office.  The questionnaires found in 
Appendix 5B covered the following areas as: 
 Consumer and expert knowledge of the industry or market or reforms  
 Consumer behaviour or reaction in an inefficient distribution system 
 Consumer and expert perception on management of EDC 
 Consumer and expert views on electricity regulation 
 Consumers and experts views on political interference of the electricity distribution 
system 
 Consumers and experts opinion on the proposed privatisation or concession 
arrangement of the EDC. 
The survey data from survey monkey was imported into SPSS and that of the manually filled 
questionnaires inputted into same software.  
Analysis was then done subsequent to merging the responses from the two data collection 
platforms. Responses were plotted in graphs and discussed accordingly. Trends and clear 
consumer behaviour patterns were discovered and discussed in the context of understanding 
why these trends and patterns exist. The opinions of the stakeholders in the questionnaire 
were identified analysed and incorporated in the qualitative analysis section. 
In the qualitative survey, 20 stakeholders (detailed in Appendix 5) consisting of experts, 
regulators, civil society groups, consumers, management and staff of ECG were interviewed 
on a face-face basis.  Over 40 commentaries from articles in newspapers, video interviews of 
key stakeholders who were not captured in the face to face session form part of the data pool. 
Secondary sources of data including commentaries and interviews from regulatory bodies, 
Management ECG, Operational Staff of ECG, experts, multilateral and donor agencies like the 
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World Bank, USAID and AfDB enriched the data pool. These information were coded in Nvivo 
programme and analysed using a thematic approach.  From theory and literature, certain 
themes were developed before coding and that was a good place to commence the thematic 
approach adopted. These themes or categories were refined and enriched as coding 
progressed, following an inductive category development process. To clarify, themes were 
split, combined, deleted, and added as coding progresses. 
The stakeholder matrix below gives details of the different types of change agents that were 
included and interacted with in the study. 
 
Figure 5.11: Electricity Distribution Sector Stakeholder-List and Data Collection Methods.  
*Green coded: Questionnaire 
*Blue coded: Face-to-face interview 
*Purple coded: Secondary data sources (News articles, online video and audio recordings) 
* Two colour codes on one stakeholder indicate two data collection methods were used. 
The figure above shows the stakeholders in the power distribution sector. There are different 
levels of interactions within this network of stakeholders with different interests and 
incentives, already explained in the section that gives the background to the electricity supply 
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sector of Ghana. There are obvious dependencies based on their roles and that culminate in 
a deeper understanding of the inefficiency problem outlined in the results section following.  
5.6 Results, Analyses and Diagnosis 
In this section, the focus is to discuss the results in two folds. The outputs of the surveys and 
interviews are discussed. In the first part, the results of the quantitative part is presented and 
analysed. It is then followed with the qualitative analyses where thematic themes developed 
from NVivo are thoroughly discussed. 
The quantitative part commences with a validation exercise using the SEM as discussed earlier 
in the chapter in order to validate the type of research instruments used. Two elements 
introduced in our questionnaire accounts for the effect of political power and influence of 
powerful people on how inefficiency is perceived in the electricity distribution system of 
Ghana. The relationships of these factors as well as the high tariff effect factors are regressed 
on the inefficiency perception of the survey respondents in this same section. By doing so, 
insights on how the perception of inefficiency is affected by their view on the existence of 
Political Factors and dominance/influential agent factors could be discussed. The same is 
done on how high tariffs affect the perception of inefficiency in the electricity distribution 
system.  
After the quantitative analyses, an investigation is carried out on the qualitative data from 
the in-depth interviews where a deeper appreciation of the challenges as well as possible 
mitigation strategies or actions are analysed. This section therefore seeks to understand the 
opinions and reactions of consumers and stakeholders in an inefficient distribution system. 
This task is executed while being guided on what the problems are and how the problems 
may be eliminated or managed from the responses as well as the other sources of data used.   
5.6.1 Quantitative Results and Analyses 
In this part of the study, quantitative results are presented and analysed accordingly. It 
commences with the validation of the research instrument (questionnaire) and then followed 
by the analyses of the responses from the questionnaire in order to capture emerging issues, 
trends and potentials of the various aspects of the inefficiency problem being investigated. 
5.6.1.1 Validation of Survey Questionnaire and Responses  
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Using the items listed in Table 5.2.an exploratory test was conducted with the output shown 
in figure 5.12. The essence of an explorative test is to allow the data to determine possible 
constructs from a range of items under review. Three constructs, F1*, F2*, and F3* are 
generated with considerable factor loadings or correlations. Although most of the items have 
relatively high factor loadings, a few items have factor loadings below a recommended 
threshold of 0.4. See appendix 5A for factor loadings and statistics results of exploratory tests. 
Table 5.2: Items and Constructs Used in the Exploratory and Confirmatory Analyses 
Attributes of an inefficient Distribution Sector  
High Voltage is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS1 
Inadequate supply of power is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS2 
Irregular Meter reading is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS3 
Heavy electricity bills is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS4 
Unfenced transformers is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS5 
Defective connections is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS6 
Unusual power cut is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS7 
Improper working of transformers is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS8 
Loose connection in the main wire is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS9 
Poor customer service by staff is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS10 
Illegal connections by bad customers is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS11 
Non-payment of electricity bills is a major cause of inefficiency AIDS12 
Benefit of an Efficient Distribution Sector  
One of the benefits of an efficient distribution sector is lower cost of power to consumers AEDS1 
One of the benefits of an efficient distribution sector is reliable energy source to the 
industrial and commercial sectors 
AEDS2 
One of the benefits of an efficient distribution sector is more financial stability of Private 
Power Producers or Power Producers in general 
AEDS3 
One of the benefits of an efficient distribution sector is more financial stability 
of Electricity Distribution Companies 
AEDS4 
One of the benefits of an efficient distribution sector is less corruption AEDS5 
One of the benefits of an efficient distribution sector is less power theft AEDS6 
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Figure 5.12: Exploratory Analysis Output 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Output 
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Subsequent to the exploratory analysis, a confirmatory factor analysis using factors meeting 
the 0.4 loading threshold is conducted. The output of the test can be seen figure 5.13 and a 
complementary path diagram seen below in figure 5.14 
Figure 5.14: A Path Diagram Illustrating the Factor Correlations of the Standardised Model  
 
Table 5.3: Goodness of Fit of Model8 
 Assessment of model fit 
Model fit Indices X2/df CF NFI SRMSR RMSEA 
Recommended Threshold  ≤3 ≥0.9 ≥0.9 ≤0.08 ≤0.05 
Observed 1.32 0.90 0.91 0.074 0.076 
Comment Yes  Yes Yes Yes No 
 
The model fit measures the extent to which the covariance predicted by the model 
corresponds to the observed covariance in the measurement data. The most commonly used 
SEM model performance indicators are the root mean squared error of approximation 
(RMSEA), the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the standardised root mean 
squared residual (SRMSR). Hu and Bentler (1998) have suggested a set of model-fit cut-offs 
for these indices (SRMSR≤.08, RMSEA≤.05, and CFI/TLI ≥.95). 
                                                          
8 RMSEA (root mean squared error of approximation) assesses the goodness of the approximation of the 
model rather than its correctness; NFI (normed fit index) compares the chi square of the empirical model with 
the chi square statistics of the null model; and CFI (comparative fit index) takes the same approach as the NFI 
but is adjusted by the degrees of freedom. 
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According to the results in Table 5.3, the SEM shows a good fit for the efficiency attribute and 
efficiency benefit as two latent constructs. All of the goodness-of-fit indicators (Table 5.3 –CFI 
= .90 and NFI= .91 – satisfy the threshold of .90, the standard deemed important for model 
fit. However, the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.08, approaching the 
required threshold model of 0.5 but not satisfactory. Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended 
that assessments of SEM model fit should be based on a joint evaluation of several fit indices. 
In this case apart from the RMSEA indicator, all the other thresholds are satisfied and fitness 
for the SEM is satisfactory. 
Table 5.4: Convergent Validity Test Results 
 Efficiency Attributes Efficiency Benefits Total 
Alpha C 0.8441189 0.4061459 0.6913126 
Composite Reliability 0.8521425 0.4235272 0.6913126 
AVE 0.3478154 0.1274986 0.1779216 
 
Table 5.5: Fornell-Larcker Criterion for Discriminant Validity for Efficiency Attributes and Efficiency 
Benefit9  
Efficiency attributes (EA) Efficiency benefits (EB) 
Efficiency attributes √AVE(EA) 
0.59 
 
Efficiency benefits COR(EA,EB ) 
0.349 
√AVE(EB) 
0.36 
 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the Fornell-Larcker criterion of assessment with the square root 
of the construct’s average variance extracted (AVE) on the diagonal and the correlations 
between the constructs in the off-diagonal position. The discriminant validity of the construct 
is examined by comparing squared root of AVE of the efficiency attributes with the correlation 
between efficiency attributes and efficiency benefit and verse versa. To establish discriminant 
validity, the square root of each construct’s AVE must be larger than its correlation with other 
construct(s). In the Table 5.5 above the two constructs EA and EB, which are conceptually 
different, are sufficiently empirically different, since the square root of the AVE of EA (0.59) is 
                                                          
9 Fornell and Larcker (1981) criteria, specified as: 
• Convergent validity:  CR >=0.7 and AVE > 0.5 
• Discriminant validity: √AVE > highest  correlation between constructs 
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larger than its correlations with EB. In the same vein, the AVE of EB (0.36) is greater than its 
correlation with EA which is 0.349. 
With convergent validity test, factor loadings, AVE and composite reliability are examined. As 
can be seen from the results of the confirmatory factor analysis in figure 5.16, Table 5.4 and 
Table 5.5, all the items load significantly on their purported factors, they load positively and 
sufficiently high (i.e. above 0.4) on their factors except item AEDS4 which has a factoring of 
0.28.  The efficiency attribute construct has a good level of composite reliability (more than 
0.7) and AVE value of 0.35. This suggests the efficiency attribute construct satisfies the 
convergent validity criteria. However for the efficiency benefit, the composite reliability was 
0.42 with an AVE of 0.13. The results could be improved on with an increased sample size and 
may not be that the factors of Efficiency Benefits do not show much convergence. However, 
the entire test proved that the questionnaire used in the consumer survey is valid with 
constructs or factors that predict the latent variable (perception) on the efficiency of the 
electricity distribution sector of Ghana. 
5.6.1.2 Summary of SEM or Validation Test. 
Two different constructs were applied and tested to estimate the perception of the 
stakeholders on the efficiency of electricity distribution in Ghana. Attributes and benefits of 
an efficient electricity distribution sector were the two main constructs used to determine 
the respondents’ perception of electricity distribution efficiency. The results of the test shows 
that the composite reliability of these constructs are acceptable. The impetus was to be 
certain that the two constructs theoretically designed can adequately determine or drive the 
respondents’ perception of the efficiency of power distribution. In short, given that most of 
the tests conducted are satisfactory, the main of the exercise is achieved and it suggests that 
the respondents’ survey responses can be relied upon for further analysis in the next section. 
5.6.1.3 Consumer Perception and Responses to an Inefficient Electricity Distribution Sector 
Subsequent to the validation of the research instrument, the survey responses are then 
analysed and discussed in this section. These findings are examined in the context of the main 
themes on which the questionnaire is designed and listed below as: 
 Consumer and expert knowledge of the industry or market or reforms  
 Consumer behaviour or reaction in an inefficient distribution system 
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 Consumer and expert perception on management of EDC 
 Consumer and expert views on electricity regulation 
 Consumers and experts views on political interference of the electricity distribution 
system 
 Consumers and experts opinion on the proposed privatisation or concession 
arrangement of the EDC. 
Figure 5.15: Consumers Informed of Major Reforms in the Electricity Industry 
 
 
Over 90% were confident to say they are aware of the major changes of the industry. They 
have been saddled with enormous issues in this industry to have not known them. There is a 
teeming public that is unyielding to the inefficiencies of the electricity sector. 
Figure 5.16: Reforms and Improved Efficiency 
 
 
91%
9%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Yes No
Consumers informed of major reform changes 
91%
9%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Yes No
Reforms and improved efficiency
 
  
169 
 
As will prove to be the case by our questionnaire validating results, over 90% do understand 
the benefits of reforms on the efficiency of distribution companies. Our validation results 
show that the survey respondents were consistent and appreciated the questions asked. Less 
than 9% did not acknowledge the effect of reforms on electricity distribution. 
Figure 5.17: Customers’ Perception on the Level of Efficiency and Reforms 
 
 
Only 9% accept that the pace of reforms on efficiency is fast. Over 58% believe that it is rather 
of a low pace while a considerable size of 27% think the results shown out of the reforms 
embarked on are normal or just expected. 
 
Figure 5.18: What Consumers Do When They Have Problems with the EDC 
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Nearly 73% report the incident should they have problems with the EDC. A significant number 
of customers (27%) do not bother reporting at all. They explain by saying it is not cost effective 
to do so and they will rather engage electricians in their localities to repair the problems. One 
of the consumers say: 
 “I will not waste my time to go and queue only for the line to be jumped by VIPs. I will rather 
pay someone to do it”.  
The analyses of this may well mean that the staff could be stretched further should this 27% 
of customers decide to contact the EDC when they are faced with distribution problems (refer 
to 5.20). Out of those who report or have reported problems, about 65% admit that the 
problems get solved but not on time. Nearly 24% concede that the EDC does not solve their 
problems and this could mean the distribution company never attempts solving the problem 
at all or is unable to resolve the problems after attempting to do so.12% of the survey 
responses suggested being attended to and service delivered on time. Therefore, only about 
12% out of the 73% who report cases to the EDC are satisfied with their service delivery. (See 
figure 5.19 for details) 
 
Figure 5.19: Consumers Who Have Reported Problems to the EDC 
 
 
Consumers’ responses to hikes in electricity prices. 
It is anticipated that customers will respond to price through changing their consumption 
behaviour or patterns either in the short term or long term. In the same vein, electricity 
consumers are expected to react to high electricity prices. Our survey reveals that as a result 
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of the status quo (unreliable power and high cost of power and other factors) a section (22%) 
of Ghanaian consumers are becoming prosumers i.e. they fully or partially produce and 
consume their own electricity. That apart, nearly 50% of the respondents indicated that they 
reduced their energy consumption in response to high tariffs. Over 18% have found 
investments into more efficient gadgets useful in dealing with high energy prices. By these 
findings, an agenda to introduce alternative power sources from renewables could thrive. In 
the same vein, there is a potential to promote efficiency at the demand side. There could be 
an important stage in the history of the country that was once bedevilled with power crisis 
but also on the whole has challenged the country and its electricity consumers to think of 
ways to survive this. Two strands of lessons: first is the change to produce and consume their 
own energy and second is the attitudinal change towards energy saving. 
Figure 5.20: Consumers’ Reactions to High Tariffs  
 
 
Possible Sources of inefficiency of the EDC 
Figure 5.21: Survey Opinion on the Main Sources of Inefficiency 
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Corrupt managerial practices is perceived by 42% of the survey participants to be a major 
cause of the EDCs inefficiency. Financial Inefficiency is observed by 37% of the survey 
respondent to be a major cause of the EDC’s inefficiency. 
66% accord political interference in the electricity distribution sector as one of the major 
causes of the inefficiency of the distribution system. About 57% of the survey respondent 
perceive that some influential people benefit from the inefficient system. 
Promoters of Efficiency –the right channel 
Figure 5.22: Most Important Institution That Can Influence EDCs to Be More Efficient 
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 One that accepts some arrangements but still supports that ownership be unchanged 
 One that further subscribes to an approach that privatisation could be executed with 
specific guidelines. 
Nonetheless, only about 8% still wants the company to be under the stewardship of the 
existing management. Their justification is that the engineers are equally qualified and so are 
good managers. The point which is missing and one that can affect the rationality behind their 
choices is rather debilitating in the sense that, engineers are different from managers. That is 
not to say engineers cannot be good managers and certainly does not mean that good 
engineers turn to be good managers. The story unfolds that about 95% of the number of 
managing directors since inception have been engineers. 
The section following will investigate further some of the chosen themes from the survey. 
This implies that the results above are thoroughly investigated using face to face interviews, 
commentaries from the press and videos from experts. The triangulation approach is adopted 
during the interviews to ensure counter-views are captured and equally analysed to bring 
findings that are more representative of the matters on ground.  
5.6.2 Qualitative Diagnostic Results and Analyses (3d thematic analyses) 
In this section, the qualitative data obtained from both primary and secondary sources are 
analysed using a thematic approach aided by the NVivo software10. The qualitative data come 
from interviews with industry professionals, energy experts from academia and civil society 
groups, development partners’ consultants, management and operational staff of ECG, 
regulators and the energy ministry. Other secondary sources from video interviews, 
documentaries, newspaper articles are also included in the data pool for onward qualitative 
analysis. The survey results were transcribed and a three-D thematic approach employed to 
understand the causes and some proffered solutions from the different stakeholders in the 
electricity industry. NVivo is used to capture our interviews as well as the existing 
commentaries and literature on the subject matter. With about 20 interviews and over 100 
commentaries from videos and newspaper articles, the PEA arrived at 6 themes in which the 
causes of inefficiency in the electricity distribution sector of Ghana are enveloped. In this 
                                                          
10 A software that aids in organising, storing and retrieving data in a more efficient way. In both qualitative and 
mixed method analysis, the Nvivo software provides a platform that can categorise qualitative data into 
themes  
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section, an analysis of the conversations around these themes are executed with the motive 
of bringing out the focal points of the inefficiency problem that could warrant an 
understanding of the status quo. In figure 5.23, foundations of the problems adding on to 
inefficiency are bundled up into the themes below. 
 
Figure 5.23: An NVivo Output of a Thematic Analysis of the Sources of Inefficiency in ECG 
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5.6.2.1 Cultural and Attitudinal Issues  
Pascoe and Welsh (2011) suggest that the level of whistleblowing cases increases the 
detection and conviction rates for corporate crime. They propose legislative provisions and 
corporate codes of conduct or ethics as the two methods utilized for the purpose of 
encouraging corporate sector whistleblowing. 
The 2006 whistle-blower’s act in Ghana is meant to enable citizens to disclose information 
about the corrupt or unlawful activities of other people. It offers them protection from 
victimization linked to such disclosures. However, over a decade of its being enacted, 
Ghanaians seem reluctant to use this platform to report corruption or illegalities. According 
to an anti-corruption officer Adam Bani and many other stakeholders being interviewed, the 
law was passed after Ghana was upset by a series of financial scandals but ten years later, 
most Ghanaians spoken to appeared unwilling to acquire the whistleblowing habit. 
Our attitudes are affected or influenced by the things we are exposed to and what could be 
collectively called culture. A section of the stakeholders hold the view that Ghanaians are 
rather less confident to report their neighbours for wrong doing. Others including a manager 
of ECG said that nature of the Ghanaian is much explained in the details of the guiding 
principles in our culture. He said: 
“But sometimes if you are down there you will not understand it… It is also a societal 
problem…. I can say 80% is due to our culture. I dare say Ghanaians are trained to be cowards 
and timid...What do they tell us in our culture? That an elder can never be wrong!” 
Ghana, has shown some progress in dealing with corruption to some extent but being ranked 
56th out of 168 countries as surveyed by Transparency International in 2016 (from the index 
of business perceptions of corruption) indicates the high level of efforts expected to make 
significant changes to the status-quo. Undoubtedly deepening of the incentives to blow the 
whistle as well as a collective action to be championed by many non-governmental 
organisation are some of the resolutions to address the short-falls in the act and its needed 
activation.  
Favouritism affects the level of efficiency in the ways of quality of labour, quality of invested 
capital and finally quality of service delivery. The Ghanaian culture and some West African 
culture are extensive to the core even though westernisation is gradually eroding the social 
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and cultural settings that were accorded Africans and Ghanaians. Notwithstanding, With 
reference to the quantitative data, there are about 70% of the respondents who agree that 
the staff of ECG are well qualified and can technically discharge their duties. The question of 
professionalism which is lacking as underscored by the survey data must be coming from the 
way in which recruitment is made and what happens after recruitment.  According to another 
senior manager of ECG, many people have had to consider relatives over others when it 
comes to employment and that this practice is not peculiar to the ECG alone or the energy 
industry-it is a systemic problem which comes from many years of the culture of “helping our 
own”. In a system where relatives and friends are recruited, it will be difficult to crack the 
whip when compliance to work ethics are abdicated. It is not surprising therefore that the 
prevalence of power theft and “illegal connections” has not been addressed as a result of 
inadequate deterrence even with existing laws and law enforcement agencies. This is 
explained by the lack of application of laws and their related punitive measures. 
During the interviews, it was observed that some people high in authority and people who 
are influential can abuse and exploit the system. An Engineer at ECG (one who dislikes the 
state of ECG management) says 
“Very prominent chiefs in this country are using electricity free of charge because their subjects 
will not even let you send them a bill. There are many chiefs and even Kings who comment on 
inefficiencies of our work yet may have never asked to know how much electricity they 
consume let alone to pay for it. This is wrong! Not one palace not two, here in Kumasi. You 
can check for yourself. How then do you go to the man who finds it difficult to buy food and 
expect him to pay?” 
Another customer expressed his opinion on how favouritism undermines even the quality of 
services to their customers by referring to the customer service desks of ECG in some 
branches where some customer types have priority just because they are branded very 
important people (VIP) and are permitted to jump queues for services. 
Another feature that characterises the people of Ghana as suggested in many of 
conversations around factors that drive corruption is the external financial pressure on the 
working class. The nature of the extended family network which is very different from most 
western culture creates a certain expectation of support from families and friends from 
 
  
177 
 
working class. Workers have more than just their immediate family to cater for and so are 
hard-pressed by the situation to give in to corrupt practices.  
The above socio-cultural attributes are very important concerns that management will have 
to appreciate before driving any organisational change. These attributes may be considerable 
in defining the type of labour force or customers the organisation is operating with. By this, 
the intention is not to describe the situation as unvarying but it is also important to note the 
level of efforts required to drive a cultural change. Nonetheless, some companies now and in 
the past have had to scrap and replace their organisational culture before they could perform 
competitively and efficiently.  According to Yoram and Main (1999), this kind of alteration 
occurred in the history of IBM, Xerox and Perot Systems. This requires planning over years for 
the kind of culture fit for the kind of business they do. There is an important aspect of linking 
the needed culture to the values of the company. In the case of ECG, there is an irony of what 
their values and organisational culture propose and this view is shared strongly from the 
survey feed-back. 
As asserted by Dartey-Baah and Amoako (2011) some managers in African organisations, 
particularly in Ghana, perhaps because of societal norms and expectations, place emphases 
on bureaucratic practices with total reliance on rules and regulations that employees obey 
without questioning or proffering constructive criticisms. Ghanaian civil and public sectors are 
characterised by such a culture. As a results employees turn to work as robots and merely 
follow rules and regulations without taking initiatives of their own. According to Kippis (1976), 
such mechanistic approach separates workers from both their jobs and the organisations. At 
this point workers only enjoy achieving personal needs instead of those of the whole 
organisation while managers, engaged in these bureaucratic practices, are often more 
interested in exercising absolute power over their employees. 
Jaeger and Kanungo (1990) suggest that, it is important for Ghanaian managers to note that 
employees can be motivated to work without being perceived as driven mainly by the 
economic benefits that are to be gained because of the work they do. However, this requires 
an appreciation of their needs and strategies that will boost the full commitment of workers 
in pursuing organisational objectives. 
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“Go to some branches like Kasoa where you will see that some customers are more human 
that others and have the right to jump the line for fast services while we those considered less 
important stay in the lines for ages before we get attended to”  
A consumer in the Kumasi Metropolis showed her grief concerning the abuse of ECG’s 
monopoly and how poor their quality of service is. She said: 
“When we have problems we go there and they say; you go we will come and check... But you 
will be there for ages and they won’t come. Look, to be honest, if electricity was like a phone 
sim card... I will have thrown that into the ocean by now” 
5.6.2.2 Financial Mismanagement 
“We need to pay our bills … if we do not pay our bills, how can ECG pay its generators and the 
generators pay its suppliers and the suppliers pay the banks. Our electricity industry is waiting 
to collapse before or after the collapse of our banks. Where do we go from there? No 
production and so we are in for economic crisis if we do nothing about that. Financial 
management and efficiency are major challenges. “By Kwaku Awotwi (Former CEO of Volta 
River Authority) 
Funding is an indispensable requirement for most part of the operations of EDCs. As a result, 
any inefficiencies whether technical or commercial is reflected in financial inefficiency. 
However, in this context we try to separate financial implications as a consequence of other 
operations from the real financial inefficiency arising from an improper funding and 
investment. By this we are able to distinguish between financial consequences due to corrupt 
practices from financial consequences due to a misapplication of a financial strategy, poor 
negotiation of core contracts and/or causing financial loss to the company. 
The issues surrounding high cost of electricity and its selling prices have contributed to some 
of the illegalities and non-payment of bills. A perfect example will be the heavy levies or bills 
imposed on consumers as a result of bad contract negotiations that has little value for money. 
The high cost in the value chain before the distribution point becomes a pass-through if the 
negotiating or consortium is unable to reach a reasonable off-taker price of generated power. 
The high prices of electricity against low income levels could influence some consumers to 
resort to illicit behaviour (power theft) conferred earlier. 
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With reference to some commentaries in the newspapers, most of the PPAs signed by the 
ECG need to be reviewed as other stakeholders including some staff of the energy commission 
believe that the state was short-changed in most of the agreements. They highlight the role 
ECG plays in the negotiation and have varied perception on the complexity of the role and the 
related competence in this area. Top managers have expressed their opinion on the need to 
involve all generators and other energy experts when reviewing off-taker agreements. This 
suggests that the company needs to match up the role with the required competence or may 
have to outsource some consultants in the future. Defence from the ECG and the erstwhile 
Ministry of Power indicate that the urgency of the increasing generation during the long 
period of power outages (Dumsor) makes the negotiation at the time justifiable. Re-
negotiation of the PPAs has been proposed by some experts. ACEP (African Centre for Energy 
Policy), one of the stakeholders and civil societies opined that there could be some gains if 
these PPAs are reviewed in order to reduce the cost of production and distribution of power.  
The financial efficiency ratios of ECG indicate instability in the management of its debt. From 
the financial analyses below, there is a consistent decline in ECG’s ability to settle liabilities in 
both the short and medium term. Penalties and charges from not honouring its contractual 
obligations can only increase their debt profile. ECG is highly geared and Mr Kwaku Awotwi 
highlighted the rippling effect of the financial mismanagement of ECG.  
Figure 5.24: ECG Financial Performance from 2008 to 2013Q2 
 
Source: International Financial Corporation (2014) 
The figure above validates the weakening financial position of the company and the USAID is 
justified for referring to it as such in their due diligence report published in 2014. It states 
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“ECG’s financial position is extremely weak. ECG is currently loss making, reporting negative 
net pre- and post-tax profit for the last two years (2011 and 2012) and the first half of 2013. 
For the previous three years ECG reported positive pre-tax net profit, however, if account is 
taken for its practice to include deferred taxation in the Income Statement it has reported 
negative net (post-tax) profit over practically all of the period considered from 2008.” 
5.6.2.3 Technical Inadequacies 
This aspect of inefficiency could be a major contributor of high cost inefficiency given the 
related technical and allocative implications on input quality, technology quality as well 
managerial or supervisory quality. In our survey, the technical expertise of the employees of 
ECG was not in doubt even though they speak highly of only the engineering workforce 
without considering other technical participants relevant to ECGs operations. Both regulators 
and consumers take pride in the expertise of their Engineers even counting them as the best 
in Africa. With this preamble, one may begin to wonder and may conclude that given all 
materials ECG should face little technical inefficiency. That may be a bit misleading as it is 
revealing that systems to check and monitor the contracts of these supposedly quality 
engineers are impaired by some external political and non-political factors. Below is Dr 
Asirifi’s comment on the awarding of contracts in ECG and many public owned institutions. 
“It is the politicians who are supposed to change the status quo… But because they are 
benefitting from it …where is their will power to do that... Why should engineering council up 
to date after fifteen years of defending the bill in parliament, why is it not fully operational? 
Because it is the politicians controlling the engineering practice in Ghana. All government 
contracts are handled by the politicians. So let me ask you a question... In Ghana, have you 
ever heard that a work has been scheduled down and the engineer who supervised the work 
has ever been mentioned?” 
A source of technical inefficiency from the interviews is the unmet expectations of contractors 
by management and vice versa. The management of ECG having taken a strategic decision to 
outsource some aspect of their operations expect a certain level of delivery from these 
contractors. Our investigations show that management is not satisfied with their level of 
delivery and have over the period found ways of assisting them to improve. However, they 
believe it is a systemic problem that requires a national intervention in our education system.  
 
  
181 
 
The sub-contractors on the other hand have directed their inability to meet the standards to 
management’s inability to offer them adequate materials to do the job. One of the 
contractors (member of ECG contractors association) who wants to remain anonymous said: 
“You ask for a 50 meter length of a specific wire and other materials but they do valuation and 
arrive at 40 meters of wire, and you know you cannot do the work well with that which is 
provided….. You still have to manage to do a job that is not up to the standard required. We 
need to be in jobs and provide for our families so we just do with what we have.” 
5.6.2.4 Regulatory and Supervisory Inadequacies 
Transmission, distribution and generation (wholesale) are all licensed activities in Ghana. A 
public utility can apply for a licence to distribute and sell electricity subject to the EC’s 
conditions. The rates and charges for its services must also be approved by the PURC, as a 
condition to the grant of the licence. When granting the licence, the EC must consider the 
demand and supply of electricity in the designated area, the capability to interconnect 
distribution facilities or installations with transmission systems in the designated area and the 
ability to fulfil the duty to provide electricity in the designated area. The licensee must make 
diagrams and maps of its electricity facilities authorized by the EC available for public 
inspection at its offices.  
With the exception of the transmission licence, of which only one may be granted, the EC may 
grant more than one of all the other categories of licence. To date, the EC has granted only 
three distribution licences to ECG, NEDCo and the Enclave Power Company. Each of these 
distribution companies has a separate area of operation in which they effectively operate as 
monopolies, although as indicated, there is no legal bar to the grant of one or more licences 
for electricity distribution in all or parts of their areas of operation.  
During our deliberations with the Energy Commission, they indicated that they were open to 
the idea of granting up to three more distribution licences, creating up to six distribution 
utilities in all. However, the regulators and some of the stakeholders doubt the financial 
viability in terms of economy of scales when 6 utility companies are carved out of the nation. 
Processing applications for new service, minimum requirement in terms of reliability of 
electricity supply and requirements for metering installations are some of the parameters 
involved in the regulation of task under L.I. 1935 4 as issued in 2008.  
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Payments, dispute resolution, notification of rights of customers and provision of information 
also fall under the ambit of the EC. These above aspects of regulation are in tandem with 
international standards and are supposed to provide a robust framework for regulating 
activities of the distribution sector. 
The review of the distribution codes and performance standards indicate that the current 
regulations are in line with other international standards and provide solid technical 
framework for the development of the distribution sector’s activities. 
In general, these regulations follow international best practices. However, it is quite clear that 
not all provisions stated in them are actually being applied. For example, based on the analysis 
undertaken, the penalties applicable in case the duration and frequency of interruptions to 
customers exceed the thresholds set in the Electricity Supply and Distribution (standards of 
Performance) Regulations are not being applied. However, there are impediments that impair 
the discharge of such regulatory duties.  
According to the head of Technical Regulation at the Energy Commission, the challenges are 
compounded because the ECG has both distribution and retailing licenses which currently 
overwhelms the company. On one hand, the economies of scale and the structure of the 
distribution sector hinder introduction of competition in this very sector. On the other hand, 
the other available option which is to horizontally unbundle the sector where regions could 
be created and each region open for competitive tendering by capable investors seem to be 
challenged economically. This is explained in the bias of customer density and the lack of 
economies of scale at this level which is a disincentive to most investors. As stated by one of 
the senior managers of ECG: 
“They all want the juicy part of the business and that cannot be… who should go for the non-
lucrative regions?”  
One way to reduce the burden of ECG is to further unbundle the electricity sector by 
introducing a competitive retailing end. The issue of commercial losses could be reduced as 
competition will encourage companies to embark on productive revenue collection and good 
customer services especially at the commercial and residential segments of the market. A 
senior officer in charge of technical regulation is quoted as saying: 
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“…the fact that the company is not financially liquid means that financial risk is high but if you 
can commercialise the tail end (retail end) of the value chain the liquidity issue could be solved. 
So it is either the whole company is privatised or the retail end should be commercialised and 
privatised.” 
Our deliberation hinged also on the independence of the electricity regulators and how they 
could discharge their duties without fear and panic. It was revealed that the independence of 
the regulators are curtailed in many ways. First, government is the sole owner and any 
sanctions meted out to these companies do not materialise. Also, being that the ruling 
government chooses the executive secretary or commissioner of the electricity regulatory 
bodies, they are compromised in their line of duties. As a very senior regulator puts it 
“Most of the rots turn not to be inbuilt but externally sourced. You are forced to work and to 
do what you are told to do what the powers want not what is right in your judgement”.  
5.6.2.5 Political Interference  
“We have used politics to retrogress instead of progress...Look! If you are politically appointed 
as the managing director... when another party comes into power, whether you are 
performing well or not... you will be removed... this is not good for the company. The 
company should appoint its own directors.” 
The above relates a major part of corporate governance and the polarisation of the top 
management positions are bound to cause problems if the company stands the chance of 
being led by a new Managing Director every four Years.  This opinion is generally shared by 
some of the staff of ECG, some Civil Society Groups and some consumers. 
The one decision or change at the top trickles down to various aspects of the operations from 
changing contractors to changing roles and tasks of the work force.  
A Senior Manager of ECG at the Ashanti Region Head Office could not have expressed that 
more vividly as he lamented:  
“Then we come to the political atmosphere… the managing director is appointed by the 
government to pursue government interest. And because of that…it trickles down… the 
managers also cherry pick their people not on merit… but people who will help him or her 
build his kingdom.” 
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The issue of favouritism remains in the network where competence is sacrificed and 
consequently the company becomes more inefficient and impairing quality of service 
delivery. The quality of human capital goes beyond the technical skills of the employees and 
that is why recruiters investigate how prospective employees can manage other aspects of 
the job. Driving change in organisations is possible but depends on what workforce we are 
dealing with. When politicians and external forces interfere with recruitment processes, the 
possibility of getting inadequate service delivery from the employed is almost predictable. 
They are likely to distort the desired direction of the company and even the organisational 
culture. 
Government interference in the business of ECG according to some of the survey responses 
is a major cause of ECG’s financial inefficiency as well as some aspect of technical inefficiency. 
As the Deputy General Secretary of the Public Utilities Workers Union Mr. Michael Nyantakyi 
posits 
” The real problem of the power distributor is political interference. It does this in two main 
ways – taking power for the Ministries and public offices without paying and also resisting 
ECG's calls for tariff review. These two main factors have left ECG on its knees with huge 
debts”. 
Our analyses made on ECG reveals that government’s debt to ECG constitutes over 60% 
(US$500 million) of the company’s total debt. PUWU, ACEP and many policy advisors have 
insisted that the financial weakness of the company could be improved on if government is 
reliable in redeeming its debt to ECG. Governments by this action is affecting the revenue 
streams of the company making it illiquid and unable to meet its operational costs as well as 
its obligations with its creditors which comes with high penal charges.  
Another issue is with the payment for the actual cost of electricity which is a debatable one 
which stakeholders may have to come to a settlement with sooner or later. There is question 
of which should come first? Should consumers accept high prices of electricity to receive a 
better quality of service or the company should find its own investments to improve on quality 
and then charge consumers a cost-recovery based tariff thereafter? The social contract 
between the consumers and the ruling government limits the latter’s political will to pursue 
the first option while the current economic conditions continue to make it even more difficult 
to negotiate the first option.  Therefore, government will seek ad hoc measures such as 
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opposing tariff increases and subsidising electricity tariffs just before national elections even 
though a raise in tariffs might have been agreed earlier. That apart, approval for tariff 
increment is acknowledged to be problematic. Generally in developing countries, there is a 
low political will to let consumers pay for the cost-recovery tariff. The values and externalities 
of electricity supply to citizens account for its high demand. As a result, it can give electricity 
considerable political salience, reflected in electoral promises and actions by politicians to 
certain groups with the anticipation that the groups will be coerced to support them. (Scott 
and Seth, 2013) Aside the fact that price of electricity in Ghana and the West African region 
(average of 17cents against an average of between 4cents and 6cents in East Asia) is already 
relatively high and could impose more economic hardships on consumers, the ruling 
governments are unwilling to permit tariff increases during their regimes and even so around 
election periods.  
5.6.2.6 Managerial Inadequacies 
Discussions around corporate governance of most public owned institutions have come to 
the fore. Particularly in the case of quality of service delivery, that is a finality of the efforts of 
the actors in the institutions. There is a great disparity between the governance efforts of 
private companies and that of publicly owned companies. As in the case of ECG, most publicly 
owned institutions are tagged weak in governance. Governance refers to the art of steering 
societies and organisations. According to the Ottawa Institute on Governance, it is the process 
by which stakeholders articulate their interests with their inputs absorbed, decisions taken 
and implemented while these decision makers are accountable for the consequences of their 
actions. Thus good governance in electricity utilities could be described as the range of 
political, organisational and administrative processes through which communities (stake 
holders) articulate their interests and input , make decisions that are implemented with 
decision makers held accountable in the distribution and management of electricity resources 
in order to deliver the best quality of services. 
It is evidenced in many cases how failure to adhere to good corporate governance could lead 
to dire consequences which may stifle the growth and sustainability of these organisations. A 
specific relationship can be seen in how cost of distribution is likely to increase when 
institutions do not adhere to safety requirements as well as not conforming to the required 
standard of quality of services provided.  
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By the survey results, it is becoming established that ECG’s inefficiencies could be coming 
from management’s failure to address good governance issues in the aspects below: 
 Institutional and regulatory structures 
 Tender/bid processes and evaluation criteria  
 Power purchase agreements and associated tariff structures 
 Financing Strategies and its implications 
5.6.2.6 Power Theft 
There are many factors that encourage people to steal electricity. Socio-economic factors 
influence people to a great extent in stealing electricity. An interesting but also common view 
by many people is that, it is dishonest to steal something from their neighbour but not from 
the state or public owned utility company.  Williams and Ghanadan (2006) argue that the 
above consumer reaction is due to the lack of social legitimacy of reforms which encourages 
stealing of electricity.  By the survey, it admitted that high electricity prices, growing 
unemployment, poor economy and corrupt employees of utility companies work against 
policies to curb power theft. Irregular readings of meters by staff may well contribute to over 
invoicing or under invoicing. However, there are situations where staff have connived with 
consumers to bill them with a lower meter reading. In Ghana, during electoral campaigns 
some politicians give out metres as tokens or “bribes”. According to one of the senior 
managers of ECG, these are done without the knowledge of the company and so these meters 
are not identifiable on the database. However, they are connected to the grid anyway and 
the consumer normally will consume electricity for free until it is brought to the notice of the 
distribution company. Politicians may influence illegal consumption by supporting the views 
that electricity is a public good and should not be that expensive. During opposition or in 
power they promise them lower tariffs but are unable to do so as they suffer protest from the 
management of the company and other stakeholders.  
Prepaid meters are considered the solution for power theft but it is only conclusive if the 
meters can determine or detect their bypass as well as any illegalities to steal power. They 
may be right in averting the irregular and wrong reading by employees but may not be able 
to detect if a consumer is tempering with the device or not. The ECG for example has had to 
recheck places with prepaid meters over and over again since they suspect illegal connections 
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in these places. It emerged that a number of consumers were investigated and charged with 
illegalities even in areas where the middle-class is predominant. Power theft may seem simple 
to tackle but could require a more sophisticated and robust approach with punitive measures 
for even the least of all crimes related to power theft. 
5.6.2.7 Summary of Qualitative Analyses 
The focus of the qualitative analyses was to understand the sources of political economy in 
the power sector of Ghana and its related repercussion on the distribution of electricity. From 
the thematic analyses, key themes emerged covering technical, sociocultural, political and 
financial factors that contribute to the political economy openings in the distribution industry. 
It is clear within the analysis, that there are incentives for rent seeking which overcomes the 
moral fibre of the Ghanaian society. To the extent that, some institutions meant to shape 
good behaviour are also involved in illegitimate practices to advance their personal interests 
can only tell the gravity of the problem. However, it is possible to reshape the stakeholder 
interest and potential rent seeking behaviour by considering strategic intervention and 
policies. In the section following, the possible pathways are discussed to offer relevant 
stakeholders, management of EDCs and policy makers recommended actions to enhance 
efficiency in the distribution sector. 
5.7. Possible Intervention and Policy Issues  
The study gathered options and solutions to some of the causes of inefficiency in the 
distribution system. The PEA relied on both the causes and solutions suggested by the 
stakeholders to understand the status quo except to say that the triangulation technique was 
applied during the interactions with some experts and stakeholders to see their opinion on 
these proffered solutions. Additionally, it is realised that some of the problems were within 
the control of the management of the EDC and others were not. An internal and external 
classification of the interventions was therefore the approach employed to bring clarity to 
this section of the analysis.  
5.7.1 Internal Interventions  
This section is intended to discuss the factors or causes that can be resolved within the walls 
of ECG. This requires more efforts from the management of the company and operational 
staff. Firstly, it is assumed that the actions and inactions of these stakeholders resulted in 
those problems which the next section attempts to make available. The perception of the 
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consumers regarding the corporate entity is not commendable given the statistics and the 
deliberations in the previous sections. The interventions following therefore requires a 
committed internal cleansing and reshaping of the expectations and thinking of the corporate 
entity as a whole.  
5.7.1.1 Restructuring of Corporate Governance Terms 
The governance structure of the company after the entire survey seems to be lacking 
robustness. The company culture must be streamlined by the governance structure for 
desired outcomes. Since the corporate culture has an external influence and maybe quite 
difficult to build, it is not unsurmountable. At least there is evidence of corporates that have 
very good governance structure that has impacted on their organisational culture. 
Professionalism and ethics are at its best in some of the Ghanaian owned business that choose 
from the human resource markets as the ECG. An engineer who remains anonymous in this 
case, said to his one of his colleagues during a site visit:  
“You know you and I are thieves, you taught me how to steal and you were also taught to steal 
by someone”  
This may have been said in a playful way and that may mean there is no truth to it but the 
blatant acceptance of such a sensitive perception in the public domain resounded the 
allegations of corruption peddled against ECG workers. There are factions with “Godfathers” 
in which the existing monitoring system for punishing unethical and unprofessional behaviour 
of staff is compromised. It is therefore important promote a system that works and 
discourage nepotism in such an important industry. 
According to Wembley and Werner (2008), there seems to be is a gap between the existence 
of explicit ethical values and principles, often expressed in the form of a code, and the 
organisational attitudes and behaviour. They suggests that ineffective ethics programmes and 
deficiencies in corporate culture could be the underlying reasons for the presupposition.   This 
means that ECG should not just design codes and conducts and expect good governance to 
prevail. The ethical values requires a well-designed ethics policies, sustained ethical 
leadership and incorporation of ethics in organisational processes and strategy as part of 
organisational culture at all levels of the company.  
5.7.1.2 Streamlining Required Skill Sets for Subcontractors 
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The subcontractors are contracted to represent ECG on the field and as such must show the 
ideals that is expected of them. Any subcontractor who falls short of such quality in the 
discharge of their duties should be investigated and the right penalty meted sourcing of these 
subcontractors should be devoid of nepotism so that the system can get the best from the 
pool of electrical technicians in the market. On the external arrangements, the ECG and most 
of the power industry players should help sponsor students from Technical Institutes and 
Technical Universities to learn the trade from decent subcontractors so that they will be 
enriching their recruitment pool. The association of subcontractors of ECG have major 
concerns that need to be addressed by the management of ECG. A consensus must be 
reached and service level agreements in the contracts adhered to. It is expected that if the 
governance structure of ECG is improved, the conduct of subcontractors, perceived by some 
stakeholders to be substandard, could improve significantly. 
5.7.1.3 Incentivising the Base of the Organisation  
A reduction in the conspicuous and disproportionate employee remuneration across the 
organisational structure should be taking seriously. Some of the management have not been 
impressed by the existing structure and continue to make comparison with the structure in 
most developed economies. Some believe the misconducts of some of the operational staff 
is due to the discriminatory salary and remuneration structure.  
One of the managers of ECG who not impressed with the skewness of working incentives 
towards top management shows that in the quote below: 
“Justify why I require three toilet rolls and the man down there should be okay with just one. 
Simply, it is a bias against the people at the base.”  
 
The technicians believe that there should be enough risk allowances paid to compensate for 
the kind of job they do. They conceive their task as very dangerous and have complained that 
working conditions should improve. For example they is a common opinion within the field 
workers that health and safety needs to be improved upon. 
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5.7.1.4 Independent and Private Recruitment System 
Employment and recruitment to be outsourced to independent and private companies to 
avoid or reduce government or political interference. As was revealed in our surveys, 
nepotism exists in the Company because of the existing unofficial recruitment system. Most 
people employed are based on their relations with either management or political and 
external influential personalities. It would be easy to conclude that the best staff may not be 
recruited for the post in question. Also, even the number of required staff may be exceeded 
since once a recruitment request comes from a higher authority, management are coerced to 
employ at times when they do not need to.  An independent recruitment system could curtail 
some of the shortcomings of the existing system of recruitment.  
5.7.1.5 Boosting of Bidding and Contract Processes  
The ECG operates within their own procurement arrangements but also subject to the 
Procurement Laws of Ghana.  In the survey, matters relating to quality of procured services 
were brought to the fore. Managers and Consumers observed the deterioration of the quality 
of procured items like meters, feeders, transformers and even wires over a short period of 
time. They juxtapose that with the same in the past and conclude that the ECG is short-
changed in its procurement.  That contractors are allowed to complete works that are not up 
to standard and leave with impunity when, to start with, there are guarantees entered into 
at the beginning of the contracts. From Bid Guarantees, Performance Bonds, Advanced 
Payment Guarantees and Bank Guarantees in general are required to secure these contracts 
from the tendering stage to closure of procurement. Thus to enforce quality is to activate or 
call on the guarantees when it is established that job execution has not met the agreed scope 
of works and quality. Since it is clear that the institutions of the procurement process is not 
in contention then, the issue of enforcement needs to be addressed and departments and 
persons that do not discharge their duties creditably should be investigated and sanctioned 
accordingly. Competitive bidding may not be that competitive as some stakeholders and 
some staff have disclosed that there is interference at some stages of the procurement 
process. They have made claims of some tenderers being given insider information on what 
amount to bid in order to win the tender regardless of their level of expertise. There are also 
issues of over invoicing where contract sums are abnormally high to justify the scope and 
quality of work. In the middle of the discussion is also matters relating to the competence of 
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the human resources to handle such contracts. Power Purchase Agreements by the EDC has 
come with the argument that the company does not get the best deal in favour of its 
consumers. ACEP, one of the civil society groups has protested some contractual 
arrangements in PPA’s and sense that ECG has been short-changed. An example is the African 
Middle East Energy (AMERI) PPA signed with the Ghana Government and ECG which is 
currently under investigation for certain charges purported and spanning from causing 
financial loss to the state, fraud to value for money. The emerging issues surrounding the 
AMERI deal are rather dramatic where NPP (Incumbent) intends to show that the previous 
government (NDC) supervised over-invoicing for their self-interest. In 2018, in attempt to 
justify this, the Energy Ministry presented a proposed amendment that intended to cut ties 
with AMERI and initiate a new one with another entity. It was reviewed by parliament and 
rather found to be more expensive than the original deal which subsequently led to the 
dismissal of the Minister. The procurement of assets and materials seem to be very political 
and perceived to open avenues for rent-seeking. The motivation may be the huge contract 
sums and the difficulties in comparing and justifying prices since items procured are mostly 
bespoke. 
5.7.1.6 Improving Customer Service  
Our observations at some of the customer services centre confirmed the comments of some 
of the stakeholders who agree that the delay in attending to customer needs is one of the 
major factors leading to illegal connection and power theft. The turnaround time from the 
time a job is logged in and when it is completed is unacceptable to majority of the consumers. 
There are suggestions that a queuing system be provided by each centre to prevent others 
from receiving preferential services. In relation to a queueing system, it must be admitted 
that the Company has recently installed such systems in a few of its prime offices including 
Adum, Kumasi Airport, Accra Central and Circle branches.  Man hours are lost when 
commercial traders go to ECG offices for issues relating to billing discrepancies, request of 
meters and malfunction of meters. It is believed that this circumstance promotes bribery and 
corruption since some decide to pay staff to get quick services. The ECG could improve on 
their queuing systems, tracking of jobs and validating completion of jobs. SLA (service level 
agreements) and KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) needs to be redesigned and made 
enforceable by reviewing sanctions and queries that have the potential to improve on the 
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attitudes of staff. These should be part of the high-tech innovative approaches that could be 
adapted for problem solving.  The commercial inefficiency of the company has been 
confirmed by many stakeholders to be very high. As, the former minister of Power said: 
“Commercial efficiency can significantly be improved. ECG’s commercial management 
systems are outdated and this has a big effect on the quality of customer service offered” 
Improving management systems of the EDC has a potential to improve the quality of customer 
service and also reduce the level of commercial inefficiency. 
5.7.1.7 Internal Arrangements to Incentivise Whistle-Blowing  
The citizens must be encouraged to report the illegal activities of other citizens without fear 
or favour. They ought to report illegal connections, corrupt staff and customers, meter 
tempering, staff that condone illegal activities etc. There are stages in the process of whistle 
blowing; arrest, interrogation, verdict and reform. ECG has the responsibility to corporate 
with both internal and external agencies that are involved in the full process. However, the 
least the whistle blower could get is security. Staff and customers both agree that this 
particular ingredient is lacking in the whistle blowing process. Since whistle blowers are 
exposed eventually, they risk the attacks of perpetrators especially when they are not 
reformed in the process. To incentivise whistle-blowing there should also be some token or 
incentive offered to the blowers in order that they are motivated to report another illicit 
activity. Thus ECG should find a robust reporting system that would keep whistle-blowers 
anonymous and any staff proven guilty of sharing such confidential information should be 
punished accordingly. 
5.7.1.8 Investigating the Resilience of the System to Harsh Environmental Factors 
The vigour of distribution equipment to thunder and lightning, heavy storms and vegetation 
was discussed by technical experts during the survey. A consensus is formed on the need to 
investigate the resilience of these equipment manufactured by foreign companies. It is 
believed that the voltages of lightning and thunder in the tropics against the strong winds 
during the rainy season causes more harm to the distribution system. Wires get torn and 
transformers have their down times and all of these increase cost of operation. 
Notwithstanding, others are of the opinion that the poor quality of the procurement output 
is the factor accounting for the lack of resilience of the system. 
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Technically, as Ward (2013) and Knight (2001) explain how harsh weather conditions can 
upset some components of power systems. They add that these factors have a significant 
impact on the reliability and operation of electrical constituents and eventually on the 
resilience of the entire system. High temperatures and heat waves, high winds, lightning 
strikes on conductors may cause an array of disruption by way of energy losses, sagging lines, 
disconnections, short circuit faults and voltage surge which can cause damage to equipment 
such as transformer wings.  
It is therefore not out of place to recommend a proper research to assess impact of weather 
on ECG’s distribution system. An adaptability studies should be conducted and finally 
resilience-enhancing measures should be put in place. As recommended by Panteli and 
Mancarella (2015), it is essential to compare the cost of enhancing resilience (including 
capital, operating and maintenance costs) with the reduction in the risk achieved by these 
measures before implementation.  
Having discussed the possible internal interventions within the EDC, issues outside the control 
of the management could also be looked at and this becomes the focus of the next section. 
5.7.2 External Interventions 
In this section, the external factors that affect ECG’s operations are re-considered and possible 
interventions discussed. The external factors includes all other that are outside the control of the 
management of ECG. 
5.7.2.1 Separation of ECG’s Business from Government of Ghana’s Business 
 Under the current operations, since government is the sole owner of ECG, it finds it difficult 
to insulate its operations from that of ECG.  Investment decisions by ECG are distorted with 
Government’s intended projects which may have social advantages but may be economically 
and financially inimical to ECG. It is believed that most distribution companies have the 
tendency to deal with such interruption from government. However, the extent to which 
government interfere with the investment decisions may create inefficiencies in the 
company. Extension of the Grid to other areas requires investment analysis but Governments 
after governments have influenced the Company to carry out extension projects while ECGs 
balance sheet could not absorb such project expenditures. The discourse on this issue was 
addressed partially as governments created funding for the physical construction of the 
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project but did not consider the much more expensive operational and maintenance aspects 
for such projects. The SHEP project is one example that best describes the situation when a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was created but did not cater for operations and maintenance 
expenditures.  
5.7.2.2 Independence and Competence of Regulators  
There many reasons that account for the lack of independence of the regulators of the 
market. The core of this is still government’s interference in the appointment of the heads of 
these institutions. The regulators knowledge of government interference with ECGs business 
makes it difficult for the regulators to apply penalties for the intended purposes. In this way, 
incentives for efficiency improvements may exist but could remain impracticable. As it is 
suggested by many assessment of the power industry, there is the need to build capacity for 
regulation. There is a need for example to get more engineers into regulation for a better 
appreciation of their roles and expected tasks. In conclusion, the independence and 
competence of the regulatory institutions should be enhanced to monitor the activities and 
targets of ECG with no influence from the government. 
5.7.2.3 Enhancing Efficiency of Generators and Transmission Companies 
 ECG is down the value chain and the quality of operations of other players in the market up 
the chain could impact on the quality of service of ECG. For instance, there is the tendency of 
inefficiencies of generators and transmitters to shoot up prices of electricity. High electricity 
prices can influence illegal connections, low sales of power and non-payment of bills which 
could increase inefficiency at the distribution end. Types of fuel that are used by power plants 
are decisions made by the generator and so if they choose to go for expensive fuels (clean or 
unclean), resulting  high prices could trigger other drivers on inefficiency at the distribution 
end. The other players up in the value chain should be monitored and encouraged to be less 
wasteful to reduce the cost of production of electricity.  
5.7.2.4 Financial Engineering of ECG‘s Debt 
Further deregulation of the retail aspect of the value chain could bring in some level of 
competition. ECG has both distribution and retail licenses and it is possible for other private 
companies to compete with it at the retail end. Issues relating to illegalities of residential and 
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commercial customers could be reduced as competition will enhance management and 
technological innovations to reduce inefficiency in the system. 
5.7.2.5 Financial Engineering of ECG‘s Debt 
The involvement of government and ECG’s mismanagement have led to the financial 
weakness of ECG. Government of Ghana owes ECG a significant amount and there are 
uncollected debt some customers. However, these payments when redeemed may not be 
able to turn things around as ECG owes its VRA and most of the Independent Power 
Producers. In order to sustain the company, there is a need to have external funding or 
investment to be able to make ECG viable again. At the heart of the discussion is a decision to 
fully or partly privatise or concession the operations of ECG. On the other hand, others are 
convinced that if government insulates itself from the operations of ECG and allow the 
company to run as a proper corporate institution.  
5.8 Summary 
This chapter presents analysis on electricity distribution in Ghana using the Electricity 
Company of Ghana as a case study. A political economy analysis is employed to the 
“inefficiency problem” in the electricity distribution sector.  Largely, the study endorses the 
significance of assessing stakeholder interests, winners and losers, incentives and losses when 
dealing with a sectoral problem. In addition, it provides evidence of the prevalence of 
exploitation in the electricity industry. It exposes some of the informal rules that cause one 
to gain and many others to lose. The research provides stakeholders, other interested parties 
and investors, empirical evidence that support the rationales behind the following status quo: 
 Relatively high and persistent inefficiency in the face of inadequate power supply and 
high electricity prices.  
 Stakeholders calling for total or partial privatisation of the ECG. 
 Poor financial performance of ECG and its related inefficiency problems despite 
continuous support from government of Ghana. 
 Significant investments and reforms in the sector but on the contrary inefficiency 
problem persists. 
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 ECG’s financial weakness and how that links to the kind of relationship that it has with 
Government’s obligation and political will. 
First of all, the investigation finds evidence that the stakeholders interviewed in the matter 
have a perception or a view on the efficiency of the electricity distribution sector of Ghana. It 
further explored the perception of stakeholders on reforms, their reaction to high tariff and 
unreliable power supply where consumers by the situation may have become more energy 
efficient, changed life styles and even a significant percentage have become complete or 
partial “prosumers” This gives an indication of the sense of enterprise that can drive adoption 
of new technologies which are more energy efficient in Ghana.  
The PEA found that the interplay of political and economic factors influences the level of 
inefficiency in the electricity distribution sector of Ghana. The emergence of political 
incentives—in the shape of employment or electoral support—for extending unsolicited 
managerial assistance and interfering with the management of the EDC. Incentives for staff 
to remain corrupt could be well routed in the governance structure and the organisational 
culture adulterated by internal and external factors. Regulators are unable to monitor and 
discipline the distribution sector because of government’s interference and inadequate 
skilled labour. There was also evidence that technological and social-economic solutions could 
help address the challenges of illegal connection, meter by-passing and other inefficient 
practices of the electricity industry.  
Subsequent to comprehending the causes of the problem, the research further engaged in 
dialogues, conversations and discussions to develop technically feasible and politically 
acceptable measures that seek to improve on the efficiency of the electricity distribution 
sector. The next chapter attempts to synthesise the research finding of the various themes 
against the set objectives originally discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Synthesis of Thesis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis looked at three different themes in the efficiency space. In the first part, a 
comprehensive review was conducted on the concept of efficiency and productivity in 
production theory. It explained the concept and explored varied measuring techniques used 
in industry. This was looked at in the context of cost minimisation or output maximisation and 
therefore using the various functions developed in production theory, this thesis physical, 
revenue and profit were also reviewed.  Frontier techniques were investigated and the two 
main approaches (parametric and non- parametric) discussed accordingly. Sub-models used 
in these techniques were comprehensively analysed in the review chapter. The stochastic 
frontier technique which is one of the parametric approaches for measuring technical, 
allocative and economic efficiency. The SFA model, first introduced by Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) essentially introduces an inefficiency term in the composed error term aside 
the random noise term which is the main distinction between it and the DEA non-parametric 
model. The SFA technique has since been extended from its cross-section models to very 
varied panel models and all are explained in chapter two. As highlighted in chapter two, the 
statistical distribution used for the inefficiency term in the SFA models include half-normal, 
truncated normal, exponential, gamma and Rayleigh. Though the first three are the most 
popularly used, it is evidenced by literature that the choice of the best distribution type 
remains debatable. While a conclusion has been drawn by many other authors that, apart 
from the particular efficiency estimates that may vary from one distribution to the other, the 
ranking of the firms or the analysed firms did not change. Other authors are of the opinion 
that the distribution type could affect the scores and may have the potential to change the 
ranking of the firms when the right distribution that fits the data is applied.  With this gap 
there was a need to investigate and experiment with a much accommodating Burr type x 
whose features have been well explained in chapters two and three. In order to contribute to 
this debate, the research as part of its first theme looked at the performance of the SFA 
models based on Burr X by comparing its performance with SFA models based on the popular 
distributions mentioned earlier. 
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Chapter two also reviewed the electricity distribution sector of West Africa with its finding 
leading to the conception of the second theme which is a practical application of the 
Stochastic Frontier models discussed in chapters two and three. In the review, it was clear 
that the West African EDCs have been tagged inefficient. The state of affairs in terms of the 
quality of supply, blackouts, load shedding, high technical and commercial losses in the 
reviewed reports and other narratives pointed to the inefficient situation. Many of these 
indicators are unidirectional and are unable to capture the entire inefficiency in the 
distribution sector and therefore the need to measure the real inefficiency was imminent.  
The foundations of the second theme of the thesis is thus hinged on the above discussed gap 
and upon review, the stochastic frontier approach was chosen to investigate the level of 
inefficiency. Various sub-models of stochastic frontier models were experimented on 14 West 
African EDCs and 1 East African EDC in chapter four. The analysis pointed to a high inefficiency 
level of the West African electricity distribution sector. The mean efficiency level was just over 
50% which called for an investigation especially noting that the sector had undergone many 
reforms and significant investments. Theme three was then introduced to investigate the 
issue from a political economy perspective to clearly understand the formal and informal rules 
of the sector that may be contributing to the high inefficiency levels. 
Using the Political Economy Analysis framework and the Electricity Company of Ghana as a 
case study, quantitative and qualitative methods for data collection and analysis were applied 
in chapter five. The structural equation model is applied on the quantitative data to verify the 
questionnaire in order that the data collected can be relied upon for a meaningful analysis. 
Narratives from articles as well as qualitative data from in depth interviews with key 
stakeholders of the power industry of Ghana are analysed accordingly with very interesting 
findings. The chapter provides the possible causes and solutions to the persistent inefficiency 
problem with some policy recommendations. 
The next section of this chapter focuses on the key findings and theoretical implications of 
the design and testing of the SFA model based on Burr type x.  Sections 6.2 and 6.3 will also 
discuss the key findings and policy implications on themes 2 and 3 in relation to the efficiency 
of the West African electricity distribution sector. 
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6.2 Findings and Implications of Investigations on the SFA Model Based on Burr X 
The main objective of the first theme was to investigate the competitiveness of the proposed 
Stochastic frontier Burr type x model in relation to other models.  This work is the first 
regarding the treatment of SFA with Burr distribution and adds to the discussion on which is 
the preferred choice of distribution underlying the inefficiency term. The adopted 
methodology was to construct the joint distribution of normal and Burr x distributions, 
estimate the parameters using Maximum likelihood estimation and then incorporate the 
resultant distribution into the stochastic frontier model. In order to test its competitiveness, 
the normal-half normal stochastic frontier model was first applied on generated input and 
output data. The other three SFA models including exponential, Rayleigh and Burr x also 
utilised the same simulated data. SDs and MSEs were computed for the two variances of u 
and v as well as the efficiency estimates. 
There are three main findings from this theme of research.  First, by this investigation, the 
Burr-type x stochastic frontier model has been constructed and its potentials explored using 
a cross-sectional data. It is among the few two parameter models to be constructed aside the 
popular gamma that have be critiqued for having identification problems.  
In the investigations, it was found that, generally all the models under review closely 
predicted the parameters estimated using simulated data. There were differences in the 
absolute efficiency measurements but with a high spearman rank correlation which indicated 
the ranking of the units analysed did not significantly change when different models were 
used.  There were very little differences in the ranking of the firms using different models. 
The spearman correlation was very high meaning that the ranking of the firms barely changed. 
This arguments supports the opinion of a group of authors who suggest that changing the 
distribution underlying the inefficiency term least affect the ranking of the firms. Using a 
Monte Carlo analysis, the rank correlation of the stochastic frontier estimates when Ruggiero 
(1999) compared half normal to exponential showed very little differences between the true 
distribution and the misspecified distributions.  In practice with data, some authors like 
Greene (1990) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) tested the possibility of change of rankings. 
Greene (1990) using US electricity utility providers tested the half-normal, truncated normal, 
exponential, and gamma distributions and found average efficiency to be of no significant 
difference. Kumbharkar and Lovell (2000) found also very high rank correlation with the same 
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data with values between 0.75 and 0.98.  Our investigations seem to support the notion that, 
the frontier of the stochastic frontier could change when different models are used but in 
items if the relative distances from it, the firms under analysis do not change their rankings. 
Finally, to comment on the performance of Burr type x for cross-sectional data, it is observed 
that the misspecified models competed satisfactorily. There was no significant differences 
between the estimation of the control model (Half Normal) and the misspecified models. It 
will be over ambitious to indicate that the Burr a better model and it will be far from true to 
conclude that it did not compete well with exponential and Rayleigh. However, the potential 
of Burr x will need to be further explored in other tests with different sample sizes and with 
panel data to see the advantages that these conditions offer to Burr X.  
6.3 Findings and Implications of Investigating the Cost Efficiencies West African EDCs 
Fourteen West African EDCs from Nigeria, Togo, Ghana and La Cote d’Ivoire were involved in 
the investigations. The main aim of the theme was to empirically test the efficiency level of 
the electricity distribution sector of West Africa. As a result, the research relied on the 
stochastic cost frontier model to empirically estimate drivers of total cost of operations and 
the efficiency levels.  Aside cost variables such as labour and capital costs, the models included 
load factors and customer density to control for certain constraints beyond the control of the 
management of the firms.  Given that these EDCs sometimes operate in somewhat inherent 
and persistent conditions, it was a reasonable adjustment especially with the recently 
privatised Nigerian EDC.  Using Kenya Power as a comparator from East Africa the study was 
able to make comparisons with sub-groups in the sample.  Nigerian EDCs, other West African 
EDCs and East African EDC were the subgroups within the sampled EDCs.  The key findings of 
the research are as follows: 
The Pooled model and the Pitt & Lee models were the two among other  stochastic frontier 
panel models used in the investigation  that produced robust results with the former being 
the more robust. With the sample data used the True Fixed Effects Model (TFEM) and True 
Random Effects Model (TREM) produced unreasonable and less robust results and so were 
not considered for analysis. However the most preferred sub-model was the Pooled Normal-
Half Normal one which was used in the analysis of the total cost drivers and the level of 
inefficiencies of the EDCs in West Africa. 
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Generally as discussed earlier, the efficiency levels for the entire West African electricity 
distribution sector as per the results from the cost efficiency estimates is highly inefficiency 
with an average efficiency level of 48% (Pooled Normal-Half Normal Estimates). These results 
is in consonance with the narratives that surround the perceived underperformance of the 
sector. That, the stakeholders’ perceived inefficiency of the West African EDC is empirically 
tested and confirmed as such.  
The level of inefficiency was very high in the Nigerian EDCs and there was no clear trend to 
show an improvement even after privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry. The Nigerian 
EDCs performed worst in the sub-group analysis with a below average inefficiency 
performance of 51%. It is important to state, however, that some of the EDCs in Nigeria 
outperformed some of the other West African EDCs and BEDC in one of the years recorded as 
high as 78%.  The notion that Nigeria has an inefficient distribution system may be a 
generalisation as the investigation conducted suggest that not all of the EDCs are inefficient. 
In addition, the low average cost efficiencies of the West African and particularly the Nigerian 
EDCs suggest that there are opportunities to improve which comes with high expectations for 
investment by the private sector.  
6.4 Findings and Implications of the Political Economy Analysis of the Persistent 
‘Inefficiency Problem’ in the Electricity Distribution Sector 
In the previous section, it was evidenced that the West African Electricity Distribution Sector 
has been persistently inefficient. In an attempt to understand the problem Chapter five 
conducts a PEA in order to unearth the behaviours of change agents as they react or respond 
to reforms that aimed at improving the electricity distribution sector of West Africa. Another 
objective perfecting these investigations was to understand how consumers respond to an 
inefficient system resulting in the key findings of theme three discussed in the section. 
Consumers perceive the distribution system as inefficient and respond to its effects in many 
ways. Consumers in the period of reliable and relatively less costly power are expected to be 
used to some inefficient and uneconomical behavioural practices. They may never switch off 
their light bulbs during the day when there is enough natural daylight to enable vision. They 
may give less consideration if any at all to efficiency or energy consumption of stock of 
appliances they use in their homes, offices and even their commercial engagements. The 
quantitative results indicate that in the phase of high tariffs and unreliable power supply a 
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significant number (30%) of consumers become less reliant on the distribution company and 
fully or partly produces and consumes their own energy. They respond to the conditions by 
having alternative energy such as solar energy and invest in storage facilities to ensure they 
have a backup. Many others rely on small generating plants. Specifically with high tariffs, 
about 50% of the consumers react by reducing their energy consumption. A relatively smaller 
number of consumers prioritise efficiency when buying electrical appliance and exhibit some 
demand management skills. From the above consumer behaviour, there are good signs that 
due to their experience of an inefficient distribution sector, most have inculcated some 
conservation behaviour or thinking which could become a leverage for the introduction of 
clean and renewable energy options. For Ghana, it has come at a time where alternative 
energy is getting considerable attention and policy makers could take advantage of the 
situation to stimulate the private sector to invest into renewables.  
What is more worrisome is that over the years, nearly a third of the consumers do not bother 
to report problems to the EDC or any third party dealing with consumer concerns. It is 
evidenced that consumers have lost confidence in the management of the EDC and accuse 
them of neglecting their concerns, involved in corruption and being wasteful. In this part, 
there was evidence of economic gains and incentives leading to some informal rules of the 
game where consumers are frustrated enough such that there is a growing “mediator or 
middleman “operations who connive with the EDC’s staff to extort moneys for services that 
should be done for free.  The management of the EDC therefore has a herculean task of 
regaining the trust of its consumers and that will require serious internal reforms including a 
relook at the EDCs corporate culture.   
This research also found that the causes of the inefficiency problem in the distribution sector 
goes beyond the EDC. The data collected and analysed produced six causal themes that are 
cultural, financial, technical, managerial, political and regulatory. Most of the issues 
underlying these themes come about because some informal rules have been gradually 
accepted as the norm. Some stakeholders that are powerful and influential in the wider 
Ghanaian society use their influence to enhance their gains which eventually causes more 
problems for the efficient running of the sector. The underlying theory of the applied PEA 
approach was confirmed in the investigations as there is a culture of patrimonialism and 
clientelism exhibited in the electricity distribution sector.  Also, it is rather alarming how the 
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financial weakness of the EDC could affect the banking industry and the entire economy if 
immediate actions are not taken. Government of Ghana has since devised a taxing regime to 
collect funds to offset the debt on the balance sheet of the EDC. This is rather a reactionary 
solution and a more preventive measure should be found. Political interference affects the 
management of the company as well as the regulation of the sector and it is hard time 
government of Ghana began treating the EDC and the regulators as separate entities that are 
competent enough to make prudent economic and technical decisions.  
In chapter five, internal and external interventions are analysed and recommended to solve 
the inefficiency problem. The internal interventions are supposed to be initiated by the 
management of the EDC while other agencies or parties are responsible for the external 
interventions.  The denominator of these solutions rests in the drive for all stakeholders to 
perform their roles satisfactorily. A consensus must be reached that the issues are beyond 
any individual stakeholder and unless institutions perform their responsibilities the problem 
will always be a blame game and the vicious cycle regarding the problems will continue to 
exist. The World Bank’s Development Report (2004) regards service delivery in three 
relationships or interactions at the levels of policymakers, service providers and clients. In 
Ghana and in most West African states, the solutions proffered through reforms have 
concentrated on the Policymaker-service provider connection which is normally technical 
with less attention to the policymaker-client and the service provider-client relationships. 
Specifically, the utility-consumer and the politician-consumer interactions cannot be ignored 
when searching for a holistic approach to tackle the inefficiency problem in the electricity 
sector as suggested by Lal (2006). Therefore, an approach that is technical and flexible that 
takes into consideration the incentive structure of all these three interactions and the local 
politics would be able to build coalitions to support reforms in improving efficiency in the 
electricity distribution sector of Ghana. 
6.5 Summary 
This PhD project looked at three connected themes in efficiency studies with two cases 
applied in the West African Sector. The theoretical concepts of efficiency measuring 
techniques were reviewed in previous chapters and accordingly the proposed SFA based on 
Burr X distribution is constructed and tested.  In terms of application, the SFA model was used 
to measure the efficiency levels of EDCs in West Africa which produces an expected result of 
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high inefficiency confirming the narratives in the public discourse. The political Economy 
Analysis methodology applied to the electricity distribution sector of Ghana revealed causes 
and possible interventions of the persistent ‘inefficiency problems’.  
The wider implications of the different themes are discussed in this chapter and their linkages 
to the main aim of the project are well illustrated.  The next or last chapter of this thesis 
presents concluding remarks of the thesis highlighting the research contributions, limitations, 
recommendation and future or further work. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Main Research Contributions 
This thesis aimed at understanding the concept of efficiency and the inefficiency problem of 
the West African electricity distribution sector. The centre of the discussion has been the 
deplorable state of the electricity distribution sector of West Africa. The sector is 
characterised by inadequate generation capacity, high demand and supply deficit, low access 
to electricity, high tariffs, poor quality of service, and high technical and commercial losses. 
The severity and complexity of the problem is reflected in the following questions: 
 Why there are high losses in a sector of a high demand and supply deficit? 
 Why there are high tariffs for a sector characterised by poor quality of service? 
 Why there is a persistent “inefficiency problem” in a sector which has experienced 
several reforms and significant investments? 
Thus the motivation of this thesis is drawn from the compelling desire to understand the 
contradictions above. First the concepts and foundations of efficiency was to enhance the 
understanding of how to measure it and measure it right. Subsequently it could be plausible 
to understand the causes of the inefficiency problem in the West African Region.  
In the investigation of the best technique to measure efficiency of the distribution system, 
the stochastic frontier was more appealing but set out a problem or gap that was prudent to 
address. The debate surrounding which distributional assumption on the inefficiency term is 
preferred has remained inconclusive. The Burr X distribution based on its attributes and 
particularly being one of two distributions with two parameters was incorporated into the 
stochastic frontier model. Apart from Gamma SFA constructed by Greene (1990) the newly 
constructed Burr X SFA is the other model developed on a distribution with two parameters. 
So far, unlike the Gamma SFA which has identification problems as pointed out by Ritter and 
Simar (1997), the newly developed Burr x performs satisfactorily with cross-sectional data. It 
competed well with Rayleigh and Exponential stochastic frontier models. One observation 
that has been confirmed on similar tests is that the rankings of the firms in terms of efficiency 
remain nearly the same as the assumed statistical distributions vary and this research 
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confirms that too with spearman rank correlation that approximates 1 in the range of 0.95-1. 
However, it is also important to state that the panel models for Burr X SFA have not been 
developed yet and it may be too early to suggest it as a generally robust model.  
Furthermore, the investigations and tests conducted in assessing its performance against 
other SFA models could be improved upon and the lack of a much fairer test could be a 
limitation in the experiments conducted in Chapter three. Wang, Amsler and Schmidt (2011) 
propose the goodness of fit test in distribution assessment in stochastic frontier models and 
a review of their proposed methodology could enhance the test performed to allow a much 
firmer conclusion. Nonetheless, this Burr X SFA joins the list of stochastic models based 
distributional types to enrich the literature of efficiency and its measuring techniques.  
In the second theme of the research, the stochastic cost efficiencies of the EDCs in West Africa 
was modelled. Using different stochastic frontier panel models, this study happens to be the 
first inter-country cost efficiency investigations conducted in the sub-region and in the 
electricity distribution sector. In order words, much as there may be efficiency studies within 
a country and different sectors, this work provides for the first time a cost efficiency analysis 
of EDCs in West Africa and therefore provides a baseline or benchmark in the region. Sarpong 
(2013) for example, conducted efficiency studies on the SBUs of electricity distribution 
companies in Ghana. The results of these investigations should expose the severity of the 
inefficiency problem as the region shows an average inefficiency of nearly 47%.  The Nigerian 
EDCs proved to be the worst with a mean average inefficiency of 51% which is relatively high 
when compared to other EDCs Ghana, Togo and La Cote D’Ivoire. For the management of the 
EDCs and regulators, these finding could be used to set targets that will improve their 
efficiency levels. Peer review is another way of self-assessment which is very important in any 
industry and therefore even if the distribution companies do not belong to the same 
regulated market, the outputs of such reviews are still very important.  
The last part of the thesis conducted an investigation to bring understanding to the persistent 
inefficiency problem that was confirmed by the studies conducted on the cost efficiency of 
the electricity distribution sector.  Using a political economy analysis framework and ECG as 
a case study, it is perceived that informal rules are used to satisfy the interest of some 
stakeholders who gain politically or economically. The main contribution from this theme is 
that the results suggest that any intervention or reform should consider at its centre the 
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political economy of the problem as well as the technical and non-technical solutions. This 
research therefore gives a comprehensive approach to understanding the persistent 
inefficiency problem and adds to the discussion on regarding the solutions and interventions 
needed to eliminate the related issues of an inefficient distribution system. In terms of 
literature, it is one of the few studies that has utilised a mixed method underpinned by the 
theories of political economy in order to investigate a popular but complex problem. By this 
approach, other findings that could be considered to improve the management, regulation 
and formulation of policies were revealed. For example, it is possible to take advantage of the 
emerging energy conserving/ energy saving attributes as well as the increasing adoption of 
renewable energy technologies by the consumers in order to improve the energy situation in 
the region.  
7.2 Research Limitations 
This research utilised the best data available in order to reach conclusions that are 
representative of the facts on the ground. There were definitely limitations in terms of the 
data collected or the data collection phase without which the findings of this research could 
have been much enhanced.  In particular, certain variables could have been added to the 
models used in estimating the cost efficiencies of the EDCs.  Some environmental factors such 
as size of area of operations, climatic data and data on transformer sizes and numbers could 
have made the assessment platform fairer as more heterogeneity is introduced in the models. 
Most of the cost variables were derived from financial reports which have different reporting 
styles and formats and even though this was taken into account during the data collection 
stage, there is still the possibility that some of the cost variables may have been less accurate 
due to conversion and approximating errors. Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) also confirm the above 
limitation and suggest that in international comparison the quality of data is impaired by the 
various accounting principles applied especially with the treatment of capital cost, 
operational expenses and depreciation. It is therefore important to note that had it not been 
for the paucity of data in other West African EDCs not included in this study, the results on 
the cost efficiency would have included more EDCs in the sub-region to offer findings that are 
more representative of West Africa.  For the PEA of the “inefficiency problem” and in the 
quantitative analysis, a bigger sample size would have added more weight to the findings of 
the consumer attributes and reactions to an inefficient distribution system. However, since 
the main motive of that part of research was to get leading questions for further 
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investigations in the qualitative analysis, though the sample size may be a limitation in a wider 
context, in the specific case of this research it is adequate. Thus, it is possible to investigate 
how consumers respond to an inefficient distribution system by increasing samples sizes and 
injecting more diversity in the type of respondents to study certain trends and patterns 
related to specific groups, clusters or individuals. 
As suggested earlier, using the half-normal distribution as a control distribution poses a 
limitation to the test methodology applied in chapter three. Other fairer and less biased 
methodologies could be explored to judge the performance of the various SFA models tested. 
7.3 Future Work 
In the light of the research conducted, there are developments of new ideas or research gaps 
that could add to this work. 
Firstly, the same motive for developing panel models in the other classical SFA methods is 
also valid in the case of Burr X SFA and therefore any attempt at developing such panel models 
will be valuable. A future work in this regard will be developing the panel models of the Burr 
type x SFA in order to permit the study of efficiency of firms or units overtime. In this proposed 
work, the choice of the testing methodology could be improved upon by the considering the 
goodness of fit test as well as other tests to bring to a logical conclusion on the performance 
of the candidate models. 
In chapter four, the approach adopted for measuring the efficiency levels of EDCs in West 
Africa was the stochastic cost frontier model (a parametric approach). Being the first study in 
this arena, it will be prudent to test the case of different models including non-parametric 
approaches to find out how the data behave with different models. That is to say, there could 
be a much better model at determining the efficiency levels of the West African EDCs.  Also 
in these models, an inclusion of variables that can depict the performance of EDCs in terms 
of quality of service could add more weight to the findings so far. Variables such as hours of 
load shedding, blackouts, customer complaints, quality of power, hours of low voltages, 
health and safety incidents, quality of billing systems etc. could be added to boost up the 
employed efficiency measuring technique. The models could also include more 
environmental factors that can control for heterogeneity and offer a much fairer result, 
especially as these EDCs operate in different geographical areas. Research in future could 
therefore consider different parametric and non-parametric models which utilise variables 
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that are quality of service oriented as well as include environmental variables in order to 
understudy the behaviour of these different models on the data on West African EDCS.  
In chapter five, this study applied the PEA framework to the inefficiency problem of the 
electricity distribution sector. In this research, one of the emerging issues was that some 
consumers in the face of an inefficient electricity distribution have developed some attributes 
or attitudes towards energy conservation and even generation of their own energy. These are 
definitely positive responds that the power sector authorities and policy makers could explore 
to introduce and enhance the use of new technologies and push the concept of community 
energy or other forms of decentralised energy that put less stress on the central distribution 
system. Therefore, in the future, a principal research on how to identify such attributes in a 
wider context as well as how to sustain and enhance these attributes even when the central 
distribution system improves could be very useful to the West African sub-region. 
7.4 Summary 
In this study, while attempting to understand the electricity supply landscape of West Africa, 
it was established and widely accepted that the sub region is faced with inadequate supply of 
electricity, high cost and unreliable supply of power.  This issue is further compounded with 
the persistent inefficiency problem of the electricity distribution sector. This inefficiency 
problem always dominate the public discourse and yet apart from reports on technical and 
commercial losses and other partial efficiency indicators, there has yet to find a study which 
attempts to measure or  determine empirically and holistically the level inefficiency in the 
region.  To decide on what approach is holistic enough to measure the efficiency levels of the 
EDCs, this thesis reviewed the various techniques of measuring efficiency. In the process, 
there was a need to advance or enhance the stochastic frontier technique by incorporating 
the Burr X distribution as an assumed distribution of the technical inefficiency term u. The 
newly constructed Burr x Stochastic frontier model exhibits some competitive attributes in 
the cross-sectional form against other existing models which is a good place to commence 
modelling its panel equivalents.  
Eventually, the stochastic cost frontier model was applied on a sample of West African EDCs 
and the various panel models analysed. With an indication of relatively inefficient West 
African Electricity Distribution Sector with a mean efficiency of 47%, it was prudent to 
investigate the reason behind the inefficiency problem. Given that there is adequate evidence 
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of failed electricity sector reforms in the midst of significant investments, a political economy 
analysis was one of the recommended approaches to investigate the sources of inefficiency 
and its possible interventions that focus on the dynamics of rents seeking linkages to the 
interest of some key stakeholders since the investigation is premised on the notion that some 
agents of change exhibit or utilise their influential and political controls to intentionally or 
unintentionally oppose reforms that target improving the efficiency levels of EDCs.  
The findings have confirmed that the electricity distribution sector is perceived inefficient to 
the extent that some consumers have lost any hope in reversing the situation. This thesis 
makes also important recommendations that could be adopted by policy makers and 
regulators so as to reduce the inefficiency problem. One that is very important is the 
collaboration of all the stakeholders in the power industry to collectively face this issue of 
inefficiency and resist from the typical blame game. All stakeholders should be engaged to 
collectively play their roles earnestly and allow institutions to work. 
Finally, this thesis proposes or suggests some areas of further research that could be executed 
to bring more understanding to the theory of efficiency measurement, the applications of 
efficiency measuring techniques as well as the policy implications or benefits of the findings 
in efficiency studies.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 3A: Bo Mean Estimates for SFA Models Assessed 
 Bo Mean Estimates for Normal-Half Normal SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 1.09 1 0.93 0.89 0.89 
50 1.04 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.97 
100 1.03 0.99 0.93 0.94 1 
250 1.01 0.97 0.93 0.96 1 
500 1.01 0.96 0.94 0.98 1 
 Bo Mean Estimates for Normal-Exponential SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 1.02 0.95 0.88 0.8 0.82 
50 0.99 0.91 0.84 0.79 0.83 
100 0.97 0.89 0.83 0.8 0.84 
250 0.96 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.85 
500 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.85 
 Bo Mean Estimates for Normal-Rayleigh SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 1.3 1.2 1.16 1.08 1.12 
50 1.27 1.2 1.12 1.16 1.21 
100 1.23 1.16 1.13 1.15 1.25 
250 1.17 1.14 1.14 1.21 1.25 
500 1.15 1.11 1.12 1.23 1.26 
 Bo Mean Estimates for Normal-Burr x SFA 
  
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.87 1.1 0.7 0.84 1.13 
50 1.01 0.91 0.85 0.69 0.72 
100 0.77 1 0.68 0.68 0.71 
250 1.03 0.81 0.81 0.82 1.09 
500 0.79 0.95 1.14 0.73 1 
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Appendix 3B: B1 Mean Estimates for SFA Models Assessed 
 B1 Mean Estimates for Normal-Half Normal SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.98 1 1.01 1 1.01 
50 1.01 0.99 0.99 1 1 
100 1.01 0.99 1 1 1 
250 1.01 1 1 1 1 
500 1 1 1 1 1 
 B1 Mean Estimates for Normal-Exponential SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.98 0.97 0.99 1.03 1.02 
50 1 0.99 1 0.99 1.01 
100 1 1.01 1 1 1.01 
250 1 1 1 1 1 
500 1 1 1.01 1 1 
      
 B1 Mean Estimates for Rayleigh SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 1 1 1 0.99 1 
50 1.01 0.99 0.99 1 1 
100 1 1 1 1.01 1 
250 1 1 0.99 1 1 
500 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 B1 Mean Estimates for Normal-Burr x SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.98 0.55 0.77 1.12 0.7 
50 1.03 1 1.04 0.97 1.06 
100 1.1 0.89 1.09 1.03 1.07 
250 0.9 1.01 0.94 1.06 0.94 
500 0.94 0.95 0.9 1.11 0.95 
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Appendix 3C: Sigma u mean estimates for SFA Models Assessed 
 Sigma u Mean Estimates for Normal-Half Normal SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.48 
50 0.37 0.35 0.4 0.42 0.57 
100 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.43 0.59 
250 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.45 0.59 
500 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.48 0.6 
 Sigma u Mean Estimates for Normal-Exponential SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.32 
50 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.31 
100 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.2 0.32 
250 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.22 0.33 
500 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.33 
  Sigma u Mean Estimates for Normal-Rayleigh SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
      
        
20 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.48 
50 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.45 0.55 
100 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.44 0.58 
250 0.26 0.3 0.36 0.40 0.59 
500 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.50 0.59 
 Sigma u Mean Estimates for Burr x SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.39 0.52 
50 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.32 
100 0.06 0.21 0.2 0.22 0.42 
250 0.15 0.12 0.27 0.37 0.66 
500 0.11 0.28 0.5 0.27 0.61 
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Appendix 3D: Sigma v Mean Estimates for SFA Models Assessed 
 Sigma v Mean Estimates for Normal-Half Normal SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.15 
50 0.5 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.18 
100 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.38 0.19 
250 0.57 0.53 0.48 0.39 0.20 
500 0.58 0.55 0.49 0.39 0.20 
 Sigma v Mean Estimates for Normal-Exponential SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.5 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.19 
50 0.55 0.53 0.48 0.41 0.25 
100 0.57 0.54 0.5 0.42 0.26 
250 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.43 0.26 
500 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.43 0.26 
  Sigma v Mean Estimates for Normal-Rayleigh SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
        
20 0.36 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.07 
50 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.28 0.08 
100 0.52 0.48 0.42 0.33 0.09 
250 0.55 0.51 0.45 0.34 0.11 
500 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.35 0.12 
 Sigma v Mean Estimates for Normal-Burr x SFA 
n/scale 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
 
     
20 0.51 0.35 0.29 0.29 0.18 
50 0.48 0.46 0.39 0.28 0.19 
100 0.52 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.24 
250 0.54 0.43 0.4 0.32 0.16 
500 0.55 0.45 0.37 0.31 0.17 
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Appendix 3D: R codes for Various SFA Models and Monte Carlo Simulation Analysis 
Appendix 3D1: Normal- half normal SFA 
SFA_sim<-function(n,scale){ 
   
  # generate sample 
  x <- runif(n, 0, 1) 
  u <- abs(rnorm(n,sd=scale)) 
  v <- rnorm(n,sd=sqrt(0.4-scale^2)) 
  y <- 1+x+v-u 
   
   
  logl <- function(theta){ 
     
    b0 <- theta[1] 
     
    b1 <- theta[2] 
     
    g <- theta[3] 
     
    s2 <- theta[4] 
     
    lxd <- b0+b1*x 
     
    e <- y-lxd 
     
    pn <- pnorm(-e*g/sqrt(s2)) 
     
    ret <- n*log(sqrt(2/pi))-n*log(sqrt(s2))+ sum(log(pn))-sum(e^2)/(2*s2) 
     
    return(ret)  
     
  } 
   
  thetastart <- c(1,1,scale, sqrt(0.4-scale^2))#c(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5) 
   
  o <- optim(thetastart,logl,control=list(fnscale=-1)) 
      
  #To obtain the ML-estimates of the variances, we convert the estimated parameters and estimates 
of the variances  
   
  b0.d <- o$par[1] 
   
  b1.d <- o$par[2] 
   
  g.d <- o$par[3] 
   
  s2.d <- o$par[4] 
   
  s2.u.d <- s2.d*g.d^2/(1+g.d^2) 
   
  ## [1] 0.03225 
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  s2.v.d <- s2.d/(1+g.d^2) 
   
  ## [1] 0.004234 
   
   
   
  #Using the estimated regression parameters, calculate the residuals of the regression and finally 
obtain the estimated efficiency scores as: 
   
  # Jodrow et al (1982)  estimator E(u/e)  
  ly.sfa <- b0.d+b1.d*x 
  e.d <- y-ly.sfa 
  mustar <- -e.d*s2.u.d / (s2.u.d + s2.v.d) 
  sigmastar <- sqrt(s2.u.d * s2.v.d / (s2.u.d + s2.v.d)) 
  uu <- mustar + sigmastar*(dnorm(-mustar/sigmastar)/pnorm(mustar/sigmastar)) 
   
  
  #technical efficiency 
 
  eta.d1<- mean((exp(-uu)-exp(-u))^2) 
   
  
 # thetastart <- c(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5) 
  # calculate estimators 
   
   
  sigma_u <- sqrt(s2.u.d) 
  sigma_v <- sqrt(s2.v.d) 
  b0  <- b0.d 
  b1 <- b1.d 
   
  # return results 
  return(list("b0"=b0, "b"=b1, "sigma_u"=sigma_u, "sigma_v"=sigma_v, "MSE"=eta.d1)) 
} 
 
n_grid<-c(20, 50, 100, 250, 500) 
scale_grid<-c(0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6) 
 
param_list=list("n"=n_grid, "scale"=scale_grid) 
 
# run simulation: 
 
MC_result<-MonteCarlo(func=SFA_sim, nrep=100, param_list=param_list) 
 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale", digits=2, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
 
collapse<-list( "mean",  "mean", "mean",  "mean", "mean") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
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collapse<-list( "sd",  "sd", "sd",  "sd", "sd") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
 
 
Appendix 3D2: Normal –Exponential SFA 
SFA_sim<-function(n,scale){ 
   
  # generate sample 
  x <- runif(n, 0, 1) 
  u <- abs(rnorm(n,sd=scale)) 
  v <- rnorm(n,sd=sqrt(0.4-scale^2)) 
  y <- 1+x+v-u 
   
   
  Likeli_exp <- function(theta) { 
     
    b0 <- theta[1] 
     
    b1 <- theta[2] 
    sigmau <- theta[3] 
    sigmav<-theta[4] 
    lxd <- b0+b1*x 
     
    epsilon <- y-lxd 
     
    n <- length(y) 
    ret <- (n* log(1/sigmau) + n/ 2*(sigmav^2/sigmau^2) 
            + sum(log(pnorm((-epsilon - (sigmav^2/ (sigmau)))/(sigmav)))) 
            +  sum(epsilon)/sigmau) 
    return(ret) 
  } 
   
  #ormal/exponential distribution estimates 
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  thetastart2 <- c(1,1,scale, sqrt(0.4-scale^2)) 
   
  op <- optim(thetastart2, Likeli_exp,  control=list(fnscale=-1)) 
   
 # tab1 <- round(op$par,3) 
   
  #names(tab1) <- names(tab1) <- c("b0","b1","sigmau","sigmav");tab1 
   
 
   
  #parameter estiamtes 
   
  b0.e <- op$par[1] 
   
  b1.e <- op$par[2] 
   
  su.e <- op$par[3] 
   
  sv.e <- op$par[4] 
   
   
  #tab <- round(c(b0.e,b1.e,su.e,sv.e),3) 
   
 # names(tab) <- c("b0","b1","su","sv");tab 
   
  #normal/exponentialinefficiency estimates 
   
  ly.sfae<- b0.e+b1.e*x 
  e.e <- y-ly.sfae 
  mu.e <- -1*e.e-(sv.e^2/su.e) 
  et.e <- mu.e + (sv.e*(dnorm(-mu.e/sv.e))/pnorm(mu.e/sv.e)) 
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  eta.e <- mean((exp(-u)-exp(-et.e))^2) 
   
   
  sigma_u <- su.e 
  sigma_v <- sv.e 
  b0  <- b0.e 
  b1 <- b1.e 
   
  # return results 
  return(list("b0"=b0, "b"=b1, "sigma_u"=sigma_u, "sigma_v"=sigma_v, "MSE"=eta.e)) 
} 
 
n_grid<-c(20, 50, 100, 250, 500) 
scale_grid<-c(0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6) 
 
param_list=list("n"=n_grid, "scale"=scale_grid) 
 
# run simulation: 
 
MC_result<-MonteCarlo(func=SFA_sim, nrep=100, param_list=param_list) 
 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale", digits=2, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
 
collapse<-list( "mean",  "mean", "mean",  "mean", "mean") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
 
collapse<-list( "sd",  "sd", "sd",  "sd", "sd") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
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          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
Appendix 3D3: Normal-Rayleigh SFA 
 
SFA_sim<-function(n,scale){ 
   
  # generate sample 
  x <- runif(n, 0, 1) 
  u <- abs(rnorm(n,sd=scale)) 
  v <- rnorm(n,sd=sqrt(0.4-scale^2)) 
  y <- 1+x+v-u 
   
   
  loglike.rayleigh = function(theta) { 
     
    
    b0 <- theta[1] 
     
    b1 <- theta[2] 
     
    sigmau <- theta[3] # sigma u 
     
    sigmav <- theta[4] #sigma v 
     
     
    e <- y-b0-b1*x 
     
    n <- length(x) 
    mu <- -e*sigmau^2/(sigmau^2 + sigmav^2) 
    sigma2 <- (sigmau^2*sigmav^2)/(sigmau^2 + sigmav^2) 
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    rett <- -(n/2)*log(sigmav^2)- 
n*log(sigmau^2)+(n/2)*log(sigma2)+sum(log(sqrt(sigma2)*dnorm(mu/sqrt(sigma2))+ 
              mu*pnorm(mu/sqrt(sigma2)))) + sum(mu^2/(2*sigma2))-sum(e^2/(2*sigmav^2)) 
     
    return(rett)  
       
     
  } 
   
  thetastart1 <- c(1,1,scale, sqrt(0.4-scale^2))# starting values for numerical analysis 
   
  opo <- optim(thetastart1,loglike.rayleigh,  control=list(fnscale=-1)) 
   
  #tab <- round(opo$par,3) 
   
  #names(tab) <- names(tab) <- c("b0","b1","sigma_u","sigma_v");tab 
   
    
  #parameter estiamtes 
   
  b0.r <- opo$par[1] 
   
  b1.r <- opo$par[2] 
   
  su.r <- opo$par[3] 
   
  sv.r <- opo$par[4] 
   
   
 # tab <- round(c(b0.r,b1.r,su.r,sv.r),3) 
 
  
233 
 
   
  #names(tab) <- c("b0","b1","su","sv");tab 
    #Normal-Rayleigh efficiency estimation 
  ly.sfar <- b0.r+b1.r*x 
  #y.sfa <- exp(ly.sfar) 
  e.r <- y-ly.sfar 
  mu.r <- -e.r*su.r^2/(su.r^2+sv.r^2) 
  sigma2.r <- (su.r^2*sv.r^2)/(su.r^2+sv.r^2) 
   
  et.r <- ((mu.r*sqrt(sigma2.r)*dnorm(mu.r/sqrt(sigma2.r)))+ 
(sigma2.r+mu.r^2)*pnorm(mu.r/sqrt(sigma2.r)))/ 
    (sqrt(sigma2.r)*dnorm(mu.r/sqrt(sigma2.r))+mu.r*pnorm(mu.r/sqrt(sigma2.r))) 
  eta.r <- mean((exp(-u)-exp(-et.r))^2) 
   
  #thetastart <- c(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5) 
  # calculate estimators 
   
   
  sigma_u <- su.r 
  sigma_v <- sv.r 
  b0  <- b0.r 
  b1 <- b1.r 
   
  # return results 
  return(list("b0"= b0, "b"=b1, "sigma_u"=sigma_u, "sigma_v"=sigma_v, "MSE"=eta.r)) 
} 
 
n_grid<-c(20, 50, 100, 250, 500) 
scale_grid<-c(0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6) 
 
param_list=list("n"=n_grid, "scale"=scale_grid) 
 
# run simulation: 
 
MC_result<-MonteCarlo(func=SFA_sim, nrep=100, param_list=param_list) 
 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale", digits=2, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
 
collapse<-list( "mean",  "mean", "mean",  "mean", "mean") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
 
collapse<-list( "sd",  "sd", "sd",  "sd", "sd") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
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Appendix 3D4: Normal –Burr Type X SFA 
SFA_sim<-function(n,scale){ 
   
  # generate sample 
  x <- runif(n, 0, 1) 
  u <- abs(rnorm(n,sd=scale)) 
  v <- rnorm(n,sd=sqrt(0.4-scale^2)) 
  y <- 1+x+v-u 
   
    L_burr <- function(theta){ 
     
    b0 <- theta[1] 
     
    b1 <- theta[2] 
    
    sigma_u <- theta[3] 
    sigma_v <-theta[4] 
     
    alpha <-theta[5] 
     
    lxd <- b0+b1*x 
     
    e <- y-lxd 
     
    n <- length(x) 
     
    lamda <- 1+(sigma_u^2/(2*sigma_v^2)) 
     
    a1 <-  gamma(lamda+1)*gamma(alpha)/(lamda*gamma(lamda+alpha)) 
     
      z1  <- log(a1-(sqrt(pi)*sigma_u*e/(lamda*sigma_v^2*sqrt(lamda)))*exp(sigma_u^2*e^2 
/(4*sigma_v^4*lamda))*pnorm(-sigma_u*e /(sigma_v^2*sqrt(2*lamda))) + 
                    ((alpha-
1)*sqrt(pi)*sigma_u*e/((lamda+1)*sigma_v^2*sqrt(lamda+1)))*exp(sigma_u^2*e^2 
/(4*sigma_v^4*(lamda+1))*pnorm(-sigma_u*e /(sigma_v^2*sqrt(2*lamda+2))))) 
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        a2 <- sum(z1) 
     
    a3 <- n*log(alpha)-n*log(sqrt(2*pi))-n*log(sigma_v) 
     
    a4 <- -1/(2*sigma_v^2) 
     
        ans <- a2+a3+a4*sum(e^2) 
     
    return(ans)  
     
  }    thetastart2 <- c(1,1,scale, sqrt(0.4-scale^2),0.5) 
   
  opb <- optim(thetastart2,L_burr, control=list(fnscale=-1)) 
   
  #tab1 <- round(opb$par,3) 
   
  #names(tab1) <- names(tab1) <- c("b0","b1","sigma_u","sigma_v","alpha");tab1 
   
  #parameter estimates 
   
  b0.b <- opb$par[1] 
   
  b1.b <- opb$par[2] 
   
  su.b <- opb$par[3] 
   
  sv.b <- opb$par[4] 
   
  alpha.b<-opb$par[5] 
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  #tab <- round(c(b0.b,b1.b,su.b,sv.b, alpha.b),3) 
   
  # names(tab) <- c("b0","b1","su","sv","alpha");tab 
   
  #normal/Burr inefficiency estimates 
   
  ly.sfab <- b0.b+b1.b*x 
  #y.sfa <- exp(ly.sfa) 
  e.b <- y-ly.sfab 
  lamda.b <- 1+(su.b^2/(2*sv.b^2)) 
  g.b <-su.b+(e.b*su.b/sv.b^2) 
   
  #c <- 1-(sqrt(pi)*su.b*e.b)*exp(su.b^2*e.b^2 /(4*sv.b^4*lamda.b))*pnorm(-su.b*e.b 
/(sv.b^2*sqrt(2*lamda.b)))/(sv.b^2*sqrt(lamda.b)) 
 
 # d <- ((alpha.b-1)/(lamda.b+1))*(1-(sqrt(pi)*su.b*e.b/(sv.b^2*sqrt(lamda.b+1))*exp(su.b^2*e.b^2 
/(4*sv.b^4*(lamda.b+1)))*pnorm(-su.b*e.b /(sv.b^2*sqrt(2*lamda.b+2))))) 
   
 # a <- (su.b)*((sqrt(pi)*(2*lamda.b+(e.b^2*su.b^2/sv.b^4)))*exp(su.b^2*e.b^2 
/(4*sv.b^4*lamda.b))*pnorm(-su.b*e.b /(sv.b^2*sqrt(2*lamda.b)))-
(sqrt(lamda.b)*e.b*su.b/sv.b^2))/2*(lamda.b^(3/2)) 
  #b <- 2*(alpha.b-1)*su.b*((2*sqrt(pi)*(2*(lamda.b+1)+(e.b^2*su.b^2/sv.b^4)))*exp(su.b^2*e.b^2 
/(4*sv.b^4*(lamda.b+1)))*pnorm(-su.b*e.b /(sv.b^2*sqrt(2*(lamda.b+1))))-
(2*sqrt(lamda.b+1)*e.b*su.b/sv.b^2)) 
   
    #eta.b <- exp(-a/c) #exp[-E(u|e)] 
     
  mu.b <- -e.b*su.b^2/(su.b^2+sv.b^2) 
  sigma2.b <- (su.b^2*sv.b^2)/(su.b^2+sv.b^2) 
   
  et.b <- ((mu.b*sqrt(sigma2.b)*dnorm(mu.b/sqrt(sigma2.b)))+ 
(sigma2.b+mu.b^2)*pnorm(mu.b/sqrt(sigma2.b)))/ 
    (sqrt(sigma2.b)*dnorm(mu.b/sqrt(sigma2.b))+mu.b*pnorm(mu.b/sqrt(sigma2.b))) 
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  eta.b <- mean((exp(-u)-exp(-et.b))^2) 
   
    sigma_uu <- su.b 
  sigma_vu <- sv.b 
  b0  <- b0.b 
  b1 <- b1.b 
   
  # return results 
  return(list("b0"=b0, "b"=b1, "sigma_u"=sigma_uu, "sigma_v"=sigma_vu, "MSE"=eta.bb)) 
} 
n_grid<-c(20, 50, 100, 250, 500) 
scale_grid<-c(0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6) 
 
param_list=list("n"=n_grid, "scale"=scale_grid) 
 
# run simulation: 
 
MC_result<-MonteCarlo(func=SFA_sim, nrep=10, param_list=param_list) 
 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale", digits=2, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
collapse<-list( "mean",  "mean", "mean",  "mean", "mean") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
 
collapse<-list( "sd",  "sd", "sd",  "sd", "sd") 
MakeTable(output=MC_result, rows="n", cols="scale",  digits=2, 
          collapse=collapse, include_meta=FALSE) 
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Appendix 4A: Pooled Normal –Half Normal SFA Estimates 
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Appendix 4B: Pooled Normal-Exponential SFA Estimates 
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Appendix 4C: Cost Efficiency Measurements for Nigerian EDCs 
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Appendix 5A –Results of Structural Equation Model Estimations 
lavaan (0.5-22) converged normally after  61 iterations 
 
  Number of observations                            57 
 
  Number of missing patterns                         7 
 
  Estimator                                         ML 
  Minimum Function Test Statistic              135.555 
  Degrees of freedom                               102 
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.015 
 
Model test baseline model: 
 
  Minimum Function Test Statistic              443.295 
  Degrees of freedom                               120 
  P-value                                        0.000 
 
User model versus baseline model: 
 
  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.896 
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.878 
 
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
 
  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -1334.325 
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)      -1266.548 
 
  Number of free parameters                         50 
  Akaike (AIC)                                2768.651 
  Bayesian (BIC)                              2870.803 
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  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC)         2713.625 
 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
 
  RMSEA                                          0.076 
  90 Percent Confidence Interval          0.035  0.108 
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          0.123 
 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
 
  SRMR                                           0.097 
 
Parameter Estimates: 
 
  Information                                 Observed 
  Standard Errors                             Standard 
 
Latent Variables: 
                          Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv Stdall  
  Efficiency_attributes =~                                                       
    AIDS3                     1.000                               0.665    0.569 
    AIDS4                     0.697    0.267    2.606    0.009    0.463    0.399 
    AIDS5                     1.030    0.296    3.477    0.001    0.685    0.578 
    AIDS6                     1.211    0.300    4.042    0.000    0.805    0.715 
    AIDS7                     0.718    0.257    2.795    0.005    0.477    0.431 
    AIDS8                     1.111    0.272    4.082    0.000    0.739    0.739 
    AIDS9                     1.145    0.279    4.099    0.000    0.761    0.727 
    AIDS10                    1.047    0.294    3.562    0.000    0.696    0.599 
    AIDS11                    1.321    0.309    4.280    0.000    0.879    0.803 
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    AIDS12                    1.374    0.341    4.032    0.000    0.914    0.745 
  Efficiency_benefit =~                                                          
    AEDS1                     1.000                               0.663    0.600 
    AEDS2                     1.318    0.292    4.520    0.000    0.874    0.789 
    AEDS3                     1.250    0.325    3.844    0.000    0.829    0.717 
    AEDS4                     2.861    1.520    1.882    0.060    1.898    0.281 
    AEDS5                     1.132    0.276    4.108    0.000    0.751    0.804 
    AEDS6                     1.134    0.302    3.758    0.000    0.752    0.629 
  Efficiency_perception =~                                                       
    Effcncy_ttrbts            1.000                               0.736    0.736 
    Efficincy_bnft            0.618       NA                      0.456    0.456 
           
 
 
Intercepts: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .AIDS3             3.596    0.155   23.254    0.000    3.596    3.080 
   .AIDS4             3.425    0.155   22.091    0.000    3.425    2.949 
   .AIDS5             3.264    0.158   20.670    0.000    3.264    2.755 
   .AIDS6             4.032    0.150   26.894    0.000    4.032    3.580 
   .AIDS7             3.985    0.148   26.940    0.000    3.985    3.595 
   .AIDS8             4.091    0.133   30.719    0.000    4.091    4.088 
   .AIDS9             3.754    0.139   27.056    0.000    3.754    3.584 
   .AIDS10            3.807    0.154   24.749    0.000    3.807    3.278 
   .AIDS11            4.175    0.145   28.810    0.000    4.175    3.816 
   .AIDS12            3.940    0.163   24.135    0.000    3.940    3.212 
   .AEDS1             3.930    0.146   26.827    0.000    3.930    3.553 
   .AEDS2             4.298    0.147   29.298    0.000    4.298    3.881 
   .AEDS3             3.877    0.153   25.327    0.000    3.877    3.355 
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   .AEDS4             4.877    0.896    5.444    0.000    4.877    0.721 
   .AEDS5             4.070    0.124   32.902    0.000    4.070    4.358 
   .AEDS6             3.895    0.158   24.611    0.000    3.895    3.260 
    Effcncy_ttrbts    0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    Efficincy_bnft    0.000                               0.000    0.000 
    Effcncy_prcptn    0.000                               0.000    0.000 
 
Variances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
   .AIDS3             0.921    0.184    4.999    0.000    0.921    0.676 
   .AIDS4             1.134    0.220    5.168    0.000    1.134    0.841 
   .AIDS5             0.935    0.189    4.956    0.000    0.935    0.666 
   .AIDS6             0.620    0.135    4.609    0.000    0.620    0.489 
   .AIDS7             1.001    0.195    5.130    0.000    1.001    0.815 
   .AIDS8             0.455    0.102    4.476    0.000    0.455    0.455 
   .AIDS9             0.518    0.117    4.443    0.000    0.518    0.472 
   .AIDS10            0.864    0.175    4.947    0.000    0.864    0.641 
   .AIDS11            0.425    0.109    3.914    0.000    0.425    0.355 
   .AIDS12            0.669    0.155    4.316    0.000    0.669    0.445 
   .AEDS1             0.783    0.166    4.708    0.000    0.783    0.640 
   .AEDS2             0.462    0.135    3.417    0.001    0.462    0.377 
   .AEDS3             0.649    0.161    4.024    0.000    0.649    0.486 
   .AEDS4            42.155    8.014    5.260    0.000   42.155    0.921 
   .AEDS5             0.308    0.095    3.234    0.001    0.308    0.353 
   .AEDS6             0.862    0.186    4.634    0.000    0.862    0.604 
    Effcncy_ttrbts    0.202       NA                      0.458    0.458 
    Efficincy_bnft    0.349       NA                      0.792    0.792 
    Effcncy_prcptn    0.240       NA                      1.000    1.000 
 
R-Square: 
                   Estimate 
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    AIDS3             0.324 
    AIDS4             0.159 
    AIDS5             0.334 
    AIDS6             0.511 
    AIDS7             0.185 
    AIDS8             0.545 
    AIDS9             0.528 
    AIDS10            0.359 
    AIDS11            0.645 
    AIDS12            0.555 
    AEDS1             0.360 
    AEDS2             0.623 
    AEDS3             0.514 
    AEDS4             0.079 
    AEDS5             0.647 
    AEDS6             0.396 
    Effcncy_ttrbts    0.542 
    Efficincy_bnft    0.208 
> # fit indices 
> fit.indices <- c("chisq", "df", "cfi", "rmsea", "srmr", "mfi") 
> fitMeasures(trait.fit1, fit.indices) 
  chisq      df     cfi   rmsea    srmr     mfi  
135.555 102.000   0.896   0.076   0.097   0.745  
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Appendix 5B: Questionnaire used for consumer survey 
Efficiency studies on the Electricity Distribution Sector of West Africa 
Political Economy Analyses: efficiency of the electricity distribution sector of West Africa. 
Hello, my name is Richard Oduro, a postgraduate researcher carrying out a research on the 
efficiency of the electricity distribution sector of West Africa. This research is a major requirement 
for the award of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree at the University of Surrey, UK. Please answer 
all the questions to the best of your ability. I can guarantee in no uncertain terms that the 
information you will provide will be anonymised, handled in confidence – and used unreservedly, for 
its intended purpose. Filling the questionnaire will take about 20 minutes of your time. If you have 
any difficulty in the process of responding to the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to ask. Thank 
you.   
 
Email: r.oduro@surrey.ac.uk 
Top of Form 
Do you have an idea on the major changes or reforms in the electricity distribution sector of your 
country? 
1. Do you have an idea on the major changes or reforms in the electricity distribution sector of your 
country? 
Yes 
No 
Do you understand the role of reforms on efficiency, affordability and accessibility of electric power? 
2. Do you understand the role of reforms on efficiency, affordability and accessibility of electric 
power? 
Yes 
No 
What is your perception on the efforts made through reforms for achieving an efficient distribution 
sector? 
3. What is your perception on the efforts made through reforms for achieving an efficient 
distribution sector? 
Low pace 
Normal pace 
Fast pace 
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No opinion 
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Strongly disagree Disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree Agree Strongly agree 
High Voltage 
is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency  
High Voltage is 
a major cause of 
inefficiency  Strongly 
disagree 
High Voltage is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency  Disagree 
High Voltage is 
a major cause of 
inefficiency  Neither 
agree nor disagree 
High Voltage 
is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency  Agree 
High Voltage is 
a major cause of 
inefficiency  Strongly 
agree 
Inadequate 
supply of 
power is a 
major cause 
of 
inefficiency  
Inadequate 
supply of power is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency  Strongly 
disagree 
Inadequate 
supply of power is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency  Disagree 
Inadequate 
supply of power is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency  Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Inadequate 
supply of power is 
a major cause of 
inefficiency  Agree 
Inadequate 
supply of power is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency  Strongly 
agree 
Irregular 
Meter 
reading is a 
major cause 
of 
inefficiency 
Irregular Meter 
reading is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Irregular Meter 
reading is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Irregular Meter 
reading is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Irregular 
Meter reading is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Irregular Meter 
reading is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Heavy 
electricity 
bills is a 
major cause 
of 
inefficiency 
Heavy 
electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Heavy electricity 
bills is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Heavy 
electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Heavy 
electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Heavy 
electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Unfenced 
transformers 
is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency 
Unfenced 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Unfenced 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Unfenced 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Unfenced 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Unfenced 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Defective 
connections 
is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency 
Defective 
connections is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Defective 
connections is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Defective 
connections is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Defective 
connections is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Defective 
connections is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Unusual 
power cut is 
a major 
cause of 
inefficiency 
Unusual power 
cut is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Unusual power 
cut is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Unusual power 
cut is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Unusual 
power cut is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Unusual power 
cut is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Improper 
working of 
transformers 
is a major 
Improper 
working of 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
Improper 
working of 
transformers is a 
Improper 
working of 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
Improper 
working of 
transformers is a 
Improper 
working of 
transformers is a 
major cause of 
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What would be one outstanding thing that could cause a huge transformation with regards to 
efficiency in the distribution system? 
4. What would be one outstanding thing that could cause a huge transformation with regards to 
efficiency in the distribution system? 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your perception of 
the attributes of an inefficient distribution system – using a scale of 1 to 5, where; 1 = strongly 
disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree. 
cause of 
inefficiency 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
major cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Loose 
connection 
in the main 
wire is a 
major cause 
of 
inefficiency 
Loose 
connection in the 
main wire is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Loose 
connection in the 
main wire is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Loose 
connection in the 
main wire is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Loose 
connection in the 
main wire is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Loose 
connection in the 
main wire is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Poor 
customer 
service by 
staff is a 
major cause 
of 
inefficiency 
Poor customer 
service by staff is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Poor customer 
service by staff is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Poor customer 
service by staff is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Poor 
customer service 
by staff is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Poor customer 
service by staff is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Illegal 
connections 
by bad 
customers is 
a major 
cause of 
inefficiency 
Illegal 
connections by bad 
customers is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Illegal 
connections by bad 
customers is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Illegal 
connections by bad 
customers is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Illegal 
connections by 
bad customers is 
a major cause of 
inefficiency Agree 
Illegal 
connections by bad 
customers is a major 
cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
Non-
payment of 
electricity 
bills is a 
major cause 
of 
inefficiency 
Non-payment 
of electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
disagree 
Non-payment of 
electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Disagree 
Non-payment 
of electricity bills is 
a major cause of 
inefficiency Neither 
agree nor disagree 
Non-payment 
of electricity bills 
is a major cause 
of 
inefficiency Agree 
Non-payment 
of electricity bills is a 
major cause of 
inefficiency Strongly 
agree 
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5. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your perception of 
the attributes of an inefficient distribution system – using a scale of 1 to 5, where; 1 = strongly 
disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree. 
What do you do when you are confronted with any of the problems in question 5? 
 
 
 
6. What do you do when you are confronted with any of the problems in question 5? 
I report to the Electricity Distribution Company 
I don’t know what to do 
I don’t bother reporting 
I report to the regulatory institutions overseeing the electricity distribution industry 
Other (please specify)
 
Have you ever made an official complaint to the EDC (Electricity Distribution Company)or any 
regulatory body overseeing the EDC? 
7. Have you ever made an official complaint to the EDC (Electricity Distribution Company) or any 
regulatory body overseeing the EDC? 
Yes (please go to the next question) 
No (please go to question 10) 
How many times have you sent complaints regarding any of the problems in Q5? 
8. How many times have you sent complaints regarding any of the problems in Q5? 
Once 
More than once 
Several 
Never 
Was your problem solved? 
9. Was your problem solved? 
Yes on time 
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No 
Yes but not on time 
What have you done differently in managing your energy use after the increase in electricity prices? 
10. What have you done differently in managing your energy use after the increase in electricity 
prices? 
Reduced consumption 
Increased consumption 
wholly or partly Produce and consume electric power 
Nothing 
Changed jobs or line of business to increase income 
Changed electric appliances or wiring to more efficient ones 
Is there a single intervention you consider that could lead to an improved and efficient electricity 
distribution sector; such as a particular operational tool or policy? (Please give details) 
11. Is there a single intervention you consider that could lead to an improved and efficient electricity 
distribution sector; such as a particular operational tool or policy? (Please give details) 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your perception of 
the benefits of an efficient distribution system – using a scale of 1 to 5, where; 1 = strongly disagree; 
2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree 
  
Strongly disagree Disagree 
Neither disagree nor 
agree Agree Strongly agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution 
sector is 
lower cost of 
power to 
consumers  
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
lower cost of power to 
consumers  Strongly 
disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
lower cost of power to 
consumers  Disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient distribution 
sector is lower cost of 
power to 
consumers  Neither 
disagree nor agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution sector 
is lower cost of 
power to 
consumers  Agree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
lower cost of power to 
consumers  Strongly 
agree 
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12. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your perception 
of the benefits of an efficient distribution system – using a scale of 1 to 5, where; 1 = strongly 
disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree 
Aside the above what do you think are the benefits of an efficient electricity distribution sector 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution 
sector is 
reliable 
energy source 
to the 
industrial and 
commercial 
sectors  
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
reliable energy source 
to the industrial and 
commercial 
sectors  Strongly 
disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
reliable energy source 
to the industrial and 
commercial 
sectors  Disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient distribution 
sector is reliable 
energy source to the 
industrial and 
commercial 
sectors  Neither 
disagree nor agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution sector 
is reliable energy 
source to the 
industrial and 
commercial 
sectors  Agree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
reliable energy source 
to the industrial and 
commercial 
sectors  Strongly 
agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution 
sector is more 
financial 
stability of 
Private Power 
Producers or 
Power 
Producers in 
general 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
more financial 
stability of Private 
Power Producers or 
Power Producers in 
general Strongly 
disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
more financial stability 
of Private Power 
Producers or Power 
Producers in 
general Disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient distribution 
sector is more 
financial stability of 
Private Power 
Producers or Power 
Producers in 
general Neither 
disagree nor agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution sector 
is more financial 
stability of Private 
Power Producers or 
Power Producers in 
general Agree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
more financial 
stability of Private 
Power Producers or 
Power Producers in 
general Strongly agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution 
sector is more 
financial 
stability 
of Electricity 
Distribution 
Companies. 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
more financial 
stability of Electricity 
Distribution 
Companies. Strongly 
disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
more financial stability 
of Electricity 
Distribution 
Companies. Disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient distribution 
sector is more 
financial stability 
of Electricity 
Distribution 
Companies. Neither 
disagree nor agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution sector 
is more financial 
stability 
of Electricity 
Distribution 
Companies. Agree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
more financial 
stability of Electricity 
Distribution 
Companies. Strongly 
agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution 
sector is less 
corruption 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
less 
corruption Strongly 
disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
less 
corruption Disagree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient distribution 
sector is less 
corruption Neither 
disagree nor agree 
One of the 
benefits of an 
efficient 
distribution sector 
is less 
corruption Agree 
One of the 
benefits of an efficient 
distribution sector is 
less 
corruption Strongly 
agree 
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13. Aside the above what do you think are the benefits of an efficient electricity distribution sector 
 
The main problem in the efficient management of EDCs in your country is? 
 
14. The main problem in the efficient management of EDCs in your country is? 
Insufficient skilled labour to implement efficiency reforms 
Insufficient transformers, sub-stations and less durable cables 
Technical constraints that aid in inefficiency. (e.g. systems are incompatible) 
Financial inefficiency (e.g. debt management problems) 
Corrupt operational workers 
Corrupt managerial staff 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your perception of 
the political factors that affect the efficiency of the distribution system using a scale of 1 to 5, where; 
1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree 
15. Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements concerning your perception 
of the political factors that affect the efficiency of the distribution system using a scale of 1 to 5, 
where; 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly 
agree 
  
Strongly disagree Disagree 
Neither disagree 
nor agree Agree Strongly agree 
The process of 
implementing 
the efficiency 
reforms has 
been frustrated 
by the political 
interests at the 
local level.  
The process 
of implementing 
the efficiency 
reforms has been 
frustrated by the 
political interests 
at the local 
level.  Strongly 
disagree 
The process of 
implementing the 
efficiency reforms 
has been 
frustrated by the 
political interests 
at the local 
level.  Disagree 
The process 
of implementing 
the efficiency 
reforms has been 
frustrated by the 
political interests 
at the local 
level.  Neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
The process 
of implementing 
the efficiency 
reforms has 
been frustrated 
by the political 
interests at the 
local 
level.  Agree 
The process 
of implementing 
the efficiency 
reforms has been 
frustrated by the 
political interests 
at the local 
level.  Strongly 
agree 
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Strongly disagree Disagree 
Neither disagree 
nor agree Agree Strongly agree 
Many powerful 
people benefit 
more from the 
current 
distribution 
system than 
they would 
from a more 
efficient 
electricity 
distribution 
sector.  
Many 
powerful people 
benefit more from 
the current 
distribution 
system than they 
would from a 
more efficient 
electricity 
distribution 
sector.  Strongly 
disagree 
Many 
powerful people 
benefit more from 
the current 
distribution system 
than they would 
from a more 
efficient electricity 
distribution 
sector.  Disagree 
Many 
powerful people 
benefit more from 
the current 
distribution 
system than they 
would from a 
more efficient 
electricity 
distribution 
sector.  Neither 
disagree nor 
agree 
Many 
powerful people 
benefit more 
from the 
current 
distribution 
system than 
they would 
from a more 
efficient 
electricity 
distribution 
sector.  Agree 
Many 
powerful people 
benefit more from 
the current 
distribution 
system than they 
would from a 
more efficient 
electricity 
distribution 
sector.  Strongly 
agree 
Which organisations or individuals, not currently involved in the electricity distribution sector would 
be most influential if they could be convinced to join a coalition to promote efficiency? 
16. Which organisations or individuals, not currently involved in the electricity distribution sector 
would be most influential if they could be convinced to join a coalition to promote efficiency? 
 
Which organisations or individuals, if any, are most keen to oppose efficiency reforms in electricity 
distribution? 
17. Which organisations or individuals, if any, are most keen to oppose efficiency reforms in 
electricity distribution? 
 
Why do you think these organisations or individuals oppose efficiency reforms? 
18. Why do you think these organisations or individuals oppose efficiency reforms? 
 
What organisations are most important in providing "effective scrutiny" of the process of efficient 
distribution of electricity to ensure best practice? 
19. What organisations are most important in providing "effective scrutiny" of the process of 
efficient distribution of electricity to ensure best practice? 
The Press 
The Parliament 
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Civil Society 
Auditors 
International financial institutions 
Regulators 
Other (please specify)
 
Please give suggestions relating to how the electricity distribution sector can become more efficient 
in your country. Also kindly say whether your EDC should be privatised or not with reasons. 
20. Please give suggestions relating to how the electricity distribution sector can become more 
efficient in your country. Also kindly say whether your EDC should be privatised or not with reasons. 
 
Kindly provide us with the name of the Electricity Distribution Company serving you. 
21. Kindly provide us with the name of the Electricity Distribution Company serving you. 
 
Please provide your contacts below if you care for an interview. Thank you very much. 
22. Please provide your contacts below if you care for an interview. Thank you very much. 
 
Done 
 
